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DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT

1.

Upon the death of the President, the Vice President shall
become President. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; U.S.
Const. amend. XXV, § 1. See Appendices 1 & 3.

2.

The Vice President should take the oath for the Office of
President prescribed by the U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1,
cl. 7, as follows:
"I [, Albert Gore, Jr.,] do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will faithfully execute the Off ice of President of
the United States, and will to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States."
Appendix 2.

•

3.

The oath may be administered by any "individual authorized
by local law to administer oaths in the State, District, or
territory or possession of the United States where the oath
is administered." 5 u.s.c. § 2903(c). See Appendix 6. If
the Vice President is away from the country, he simply can
swear the oath in the presence of a witness.

4.

The Secretary of the Treasury immediately should direct the
Secret Service to provide protection to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and other appropriate individuals,
pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3056(a).

5.

At any time after he takes the oath of Office, President
Gore may select and nominate a Vice President who shall take
off ice upon confirmation by a majority of both Houses of
Congress. U.S. Const. amend. XXV, § 2 •

~"
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•
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TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
Threshold Considerations
At any time that the President is, or is about to become,
temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
off ice, consideration must be given to whether or not it is
prudent or necessary to transfer temporarily full Presidential
authority to the Vice President, pursuant to the 25th Amendment.
See Appendix 3. This may be accomplished in two ways:
(1) Pursuant to Section 3 of the 25th Amendment, the
President voluntarily may transfer authority. Procedures
for such a transfer are outlined at Tab c of this document.
(2) Pursuant to Section 4 of the 25th Amendment, the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet may transfer
authority without the President's consent or even over his
objections. Procedures for such a transfer are outlined at
Tab D of this document.
The first questions that must be asked in any situation where use
of the 25th Amendment is contemplated are as follows:

•

(1) Is the President conscious and capable of understanding
and giving his assent to the temporary transfer of authority
to the Vice President;
(2) Is there sufficient time before the President becomes
unconscious or unable to understand -- ~' before he
undergoes general anesthesia -- to obtain the President's
signature or assent to a written declaration of inability as
outlined at Tab C of this Document?
If the answer to either of these questions is "no," Section 3 may
not be used. Consideration should turn immediately to the use of
Section 4.
If the answer to both of the above questions is "yes" such that
Section 3 may be used, a Section 3 transfer of authority is much
preferable to a Section 4 transfer. A Section 3 transfer of
executive power is a voluntary act by the President that can be
countermanded immediately by the President; therefore, it is less
legally ambiguous than the Section 4 procedure to restore power
to the President.

•

The decision whether or not to invoke the provisions of the 25th
Amendment can, of course, only be made in the context of the
circumstances that exist at the time that the President becomes,
or is anticipated to become, temporarily disabled. However,
certain generalizations can be made and, if time permits, the
following paragraphs should be considered:

A.
Delegation of Authority. The question of whether or not the
procedures of the 25th Amendment should be invoked may well be
answered by examining the non-delegable powers and duties of the
President. Constitutionally and by statute the President has
broad authority to delegate functions vested in him by law.
3 u.s.c. § 301. See Appendix 5. Use of the 25th Amendment
procedures might be avoided by delegation of Presidential
authority when it is anticipated -- ~., in the case of elective
surgery -- that the President would be unable to discharge the
duties of his office for a relatively short period of time. On
the other hand, the Constitution and certain statutes impose
limits on the President's power to confer his authority on
subordinate officials. If, during a period of Presidential
inability to discharge the duties of his off ice, an action must
be taken that only can be taken by the President or the Acting
President, then obviously one of the 25th Amendment procedures
must be invoked. The non-delegable functions of the President
are:
1.
The power to nominate and appoint the officers of the
United States to the extent provided in Article II, § 2,
cl. 2 of the Constitution.
2.
The power to approve or return legislation pursuant to
Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and the power
to call Congress into special session or to adjourn it
according to Art. II, § 3.
The power to make treaties by and with the advice and
3.
consent of the Senate. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
(It should be
noted, however, that the power to negotiate treaties and the
power to enter into Executive agreements may be delegated.
7 Op. A.G. 443 (1853).)
4.

The power to grant pardons.

5.
The power to remove purely Executive Presidential
appointees.
6.
The power to issue Executive orders and proclamations.
(The President can, however, delegate the power to issue
many orders which cover substantially the same subject
matter as Executive orders and proclamations as long as they
are not so labeled.)
7.
The powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces as provided in Art. II, § 2, cl. 1 of the
Constitution. Although the President cannot delegate his
ultimate Constitutional responsibilities as Commander-inChief, he may make arrangements with his civilian and
military subordinates to ensure that the chain of command
will function swiftly and effectively in time of crises.
2
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B.
Section 3 vs. Section 4. Of the two 25th Amendment
procedures by which the Vice President temporarily can assume the
powers and duties of the Off ice of President, the Section 3
procedure is eminently preferable to the Section 4 procedure.
Not only would the transfer of authority to the Vice President be
justly perceived as a voluntary and conscious decision by the
President, but the mechanism by which the President reassumes his
authority under Section 3 is very simple.
If the Section 4 procedure is invoked, the President reassumes
his powers and duties upon transmittal of his written declaration
that no inability continues to exist unless the Vice President
and a majority of the Cabinet transmit, within four days, their
written declaration to the contrary. The answer to the question
of who governs during this four-day period is uncertain, though
the more persuasive legal arguments would leave authority in the
Vice President until the four-day period had elapsed. See
discussion in Appendix 14 at p. 5 and Appendix 15 at p. 4.

•

Accordingly, any time that it is anticipated that the President
will undergo a period of general anesthesia, during which time a
decision may have to be made which only can be made by the
President, or the Vice President as Acting President, serious
consideration should be given to the use of Section 3 of the 25th
Amendment •

c.

Inability to Govern. Both Section 3 and Section 4 of the
25th Amendment involve a determination that the President is
"unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." The
legislative history of the 25th Amendment clearly envisions that
this inability to govern might stem from either physical or
mental disabilities of the President. The question arises,
however, as to whether the incapacity of the President must
necessarily be physical or mental or can it result from outside
events. For example, what if the President is kidnapped, known
to be alive, but held incommunicado? Or what if the President is
simply missing as a result of an Air Force One mishap? The
legislative history gives no guidance in such situations.
Even in situations less farfetched, once one gets beyond a
comatose state, or perhaps massive paralysis, defining inability
might prove to be extremely difficult and likely to depend, to a
large extent, on the surrounding circumstances. A discussion of
prior Presidential disabilities may be found at Appendix 13.
Perhaps the best guidance, however, can be found in the House
Report which accompanied the 25th Amendment:

•

The final success of any constitutional arrangement to
secure continuity in cases of inability must depend upon
public opinion with a possession of a sense of
"Constitutional morality." Without such a feeling of
responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
3

usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will
provide a complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases
in which most of the parties are rogues and in which no
popular sense of Constitutional propriety exists. It seems
necessary that an attitude be adopted that presumes we shall
always be dealing with "reasonable men" at the highest
governmental level.
See Appendix 17 at p. 13.

•

D.
Transfer of Authority on July 13. 1985. On July 13, 1985,
as former President Ronald w. Reagan was about to go under
general anesthesia in connection with surgery to remove a portion
of his large intestine, he signed the attached letters. The
letters were drafted in such a fashion as to preserve to former
President Reagan and future Presidents maximum flexibility in
responding to possible brief periods of inability. As noted, the
legislative history of the 25th Amendment does not provide a
definitive answer to the question whether the drafters intended
it to apply to brief periods of inability. Indeed, most of the
legislative history discussed considerably more extended examples
of Presidential inability, such as President Wilson's illness.
The letters signed by then President Reagan indicate his belief
that the 25th Amendment was not intended to cover brief periods
of inability of the sort encountered on July 13, 1985, in the
sense that a transfer of authority was not required or clearly
contemplated by the drafters of the Amendment.
The procedures of Section 3 are available at the complete
discretion of the President. While a transfer of authority may
not have been required or clearly contemplated by the drafters in
instances such as former President Reagan's surgery, his Counsel
determined that a transfer of authority was appropriate to
eliminate any doubts concerning the continuation of the powers of
the Presidency. There was some criticism of this procedure in
the media, with some critics contending that Section 3 clearly
was applicable and should have been clearly invoked. As noted,
however, because it is unclear that Section 3 was intended to
cover the July 13 situation (surgery), and a simple statement
invoking the Amendment under such circumstances would have
created a precedent that might have presented problems in the
future when Presidents were confronted with similar inabilities
but vastly different circumstances, Reagan's Administration
elected to follow the above-described procedure. This procedure
ensured that there was no lapse in the continuity of Presidential
authority, with no doubt as to who was "in charge," while not
binding future Presidents in any way. Some seven hours after
former President Reagan transferred authority, he signed the
attached letters reassuming the powers and duties of the Off ice.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1985

Dear Mr. Speaker:
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I
will be briefly and temporarily incapable of
discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of
the Office of the President of the United States.
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3
of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the
uncertainties of its application to such brief and •
temporary periods of incapacity.
I do not believe
that the drafters of this Amendment intended its
application to situations such as the instant one.
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing
arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and
not -intending to set a precedent binding anyone
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have
determined and it is my intention and direction that
Vice President George Bush shall discharge those
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I
determine that I am able to resume the discharge of
the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office.
May God bless this Nation and us all,
s0rely,

~~~
The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
20515

•

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1985

Dear Mr. President:
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I
will be briefly and temporarily incapable of
discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of
the Office of the President of the United States.
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3
of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the
uncertainties of its application to such brief and •
temporary periods of incapacity.
I do not believe
that the drafters of this Amendment intended its
application to situations such as the instant one.

•

Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing
arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and
not intending to set a precedent binding anyone
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have
determined and it is my intention and direction that
Vice President George Bush shall discharge those
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I
determine that I am able to resume the discharge of
the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office.
May God bless this Nation and us all,

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
'WASHINGTON

July 13 11 1985

Dear Mr. Speaker:
Following up on my letter to you of this
date 11 please be advised I am able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional powers
and duties of the Office of the President of
the United States.
I have informed the Vice
President of my determination and my
resumption of those powers and duties.

Since<rz~~

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

.·•

WASHINOTON

July 13, 1985

Dear Mr. President:
Following up on my letter to you of this
date, please be advised I am able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional powers
and duties of the Office of the President of
the United States.
I have informed the Vice
President of my determination and my
resumpiion of those pow~rs and duties.

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
20510

~
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TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
SECTION 3 PROCEDURE
The Vice President Becomes Acting President Pursuant
to the United States Constitution, Amendment XXV. § 3

If the President is willing and able to do so, he may provide for
the temporary assumption of the powers and duties of his off ice
by the Vice President by "transmit[ting] to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office • • • . "
Appendix 3.
The following procedure should be used:
(1) Written Declaration. The President's declaration
of disability must be written. If possible, the
letters should be typed on Presidential stationery. If
circumstances demand, however, the letters may be handwritten on any type of paper.
(2) Form. The written declaration should consist of
two short letters framed in the Constitutional
terminology and addressed, respectively, to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House. Appropriate letters are attached at
Appendix 7.
(3) Signature. The letters should be signed
personally by the President if possible, but a reliable
manifestation of his understanding and assent would
suffice. In cases of any doubt regarding his capacity
to understand and assent, the procedure under Section 4
of the 25th Amendment should be used.
(4) Transmittal. Transmittal of the letters to the
President pro tempore and the Speaker is the operative
event to effect the transfer of authority to the Vice
President. Transfer of authority to the Vice President
takes effect immediately when the letters are sent (or
placed in the hands of a messenger); it is not delayed
until the letters are received by the addressees.
Accordingly, there is no need to have the President pro
tempore and the Speaker stand ready, at the White House
or elsewhere, to receive the letters.
See Appendix 12 at p. 3, n. 4.
Documentation of when, where and to whom the letters
are sent and receipt of delivery would be prudent.

Transmittal should be made not only to the offices of
the addressees, but also to each personally.
(5) Oath. The Vice President is not required to take
a new oath. See Appendix 12 at p.l, n. 1.
(6)
Status of the Vice President. Pursuant to the
above procedure, the Vice President assumes all the
Constitutional and statutory powers and duties of the
President. He does not, however, become President.
Instead, he becomes "Acting President" and should use
that designation for all official purposes. In
addition, he would continue to exercise the duties of
Vice President while he serves as Acting President,
although he would apparently lose his title as
President of the Senate. See Appendix 12 at p.l, n.1;
and p.2 at n. 2.

2
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TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
SECTION 4 PROCEDURE
The Vice President Becomes Acting President Pursuant
to the United States Constitution. Amendment XXV. § 4

If the President is unable or unwilling to transmit a declaration
of his inability to perform his duties, the Vice President and "a
majority of the principal officers of the executive departments
• . • [may] transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office • • . " Appendix 3. In such an event,
the Vice President immediately shall assume the powers and duties
of the off ice as Acting President.
The following procedure should be used:
(1) Consensus of the Cabinet. The Vice President and
a "majority of the principal officers of the executive
departments of such other body as Congress may by law
provide" must agree that the President is unable to
discharge his duties. Congress has not designated any
"other body" to exercise this authority and the
legislative history indicates that the term "principal
officers of the executive departments" is intended to
mean the Cabinet. Appendix 12 at p.2.
"The Cabinet" traditionally consists of the heads of
the fourteen executive departments; however, to avoid
any doubt regarding the sufficiency of any given
declaration, it would be best to obtain the assent of
all executive branch officials with Cabinet rank.
Unanimity would be desirable, but if time is of the
essence, a simple majority is all that is required.
There is ambiguity as to whether or not "acting" heads
of Cabinet departments should participate in the
decision. Most of the legislative history and a
leading commentator, however, suggest that "acting"
heads should participate. See Appendix 12 at p.2, n.
3, and Appendix 16 at p.5.
(2) Written Declaration. The declaration of the
President's disability by the Vice President and
Cabinet must be written. A single declaration would be
preferable, but not necessary. If circumstances
require, counterpart declarations would be an adequate
alternative. See Appendix 12 at p.3, n. 4.

I
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(3)
Form. The written declaration should consist of
two short letters framed in the Constitutional language
and addressed to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House. Appropriate
letters are attached at Appendix 9.
(4)
Signatures. The letters need not be personally
signed by the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet. Clearly, however, their assent to the
declaration must be established in a reliable fashion
and they must direct that their names be added to the
letters. See Appendix 12 at p.3, n. 4. Moreover, as
discussed in paragraph 2 above, the Vice President and
Cabinet heads may send separate letters if necessary.
(5) Transmittal. Transmittal of the letters to the
President pro tempore and the Speaker is the operative
event to effect the transfer of authority to the Vice
President. Transfer of authority to the Vice President
takes effect immediately when the letters are sent (or
placed in a messenger's hands); it is not delayed until
the letters are received by the addressees. Accordingly, there is no need to have the President pro
tempore and Speaker to stand ready, at the White House
or elsewhere, to receive the letters .

•

Documentation of when, where and to whom the letters
are sent and receipt of delivery would be prudent.
This would be especially true if separate letters are
sent by the Vice President and the Cabinet members. If
separate letters are sent, transfer of authority to the
Vice President would not take effect until the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet had transmitted
letters. See Appendix 12 at p.3, n. 4.
In any event, letters should be sent not only to the
offices of the addressees, but also to each personally.
(6) Oath. The Vice President is not required to take
a new oath. See Appendix 12 at p.l, n. 1.
(7) Status of the Vice President. Pursuant to the
above procedure, the Vice President assumes all the
Constitutional and statutory powers and duties of the
President. He does not, however, become President.
Instead, he becomes "Acting President" and should use
that designation for all official purposes. In
addition, he would continue to exercise the duties of
Vice President while he serves as Acting President,
although he would lose his title as President of the
Senate. Appendix 12 at p.l, n. 1; and p.2 at n. 2.
2
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TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
Resumption of Authority by the President
Section 3. If the President temporarily transfers his authority
to the Vice President pursuant to Section 3 of the 25th
Amendment, he resumes his authority by transmitting, to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, his written declaration that he again is able
to discharge the powers and duties of his off ice. The procedure
for transmitting this written declaration would be the same as
for the initial transfer of authority to the Vice President as
discussed at Tab C of this document. Appropriate letters are
attached at Appendix 8.
As with the initial transfer of authority, transmittal of the
President's declaration is the operative event, and the President
resumes his full powers and duties immediately upon transmittal.
Section 4. In order to resume the full powers and duties of his
off ice after the Vice President has become Acting President
pursuant to Section 4 of the 25th Amendment, the President again
must transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that no inability continues to exist. Again, this written
declaration must be in writing and personally signed by the
President. Appropriate letters are attached at Appendix 10.
Unlike the other written declarations, however, it is unclear
under Section 4 whether or not transmittal alone is sufficient to
restore the full authority of the Presidency in the President.
See discussions in Appendix 14 at p.5 and Appendix 15 at p.4.
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment states that the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his off ice "unless" the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet "transmit within four
days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office." such an action by the Vice President and a majority of
the Cabinet would trigger a 21-day (somewhat longer if Congress
is not in session) period during which Congress can, by a twothirds vote, uphold the Vice President and Cabinet. Should such
Congressional action not be forthcoming, the President then would
resume his office.
Putting aside the prospect of a disagreement between the
President and the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet as
to the President's ability to govern, a situation which also
3
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would raise difficult questions, 1 the question remains as to who
governs during the four-day period following the President's
declaration that he again is able to perform the duties of his
office. One could read the constitutional language to provide
either for an immediate but defeasible resumption of authority by
the President or to provide for resumption of authority only
after the four-day period has elapsed. The legislative history
tends to support the latter interpretation. Even so, it would be
very difficult to avoid projecting a sense of uncertainty to the
American public and foreign governments not familiar with the
nuances of the 25th Amendment should the Vice President continue
to act as President after the President has declared himself able
to govern.
The uncertainty could be diffused by having the Vice President
and, if possible, an unanimous Cabinet declare that they have no
intention of challenging the President's declaration, but that
the Vice President will continue as Acting President pursuant to
the Constitution, although he will make no major decisions
without first obtaining the approval of the President. Such a
statement would have no force in law since clearly the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet could challenge the
President's declaration any time during the four-day period, and
there is no requirement that the Acting President consult in any
way with the President, though obviously in such a situation the
perception of harmony would be invaluable.

1

Discussion of procedural problems that would be
encountered in such a situation may be found in the memoranda
attached at Appendices 12, 14 and 16.
4
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PEATH OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT

.,

'
I

1.

Upon the deaths of both the President and the Vice
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
"act as President." U.S. Const. art. II § 1, cl. 5;
3 u.s.c. § 19(a) (1). See Appendices 1 & 4.

2.

The Speaker should take the following oath:
"I[, Thomas s. Foley,] do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith allegiance to the
same; that I take this obligation freely, without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I
will well and faithfully discharge the duties or the
office on which I am about to enter. So help my God."
See Appendix 6.

3.

The oath may be administered by any "individual authorized
by local law to administer oaths in the State, District, or
territory or possession of the United states where the oath
is administered." 5 u.s.c. § 2903(c). See Appendix 6. If
the Speaker is away from the country, he simply can swear
the oath in the presence of a witness.

4.

The taking of the above oath by the Speaker will be held to
constitute his resignation as Speaker and as a member of
Congress, which is a prerequisite to his assuming the powers
and duties of the office of President. 3 u.s.c. § 19(a) (1)
&

(d)(3).

5.

The Speaker does not become President; instead, he becomes
~Acting President" for the remainder of the current
Presidential term. 3 u.s.c. § 19.

6.

The Speaker, as Acting President, will be compensated at the
rate of pay provided by law for the President 3 u.s.c.
§ 19(f).

7.

If, upon the deaths of both the President and the Vice
President, there is no Speaker of the House, the Acting
President would be the President pro tempore of the senate
[Robert c. Byrd] or the appropriate Cabinet officer as
provided by 3 u.s.c. § 19(b) & (c).

•
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VARIOUS OTHER SUCCESSION QUESTIONS
Other possible situations in which Presidential succession
questions would arise include the following:
1.

Temporary disability of both the President
and the Vice President simultaneously;

2.

Temporary disability of the President and
death of the Vice President;

3.

Death of the President and temporary
disability of the Vice President;

4. , Temporary disability of the President and
subsequent disability of the Acting
President;
5.

Temporary disability of the President and
subsequent death of the Acting President.

All five situations raise the same basic question: how to
proceed if both the President and the Vice President are unable
to function. - The answer to this question goes beyond the scope
of the 25th Amendment.
Article 2, § 1, cl. 5 of the Constitution states that "Congress
may by Law, provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation
or Inability, both of the President and the Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President . . • "
Pursuant to this section of the Constitution, Congress, in 1948,
passed the Succession to the Presidency Act, codified at 3 u.s.c.
§ 19, which provides that "[i]f, by reason of . • . inability
. . . there is neither a President nor Vice President to
discharge the powers and duties of the off ice of President, then
the Speaker of the House shall • . • act as President . . • until
the removal of the disability of one of such individuals."
The answer to the question of who would govern in each of the
situations listed above would appear to be, therefore, that the
Speaker of the House would "act as President." There are serious
difficulties, however, with this seemingly simple answer in that
the Act articulates no procedures for the determination of
"inability".
In the first two situations enumerated above, a determination of
Presidential inability to govern would clearly be necessary
before the Speaker could act as President. Whatever procedure is
used to make this determination, since the Vice President by
reason of his own inability or death could not participate in the
decision, the Act necessarily contemplates a determination of
Presidential inability that is at odds with the 25th Amendment
procedure.

The situations listed at 3, 4 and 5 above are less problematic
since the determination of Presidential inability would have been
made pursuant to the 25th Amendment, or no such determination
would be necessary because the President is dead. Nevertheless,
a determination of Vice Presidential inability would be
necessary, and again, the Succession to the Presidency Act gives
absolutely no guidance as to what procedure should be used to
determine Vice Presidential inability.
In the third situation, another question arises pertaining to the
status of the disabled Vice President after the death of the
President. If the Vice President is unable to recite and
understand the oath, does he nevertheless become President by
operation of law?
Article II, § 1, cl. 5 of the Constitution states that upon the
death of the President, the powers and duties of his office
"shall devolve" upon the Vice President. Section 1 of the 25th
Amendment states that, upon the death of President, the Vice
President "shall become President." On the other hand, Article
II, § 1, cl. 7 of the Constitution states that the President must
take the oath prescribed therein before "he enters on the
Execution of his Office."
An argument can be made, therefore, that the Vice President does
become President, but until he takes the oath he cannot exercise
Presidential authority. For succession purposes, however, this
would mean that in the situation listed at 3 above, determination
of Presidential disability would be necessary and would,
therefore, raise the same possibilities of conflict with the 25th
Amendment as would situations 1 and 2.
Only in the last situation enumerated above -- death of the Vice
President after he had become Acting President pursuant to the
25th Amendment -- can the Act be implemented with any degree of
certainty. In that situation, the Speaker of the House would
become Acting President pursuant to the procedures outlined at
Tab F of this document.
As to the first four situations, however, no guidance can be
given with any legal certainty. The goal in all four situations
would be to have the Speaker act as President. One way in which
this goal might be obtained would be to implement procedures
which parallel the 25th Amendment. The determination of
Presidential and Vice Presidential inability should be made by
the Speaker of the House and the Cabinet. They should then
transmit their written declaration of inability to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Majority Leader, and perhaps
Minority Leader, of the House. That having been done, the
Speaker would become Acting President pursuant to the procedures
in 3 u.s.c. § 19.
2
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Article II, section 1, clause 5:

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties
of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and
the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer
shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected .

•
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•

•

•

'
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Art. II, section 1, clause 7:

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:-"! do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States."
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•

•
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Amendment XXV:

Section I. In case of the removal of the President from office or
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become Presi.
dent.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall
take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre.
sentatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either
the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa·
tives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa·
tives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume
the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit
within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days
after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to
discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President
shall resume the powers and duties of his office .

•

'·

•

3

u.s.c.

§ 19:

(a)(I) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and
as Representative in Congress, act as President.
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation,
removal from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under
this subsection.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is
to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President,
there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then
the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as
President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.

(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection
(b) of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then
current Presidential term, except that(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded
in whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and the
Vice-President-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President
or Vice-President qualifies; and
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded
in whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President,
then he shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such
individuals.

•

(d) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability,
or failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President
under subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States
who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as
President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary
of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education. *
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue
so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not
after a qualified and prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the
removal of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in
paragraph (1) of this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an
individual higher on such list shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as
President.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.
Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death,
resignation, removal from office, inability, or failur~ to qualify, of the
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of
President devolve upon them.
(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this
section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the
case of the President.

*

Pursuant to Pub.L. 100-S27 (1988) Amendment,
the Secretary of veteran Affairs is concluded
as the last agency head in line authority
for the Office of the President.
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CHAPTER 4-DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS
Sec.
301.
302.
303.

General authorization to delegate functions; publication of delegations.
Scope of delegation of functions.
Definitions.
Historical Note

Chapter added by Act Oct. 31, 1951, c.
655, § 10, 65 Stat. 712.
Similar Provisions;
Repeal;
Saving
Clause. Similar provisions were contained in
former chapter 4, comprising former sections
301 to 303 of this title, which was set out
here but which was not a part of this title.

Former sections 301 to 303 were derived from
Act Aug. 8, 1950, c. 646, §§ l to 3, 64 Stat.
419, and were repealed by section 56(j) of Act
Oct. 31, 1951. Subsec. (l) of section 56
provided that the repeal should not affect any
rights or liabilities existing under such repealed sections on the effective date of such
repeal (Oct. 31, 1951).

§ 301. General authorization to delegate functions; publication
of delegations

•

The President of the United States is authorized to designate and
empower the head of any department or agency in the executive branch, or
any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to perform without approval, ratification, or
other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the
President by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or
authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the approval,
ratification, or other action of the President: Provided, That nothing
contained herein shall relieve the President of his responsibility in office for
the acts of any such head or other official designated by him to perform
such functions. Such designation and authorization shall be in writing,
shall be published in the Federal Register, shall be subject to such terms,
conditions, and limitations as the President may deem advisable, and shall
be revocable at any time by the President in whole or in part.
(Added Oct. 31, 1951, c. 655, § 10, 65 Stat. 712.)
Historical Note
Transrer or Functions. All functions vested by law (including reorganization plan) in
the Bureau of the Budget or the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget were transferred to
the President of the United States by section
101 of 1970 Reorg.Plan No. 2, ell July I,
1970, 35 F.R. 7959, 84 Stat. 2085. Section
102 of 1970 Reorg.Plan. No. 2, redesignated
the Bureau of the Budget as the Office of
Management and Budget and the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget as Director of the

Office of Management and Budget. See Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, set out in
Appendix I to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
Similar Provisions;
Repeal;
Saving
Clause. For similar provisions contained in
prior law, and saving clause in connection
therewith, see note preceding this section.
Legislative History. For legislative history
and purpose of Act Oct. 31, 1951, see 1951
U.S.Code Cong. Service, p. 2578.
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June 5, 1951, 16 F.R. 5385, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 10732, Oct. 10,
1957, 22 F.R. 8135; Ex.Ord. No. 10752, Feb. 12, 1958, 23 F.R. 973
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
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1. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby
designated and empowered to perform the
following-described functions of the President
without the approval, ratification, or other
action of the President:
(a) The authority vested in the President
by section 1 of the act of July 10, 1935, ch.
375, 49 Stat. 477 [see sections 19e to 19n of
Title 16), to appoint members of the National
Park Trust Fund Board.
(b) The authority vested in the President
by section 2059 of the Revised Statutes [section 62 of Title 25) to discontinue any Indian
agency, or transfer the same, from the place
or tribe designated by law to such other place
or tribe as the public service may require.
(c) The authority vested in the President
by section 6 of the act of May 17, 1882, ch.
163, 22 Stat. 88, as amended [section 63 of
Title 25), to consolidate two or more Indian
agencies into one, to consolidate one or more
Indian tribes, and to abolish such agencies as
are thereby rendered unnecessary.
(cf) The authority vested in the President
by the act of March I, 1907, ch. 2285, 34
Stat. 1016 [section 140 of Title 25), to divert
appropriations made for certain purposes to
other uses for the benefit of the several Indian
tribes: Provided, that the Secretary of the
Interior shall make to the Congress reports
required in connection with action taken by
him under this provision.
(e) The authority vested in the President
by section S of the act of February 8, 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 389, as amended [section 348
of Title 25), by the act of December 24, 1942,
ch. 814, 56 Stat. 1081, [section 348a of Title
25), by the act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34
Stat. 326 [section 391 of Title 25), and by
section 3 of the act of January 12, 1891, 26
Stat. 712, as amended by section 3 of the act
of March 2, 1917, ch. 146, 39 Stat. 976, to
extend trust periods on land patents issued to
Indians and to continue restrictions on alienation.
<0 The authority vested in the President by
section 4705(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 [former section 4705(b) of Title 26) to
authorize certain persons in the Virgin Islands to obtain certain drugs for legitimate
medical purposes without regard to order
forms, and by section 4762(b) of such Code
[former section 4762 of Title 26) to provide
for the registration of and the imposition of

special and transfer taxes upon persons in the
Virgin Islands who import, manufacture, produce, compound, sell, deal in, dispense, prescribe, administer, or give away marihuana:
Provided, that the Secretary of the Interior
shall perform the functions referred to in this
subsection in consultation with the Department of the Treasury.
(g) The authority vested in the President
by section 2343 of the Revised Statutes [section 46 of Title 30) to establish additional
land districts and to appoint necessary officers under existing laws when deemed necessary for the public convenience in executing
certain provisions of law with respect to mineral lands and mining.
(h) The authority vested in the President
by section 2252 of the Revised Statutes as
affected by section 403 of Reorganization
Plan No. 3of1946, 60 Stat. 1100 [section 121
of Title 43], to order the discontinuance of
any land office and the transfer of any of its
business and archives to any other land office
within the same State or Territory.
(i) The authority vested in the President by
section 2250 of the Revised Statutes [section
125 of Title 43) to discontinue a land office in
a land district under certain circumstances
and to annex the same to some other adjoining land district.
(j) The authority vested in the President by
section 2251 of the Revised Statutes [section
126 of Title 43] to change the location of the
land offices in the several land districts established by law and to relocate the same from
time to time at such point in the district as
may be deemed expedient.
(k) The authority vested in the President
by section 2253 of the Revised Statutes [section 127 of Title 43) to change and re-establish the boundaries of land districts.
(/) The authority vested in the President
by section 2 of the act of March 2, 1917, ch.
145, 39 Stat. 951, as amended [section 737 of
Title 48), to approve the payment out of the
Treasury for other purposes of money derived
from any tax levied or assessed for a special
purpose in Puerto Rico.
(m) The authority vested in the President
by section 7 of the act of March 2, 1917, ch.
145, 39 Stat. 954; as amended [section 748 of
Title 48), to convey to the people of Puerto
Rico lands, buildings, or interests in lands, or
other property owned by the United States,
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and to accept lands, buildings, or other inter·
ests or property by legislative grant from
Puerto Rico.
(n) The authority vested in the President
by section 3(b) of the Act of March 3, 1925,
ch. 426, 43 Stat. 1111, as amended [see section 167d of Title 50), to approve regulations
governing the production and sale of helium
for medical, scientific, and commercial use.
(o) The authority vested in the President
by section 6 of the act of April 26, 1906, ch.
1876, 34 Stat. 139, to remove from office the
principal chief of the Choctaw, Cherokee,
Creek, or Seminole tribe or the governor of
the Chickasaw tribe, to declare any such
office vacant, and to fill any vacancy in any
such office arising from removal, disability, or
death of the incumbent.
(p) The authority vested in the President
by section 28 of the act of April 26, 1906, ch.
1876, 34 Stat. 148, to approve acts, ordinances, or resolutions of the tribal council or
legislature of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole tribes or nations,
and to approve contracts, involving the payment or expenditure of money or affecting
property belonging to any of the said tribes or
nations, made by them or any of them or by
any officer thereof.
(q) (Superseded by section 3 of Ex.Ord.
No. 10752, Feb. 12, 1958, 23 F.R. 973, set
out as a note under section 7 l 5j of Title 15,
Commerce and Trade).
(r) The authority vested in the President
by section 55 of the act of April 30, 1900, 31
Stat. 150, as amended (section 562 of Title
48) and by section 4 of the act of August 24,
1954, 68 Stat. 785, as amended [former section 562o of Title 48), to approve the issuance
of bonds or other instruments of indebtedness
by the Territory of Hawaii.
2. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby
designated and empowered to perform, without the approval, ratification, or other action
of the President, the following functions
which have heretofore, under the respective

provisions of law cited, required the approval,
ratification, or other action of the President
in connection with their performance by the
Secretary of the Interior:
(a) The authority vested in the Secretary of
the Interior by section 1 of the act of June 6,
1942, ch. 330, 56 Stat. 326 [section 459r of
Title 16), to convey or lease to the States or
to the political subdivisions thereof any or all
of certain recreational demonstration projects
and lands and equipment comprised within
such projects or any parts of such projects;
and to transfer to other Federal agencies any
of the said recreational demonstration areas
that may be of use to such agencies.

(b) The authority vested in the Secretary of
the Interior by section 3 of the act of July 3,
1918, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755, as amended, and
as affected by section 4(0 of Reorganization
Plan No. II, effective July l, 1939, 53 Stat.
1433 [section 704 of Title 16), to promulgate
regulations permitting and governing the
hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession,
sale, purchase, shipment, transportation, car·
riage, or export of any migratory bird included in the terms of certain conventions, or any
part, nest, or egg thereof.

3. As used in this order, the term "functions" embraces duties, powers, responsibil·
ities, authority, or discretion, and the term
"perform" may be construed to mean "exer·
cise".
4. All actions heretofore taken by the
President in respect of the matters affected by
this order and in force at the time of the
issuance of this order, including regulations
prescribed by the President in respect of such
matters, shall, except as they may be inconsistent with the provisions of this order, remain in effect until modified or revoked pursuant to the authority conferred by this order.
S. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby
authorized to redelegate to the Under Secretary of the Interior any of the authority
delegated to the Secretary of the Interior by
section 1 of this order.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10289

Sept. 17, 1951, 16 F.R. 9499, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 10583, Dec. 20,
1954, 19 F.R. 8725; Ex.Ord. No. 10882, July 18, 1960, 25 F.R. 6869;
Ex.Ord. No. 11110, June 4, 1963, 28 F.R. 5605; Ex.Ord. No. 11825,
Dec. 31, 1974, 40 F.R. 1003
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby
designated and empowered to perform the
following-described functions of the President

without the approval, ratification, or other
action of the President:

(a) The authority vested in the President
by section I of the act of August I, 1914, c.
223, 38 Stat. 609, 623, as amended [section 2
of Title 19), (I) to rearrange, by consolidation
or otherwise, the several customs-collection
districts, (2) to discontinue ports of entry by
abolishing the same and establishing others in
their stead, and (3) to change from time to
time the location of the headquarters in any
customs-collection district as the needs of the
service may require.
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(b) The authority vested in the President
by section I of the Anti-Smuggling Act of
August 5, 1935, c. 438, 49 Stat. 517 [section
170 I of Title 19), (1) to find and declare that
at any place or within any area on the high
seas adjacent to but outside customs waters
any vessel or vessels hover or are being kept
off the coast of the United States and that, by
virtue of the presence of any such vessel or
vessels at such place or within such area, the
unlawful introduction or removal into or
from the United States of any merchandise or
person is being, or may be, occasioned, promoted, or threatened, (2) to find and declare
that certain waters on the high seas are in
such proximity to such vessel or vessels that
such unlawful introduction or removal of
merchandise or persons may be carried on by
or to or from such vessel or vessels, and (3) to
find and declare that, within any customs-enforcement area, the circumstances no longer
exist which gave rise to the declaration of
such area as a customs-enforcement area.

(c) The authority vested in the President
by section 2 of the act of August 18, 1914, c.
256, 38 Stat. 699 [section 82 of Title 46), to
suspend the provisions of law requiring survey, inspection, and measurement of foreignbuilt vessels admitted to American registry.
(d) The authority vested in the President
by section 5 of the act of May 28, 1908, c.
212, 35 Stat. 425, as amended [section 104 of
Title 46), to determine (as a prerequisite to
the extension of reciprocal privileges by the
Commissioner of Customs) that yachts used
and employed exclusively as pleasure vessels
and belonging to any resident of the United
States are allowed to arrive at and depart
from any foreign port and to cruise in the
waters of such port without entering or clearing at the custom-house thereof and without
the payment of any charges for entering or
clearing, dues, duty per ton, tonnage taxes, or
charges for cruising licenses.
(e) The authority vested in the President
by section 2 of the act of March 24, 1908, c.
96, 35 Stat. 46 [section 134 of Title 46), to
name the hospital ships to which section 1 of
the said act shall apply and to indicate the

time when the exemptions thereby provided
for shall begin and end.
(f) The authority vested in the President by
section 4228 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended (46 U.S.C. 141), (I) to declare
that-upon satisfactory proof being given by
the government of any foreign nation that no
discriminating duties of tonnage or imposts
are imposed or levied in the ports of such
nation upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States, or upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported
in the same from the United States or from
any foreign country-the foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the
United States are suspended and discontinued, so far as respects the vessels of such
foreign nation, and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported into the Unit·
ed States from such foreign nation, or from
any other foreign country, and (2) to suspend
in part the operation of section 4219 of the
Revised Statutes, as amended (46 U.S.C .
121), and section IV, J, subsection I of the
act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat. 195, as
amended (46 U.S.C. 146), so that foreign
vessels from a country imposing partial dis·
criminating tonnage duties upon American
vessels, or partial discriminating import
duties upon American merchandise, may en·
joy in our ports the identical privileges which
the same class of American vessels and merchandise may enjoy in such country: Provid·
ed, that prior to the issuance of an order of
the Secretary of the Treasury suspending and
discontinuing (wholly or in part) discrimina·
ting tonnage duties, imposts, and import
duties within the United States, the Department of State shall obtain and furnish to the
Secretary of the Treasury the proof required
by the said section 4228, as amended, as the
basis for that order.

(g) The authority vested in the President
by section 3639 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended [section 521 of Title 31 ), to regulate
and increase the sums for which bonds are, or
may be, required by law, but only to the
extent that such section affects collectors of
customs, comptrollers of customs, and surveyors of customs (and the successors thereof
under section 1 of the act of July 5, 1932, c.
430, 47 Stat. 580, 584 [former section Sa of
Title 19)).
(h) The authority vested in the President
by section 3650 of the Internal Revenue Code
[now covered by section 7621 of Title 26), to
establish convenient collection districts (for
the purpose of assessing, levying, and collect·
ing the taxes provided by the internal revenue

laws), and from time to time to alter such
districts.
(I) The authority which is now vested in
the President by section 2S64(b) of the Internal Revenue Code [section 2S64(b) of Title 26
(l.R.C.1939) ), and which on and after January I, I 9SS, will be vested in the President by
section 473S(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 19S4 [section 473S(b) of Title 26 (l.R.C.
t 9S4) ), to issue, in accordance with the provisions of the said section 2S64(b) or 473S(b),
as the case may be, orders providing for the
registration and the imposition of a special
tax upon all persons in the Canal Zone who
produce, import, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away narcotic
drugs.

(j) The authority vested in the Prei;idcnt hy
paragraph (b) of section 43 of the A~·t of May
12, 1933, as amended (31 U.S.C. 821(h)) [JI
U.S.C.A. § S301(a) and (b) ]. to issue sil\'cr
certificates against any silver bullion, silver.
or standard silver dollars in the Treasury not
then held for redemption of any outstanding
silver certifkates, to prescribe the denominations of such silver certificates, and to coin
standard silver dollars and subsidiary silver
currency for their redemption.
2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby
designated and empowered to perform without the approval, ratification, or other action
of the President the following functions which
have heretofore, under the respective provisions of law cited, required the approval of
the President in connection with their performance by the Secretary of the Treasury:
(a) The authority vested in the Secretary of
the Treasury by section 6 of the act of July 8,
1937, c. 444, SO Stat. 480 [section 728 of Title
40), to make rules and regulations necessary
for the execution of the functions vested in
the Secretary of the Treasury by the said act,
as amended.
(b), (c) [Re\'oked by Ex.Ord. No. 11110,
June 4, 1963, 28 F.R. S60S.J

(d) [Revoked by Ex.Ord. No. I 182S, Dec.
31, 1974, 40 F.R. 1003.)
(e) The authority vested in the Secretary of
the Treasury by section I of Title II of the act
of June IS. 1917. c. 30, 40 Stat. 220 [section
191 of Title SO), to make rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement
of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the

territorial waters of the United States, exclusive of the territory and waters of the Canal
Zone.
(f) The authority vested in the Secretary of
the Treasury by section 6 of the act of June
19, 1934. c. 674, 48 Stat. 1178 [section 316b
of Title 31 ]. to investigate, regulate, or prohibit. by means of licenses or otherwise, the
acqu1S1t1on, importation, exportation, or
transportation of silver and of contracts and
other arrangements made with respect thereto, and to require the filing of reports in
connection therewith.

3. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury and
the Postmaster General are hereby designated
and empowered jointly to prescribe without
the approval of the President regulations, under section I of the act of July 8, 1937, c.
444, SO Stat. 479 [section 721 of Title 40),
governing the shipment of valuables by the
executive departments, independent establishments, agencies. wholly-owned corporations,
officers, and employees of the United States.
(b) The Postmaster General (now United
States Postal Service] is hereby designated
and empowered to exercise without the approval, ratification, or other action of the
President the authority vested in the President by section S04(b) of Title 18 of the
United States Code to approve regulations
issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under
the authority of the said section S04(b) (relating to the printing, publishing. or importation, or the making or importation of the
necessary plates for such printing or publishing, of postage stamps for philatelic purposes). and to approve any amendment or
repeal of any of such regulations by the Secretary of the Treasury.

4. As used in this order, the term "functions" embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, or discretion, and the term
"perform" may be construed to mean "exercise".
S. All actions heretofore taken by the
President in respect of the matters affected by
this order and in force at the time of the
issuance of this order, including regulations
prescribed by the President in respect of such
matters, shall, except as they may be inconsistent with the provisions of this order, remain in effect until amended. modified, or
revoked pursuant to the authority conferred
by this order.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10530

May 10, 1954, 19 F.R. 2709, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 10573, Oct. 26,
1954, 19 F.R. 6899; Ex.Ord. No. 10682, Oct. 22, 1956, 21 F.R. 8129;
Ex.Ord. No. 10759, March 17, 1958, 23 F.R. 1803; Ex.Ord. No.
10790, Nov. 20, 1958, 23 P.R. 9051; Ex.Ord. No. 10836, Sept. 8, 1959,
24 P.R. 7269; Ex.Ord. No. 10852, Nov. 27, 1959, 24 P.R. 9565;
Ex.Ord. No. 10889, Oct. 5, 1960, 25 P.R. 9633; Ex.Ord. No. 10903,
Jan. 9, 1961, 26 P.R. 217; Ex.Ord. No. 10960, Aug. 21, 1961, 26 P.R.
7823; Ex.Ord. No. 10970, Oct. 27, 1961, 26 F.R. 10149; Ex.Ord. No.
11012, Mar. 27, 1962, 27 P.R. 2983; Ex.Ord. No. 11116, Aug. 5, 1963,
28 P.R. 8075; Ex.Ord. No. 11164, Aug. 1, 1964, 29 P.R. 11257;
Ex.Ord. No. 11184, Oct. 13, 1964, 29 F.R. 14155; Ex.Ord. No. 11196,
Feb. 2, 1965, 30 F.R. 1171; Ex.Ord. No. 11222, May 8, 1965, 30 P.R.
6469; Ex.Ord. No. 11228, June 14, 1965, 30 F.R. 7739; Ex.Ord. No.
11230, § 2(1), (3), (5) to (14), June 28, 1965, 30 P.R. 8447; Ex.Ord.
No. 12107, Dec. 28, 1978, 44 F.R. 1055.
DELEGATION OF MISCELLANEOUS FUNCTIONS

•

PART I. DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
[Superseded by Ex.Ord. No. 11230, § 2(1),
(3), (5) to (14), June 28, 1965, 30 F.R. 8447)
PART II. THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
[Superseded by Ex.Ord. No. 11228, § 3(1),
(2), (5), June 14, 1965, 30 F.R. 7739)
PART Ill. THE HOUSING AND
HOME FINANCE
ADMINISTRATOR
[Superseded by Ex.Ord. No. 11196, Feb. 2,
1965, 30 F.R. 1171)

•

PART IV. THE FEDERAL
COM MUNI CATIONS
COMMISSION
Sec. 5. (a) The Federal Communications
Commission is hereby designated and empow·
ered to exercise, without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President, all
authority vested in the President by the act of
May 27, 1921, ch. 12, 42 Stat. 8 [sections 34
to 39 of Title 47), including the authority to
issue, withhold, or revoke licenses to land or
operate submarine cables in the United States:
Provided, That no such license shall be grant·
ed or revoked by the Commission except after
obtaining approval of the Secretary of State
and such advice from any executive depart·
ment or establishment of the Government as
the Commission may deem necessary. The
Commission is authorized and directed to
receive all applications for the said licenses.
(b) Executive Order No. 3513 of July 9,
1921, as amended by Executive Order No.
6779 of June 30, 1934, is hereby revoked.

PART V. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF
GENERAL SERVICES
Sec. 6. The Attorney General and the
Administrator of General Services are hereby
designated and empowered jointly to perform
the following-described functions without the
approval, ratification, or other action of the
President:
(a) The authority vested in the President
by section 5(a) of the act of July 26, 1935, ch.
417, 49 Stat. 501, as amended [section
1505(a) of Title 44), to determine from time
to time the documents or classes of documents having general applicability and legal
effect.
(b) The authority vested in the President
by sections 6, I !(a), and l l(f) of said act, as
amended [sections I 506 and I 5 IO(a), (f) of
Title 44), to approve (or disapprove), respectively, (I) regulations, prescribed by the Administrative Committee of the Federal Register, for carrying out the provisions of that act
(including the regulations referred to in sec·
tion 5(b) of the act [section 1505(b) of Title
44), authorizing publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER of certain documents or
classes of documents), (2) actions of the Administrative Committee of the Federal Register requiring, from time to time, the preparation and publication in special or supplemental editions of the FEDERAL REGISTER of
complete codifications of the documents, de·
scribed in the said section I !(a) [section
1510(a) of Title 44), of each agency of the
Government, and (3) regulations, prescribed
by the Administrative Committee of the Federal Register, for carrying out the provisions

of section l l of the said act (section 1510 of
Title 44), as amended.

PART YI. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 7. All actions heretofore taken by
the President in respect of the matters affect·
ed by this order and in force at the time of
the issuance of this order, including any regulations prescribed or approved by the President in respect of such matters, shall, except

as they may be inconsistent with the provisions of this order, remain in effect until
amended, modified, or revoked pursuant to
the authority conferred by this order.
Sec. 8. As used in this order, the term
"functions" embraces duties, powers, respon·
sibilities, authority, or discretion, and the
term "perform" may be construed to mean
"exercise."

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10621

July 1, 1955, 20 F.R. 4759, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 11294, Aug. 4,
1966, 31 F.R. 10601; Ex.Ord. No. 12396, Dec. 9, 1982, 47 F.R. 55897
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

•

Section I. The Secretary of Defense, and,
as designated by the said Secretary for this
purpose, any of the Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the military departments, are hereby designated and
empowered to perform the following-described functions of the President without the
approval, ratification, or other action of the
President:
(a) The authority vested in the President
by the act of March 3, 190 I, c. 852, 31 Stat.
1107, 1133 [see sections W41 and 7291 of
Title 10, Armed Forces), to establish and
modify, as the needs of the service may require, a classification of vessels of the Navy,
and to formulate appropriate rules governing
assignments to command of vessels and
squadrons.
(b) The authority vested in the President
by the act of August 22, 1912, c. 335, 37 Stat.
328, 331 [see sections 509 and 1171 of Title
IO, Armed Forces]. to approve regulations of
the Secretary of the Navy under which any
enlisted man may be discharged within three
months before the expiration of the term of
his enlistment, and under which an enlisted
man may voluntarily extend the term of his
enlistment.
(c) The authority '·ested in the President
by the act of May 22, 1928, c. 688, 45 Stat.
712 [see section 6152 of Title to, Armed
Forces] to approve regulations governing the
advancement of public funds to naval personnel when required to meet expenses of officers
and men detailed on emergency shore duty.
(d) The authority vested in the President
by the act of June 22, 1938, c. 567, 52 Stat.
839, as amended (see sections 5083, 5133,
5148, 5201 of Title 10), section 201(a} of the
act of August 25, 1941, c. 409, 55 Stat. 680
[see sections 5063, 5064 of Title 10], section 3
of the act of December 28, 1945, c. 604, 59
Stat. 666, as amended [see section 5138 of

Title 10), section 2 of the act of August 1,
1946, c. 727, 60 Stat. 779 [see section 5150 of
Title 10), and section 7(a) of the act of March
5, 1948, c. 98, 62 Stat. 68 [see Department of
Defense Reorganization Order set out as a
note under former section 5111 of Title 10],
to authorize, in his discretion, for any officer
of the Regular Navy or Marine Corps who
retires while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, as Chief of a Bureau of the Navy
Department, as Judge Advocate General of
the Navy, as Commandant of the Marine
Corps, as Director of Budgets and Reports, as
Chief of the Dental Division, as Chief of
Naval Research, or as Chief of Naval Materi·
al, or while serving in a lower rank if he has
previously served in any of such offices two
and one-half years or more, retirement in the
highest grade or rank in which he so served
and with retired pay based on that rank.
(e) The authority vested in the President
by the act of June 15, 1940, c. 374, 54 Stat.
400, to prescribe from time to time the number of warrant and commissioned warrant
officers for the Marine Corps.

<0 The authority vested in the President by
the act of June 24, 1941, c. 231. 55 Stat. 260
[see section 7306 of Title 10, Armed Forces),
to approve the use for experimental purposes
of vessels of the United States Navy stricken
from the Navy Register pursuant to the act of
August 5, 1882, 22 Stat. 296, as amended [sec
section 7304 of Title 10, Armed Forces).
(g), (h) [Revoked by Ex.Ord. No. 12396,
Dec. 9, 1982, 47 F.R. 55897).
(i) The authority vested in the President by
section 302 of the act of June 22, 1944, c.
268, 58 Stat. 287 [see section 1554 of Title
10), to approve or disapprove the proceedings
and decisions of boards of review established
under that section by the Secretary of the
Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, or the

Secretary of the Navy, and to issue orders in
such cases.
(j) to (n) [Revoked by Ex.Ord. No. 12396,
Dec. 9, 1982, 47 F.R. 55897).
(o) The authority vested in the President
by section 3 of the Travel Expense Act of
1949, 63 Stat. 166, as amended (5 U.S.C. 836)
[see sections 2105, 5701, 5702, 5707 of Title
5), to establish maximum rates of per diem
allowances for civilian officers and employees
of the Government to the extent that such
authority pertains to travel status in localities
in Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and possessions
of the United States.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense, and, as
designated by the said Secretary for this pur·
pose, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
any of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense,
are hereby designated and empowered to per·
form the following-described functions of the
President without the approval, ratification,
or other action of the President:
(a) The authority vested in the President
by section 1547 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States [see section 6011 of Title to,

Armed Forces) to approve alterations made
by the Secretary of the Navy in Navy Regulations.
(b) The authority vested in the President
by section I of the act of April 9, 1906, c.
1370, 34 Stat. 104 (see section 6961 of Title
10, Armed Forces), to approve the dismissal
by the Secretary of the Navy of a midshipman from the United States Naval Academy.

Sec. 3. All actions heretofore taken by
the President with respect to the matters
affected by this order and in force and effect
at the time of the issuance of this order,
including any regulations prescribed or approved by the President with respect to such
matters, shall, except as they may be inconsistent with the provisions of this order, remain in force and effect until amended, modified, or revoked pursuant to the authority
conferred by this order.
Sec. 4. As used in this order,
"functions" includes duties, powers,
bilities, authority, and discretion,
term "perform" may be construed
"exercise".

the term
responsiand the
to mean

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10637

Sept. 19, 1955, 20 F.R. 7025
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Section l. The Secretary of the Treasury
is hereby designated and empowered to per·
form the following-described functions with·
out the approval, ratification, or other action
of the President:
(a) The authority vested in the President
by section 149 of title 14 of the United States
Code, in his discretion, to detail officers and
enlisted men of the Coast Guard to assist
foreign governments in matters concerning
which the Coast Guard may be of assistance.
(b) The authority vested in the President
by section 229 of title 14 of the United States
Code to revoke the commission of any officer
on the active list of the Coast Guard who, at
the date of such revocation, has had less than
three years of continuous service as a commissioned officer in the Coast Guard, and to
prescribe regulations relating to such revocations.
(c) The authority vested in the President
by section 232 of title 14 of the United States
Code, in his discretion, to retire from active
service any commissioned officer of the Coast
Guard, upon his own application, who has
completed twenty years of active service in
the Coast Guard, Navy, Army, Air Force, or

Marine Corps, or the Reserve Components
thereof.
(d) The authority vested in the President
by section 235 of title 14 of the United States
Code (sec section 25 I ct seq. of Title 14], to
retire, to approve the retirement of, to place
out of line of promotion, and to approve the
placing out of line of promotion of. officers of
the Coast Guard.
(e) The authority vested in the President
by section 492 of title 14 of the United States
Code to present a distinguished service medal
(including incidental items) to any person
who, while serving in any capacity with the
Coast Guard, distinguishes himself by exceptionally meritorious service to the Govern·
ment in a duty of great responsibility.
<0 The authority vested in the President by
section 493 of title 14 of the United States '
Code to present the Coast Guard medal (in·
eluding incidental items) to any person who,
while serving in any capacity with the Coast
Guard, distinguishes himself by heroism not
involving actual conflict with an enemy.
(g) The authority vested in the President
by section 494 of title 14 of the United States
Code to award emblems, insignia, rosettes,
and other devices, to the extent that such

•

authority relates to the awarding of such
items to be worn with the distinguished service medal or the Coast Guard medal.
(h) The authority vested in the President
by section 498 of title 14 of the United States
Code to make posthumous awards of decorations and to designate representatives to receive such awards, to the extent that such
authority relates to the awarding of the distinguished service medal or the Coast Guard
medal, or ribbons, emblems, insignia, rosettes,
or other devices corresponding thereto.
(() The authority vested in the President by
section 499 of title 14 of the United States
Code to make rules, regulations, and orders
to the extent that they shall relate to the
authority described in sections l(f), l(g), and
l(h) above.
(j) The authority vested in the President by
the first paragraph of section 806 of the act of
September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 799
[section 77 of Title 1S], to direct the detention
of any vessel, American or foreign, by withholding clearance or by formal notice forbidding departure; but such authority shall be
exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury
only upon a finding by the President that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the
vessel concerned is making or giving undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any
party, or is subjecting any party to undue or
unreasonable prejudice, disadvantage, injury,
or discrimination, as described in the said
paragraph; and the authority so vested to
revoke, modify, or renew any such direction.
(I<) The authority vested in the President
by the second paragraph of the said section
806 of the act of September 8, 1916 [section
77 of Title IS], to withhold clearance from
one or more vessels of a belligerent country
or government until such belligerent shall
restore to American vessels and American
citizens reciprocal liberty of commerce and
equal facilities for trade, and the authority to
direct that similar privileges and facilities, if
any, enjoyed by vessels and citizens of such
belligerent in the United States or its possessions be refused to vessels or citizens of such
belligerent; but such authority shall not, in
either instance, be exercised by the Secretary
of the Treasury with respect to any vessel or
citizen of such belligerent unless and until the
President proclaims that the belligerent nation concerned is denying privileges and facilities to American vessels as described in the
said paragraph.

(/) The authority vested in the President by
section 963(a) of title 18 of the United States
Code to detain, in accordance with the provi-

sions of such section, any armed vessel, or
any vessel, domestic or foreign (other than
one which has entered the ports of the United
States as a public vessel), which is manifestly
built for warlike purposes or has been converted or adapted from a private vessel to one
suitable for warlike use, and to determine, in
each case, whether the proof required by such
section is satisfactory.
(m) The authority vested in the President
by section 967(a) of title 18 of the United
States Code, during a war in which the United States is a neutral nation, to · withhold
clearance from or to any vessel, domestic or
foreign, or, by service of formal notice upon
the owner, master, or person in command or
in charge of any domestic vessel not required
to secure clearances, and to forbid its departure from port or from the United States,
whenever there is reasonable cause to believe
that such vessel is about to carry fuel, a~s.
ammunition, men, supplies, dispatches, or information to any warship, tender, or supply
ship of a foreign belligerent nation in violation of the laws, treaties, or obligations of the
United States under the law of nations.
(n) The authority vested in the President
by section IO(a) of the act of November 4,
1939, ch. 2, S4 Stat. 9 [section 4SO(a) of Title
22), to require the owner, master, or person
in command of a vessel to give a bond to the
United States, as prescribed by the said section IO(a).
(o) The authority vested in the President
by section IO(b) of the act of November 4,
1939, ch. 2, S4 Stat. 9 [section 4SO(b) of Title
22), to prohibit the departure of a vessel from
a port of the United States, in accordance
with the provisions of the said section IO(b).
(p) The authority vested in the President
by section 2 of the act of August 18, 1914, ch.
2S6, 38 Stat. 699 [section 236 of Title 46], to
suspend, in his discretion, by order, so far
and for such length of time as he may deem
desirable, the provisions of law prescribing
that all watch officers of vessels of the United
States registered for foreign trade shall be
citizens of the United States.
(q) The authority vested in the President
by section 2 of the act of October 17, 1940,
ch. 896, S4 Stat. 1201 [section 643b of Title
46), to extend, whenever in his judgment the
national interest requires, the provisions of
subsection (b) of section 4SSI. Revised Statutes, as amended [section 643(b) of Title 46],
to such additional class or classes of vessels
and to such waters as he may designate.

(r) The authority vested in the Secretary of
the Treasury by the first paragraph of section
I of Title II of the act of June 15, 1917, ch.
30, 40 Stat. 220. as amended [section 191 of
Title 50), during a national emergency proclaimed as provided in the said paragraph, (I)
to make rules and regulations governing the
anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of
the United States, and (2) to take full possession and control of such vessel for the purposes set forth in the said paragraph.

(s) The authority vested in the President
by section 6 of the act of July 24, 1941, ch.
320, 55 Stat. 604, as amended [see note set
out under section 5501 of Title 10, Armed
Forces), to make appointments of officers
below flag rank without the advice and consent of the Senate, to the extent that such
authority relates, pursuant to section I l(b) of
the said act, as amended [see section 5787 of
Title 10, Armed Forces), to officers of the
United States Coast Guard.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is
hereby designated and empowered to perform
without the approval, ratification, or other
action of the President the following described functions to the extent that they relate to
the United States Coast Guard:
(a) The authority vested in the President
by Article 4(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (section I of the act of May 5.
1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 110) [see section 804
of Title 10, Armed Forces), to convene a
general court-martial to try any dismissed
officer, upon application by the officer concerned for trial by court-martial.
(b) The authority vested in the President
by Articles 4(c) and 75 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (64 Stat. 110, 132) [see
sections 804 and 875 of Title 10, Armed
Forces), to reappoint a discharged officer to
such commissioned rank and precedence as
the former officer would have attained had he
not been dismissed, and to direct the extent to
which any such reappointment shall affect the
promotion status of other officers.

(c) The authority vested in the President
by section 10 of the act of May 5, 1950, ch.
169, 64 Stat. 146 [see sections 1161 and 6408
of Title 10, Armed Forces), to drop from the
rolls any officer who has been absent without
authority from his place of duty for a period
of three months or more, or who, having been

found guilty by the civil authorities of any
offense, is finally sentenced to confinement in
a Federal or State penitentiary or correctional
institution.
(d) The authority vested in the President
by section 219 of the Armed Forces Reserve
Act, approved July 9, 1952 (66 Stat. 487) [see
section 593 of Title to, Armed Forces], to
make appointments of Reserves in commissioned grades below flag officer grades.
(e) The authority vested in the President
by section 221 of the said Armed Forces
Reserve Act [see section 593 of Title 10,
Armed Forces), to determine the tenure in
office of commissioned officers of the reserve.
(() The authority vested in the President by
section 248 of the said Armed Forces Reserve
Act [see section 1162 of Title 10, Armed
Forces], to effect the discharge of commissioned officers of the reserve.
(g) The authority vested in the President
by section 6 of the act of February 21, 1946,
ch. 34, 60 Stat. 27 [see section 6323 of Title
10, Armed Forces]. as made applicable to the
Coast Guard Reserve by section 755(a) of
title 14 of the United States Code, in his
discretion, to place upon the retired list any
officer of the Coast Guard Reserve, upon his
own application, who has completed more
than twenty years of active service as described in the said section 6.

Sec. 3. All actions heretofore taken by
the President with respect to the matters
affected by this order and in force at the time
of issuance of this order, including any regulations prescribed or approved by the President with respect to such matters. shall, ellcept as they may be inconsistent with the
provisions of this order, remain in effect until
amended. modified, or revoked pursuant to
the authority conferred by this order.
Sec. 4. As used in this order, the term
"functions" embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, or discretion, and the
term "perform" may be construed to mean
"exercise".
Sec. 5. Whenever the entire Coast Guard
operates as a service in the Navy, the references to the Secretary of the Treasury in the
introductory portions of sections I and 2 of
this order shall be deemed to be references to
the Secretary of the Navy.
DWIGHT

D.

EISENHOWER

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10661

Feb. 27, 1956, 21 F.R. 1315
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Section l. The Secretary of Defense, and,
when designated by the Secretary of Defense
for such purpose, the Secretary of the Army
are hereby designated and empowered to ex·
ercise, without the approval, ratification, or
other action of the President, the authority
vested in the President by the first section of
the act of June 26, 1946, ch. 493, 60 Stat.
311, as amended [see sections 4344 and 9344
of Title 10, Armed Forces] to designate per·
sons from the American Republics (other
than the United States) and Canada who may
be permitted to receive instruction at the
United States Military Academy at West
Point, New York.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense, and,
when designated by the Secretary of Defense
for such purpose, the Secretary of the Navy
are hereby designated and empowered to ex·
ercise, without the approval, ratification, or
other action of the President, the following·
described authority to designate persons who
may be permitted to receive instruction at the
United States Naval Academy at Annapolis,
Maryland:
(a) The authority vested in the President
by the act of July 14, 1941, ch. 292, 55 Stat.
589, as amended [see section 6957 of Title 10,
Armed Forces], with respect to persons from
the American Republics (other than the Unit·
ed States) and Canada.
(b) The authority vested in the President
by the act of June 24, 1948, ch. 616, 62 Stat.
583 [see section 6957 of Title 10, Armed
Forces], with respect to Filipinos.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of Defense, and,
when designated by the Secretary of Defense
for such purpose, the Secretary of the Air
Force are hereby designated and empowered
to exercise, without the approval, ratification,
or other action of the President, the authority
vested in the President by the first section of
the said act of June 26, 1946, as made appli·
cable to the United States Air Force Acade·
my by section 5 of the act of April I, 1954,
ch. 127, 68 Stat. 48 [see section 9344 of Title
10, Armed Forces), to designate persons from
the American Republics (other than the Unit·
ed States) and Canada who may be permitted
to receive instruction at the United States Air
Force Academy.
Sec. 4. The Secretary of Commerce is
hereby designated and empowered to exercise
without the approval, ratification. or other
action of the President, the authority vested
in the President by the act of August 9, 1946,
ch. 928, 60 Stat. 961 [section 1126b of Title
46), to designate persons from the American
Republics (other than the United States) who
may be permitted to receive instruction in the
United States Merchant Marine Cadet Corps
and at the United States Merchant Marine
Academy at Kings Point, New York.
Sec. 5. No person shall be designated un·
der the authority of this order to receive
instruction except after consultation by the
designating officer with the Secretary of State.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10950

June 27, 1961, 26 F.R. 5787
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
By virtue of the authority vested in me by
section 6(b) of the Alaska Statehood Act of
July 7, 1958 (72 Stat. 339) (set out as a note
preceding former section 21 of Title 48, Terri·
tories and Insular Possessions), and as Presi·
dent of the United States, I hereby designate
the Secretary of the Interior as my represent·
ative to exercise the authority vested in me by
section 6(b) of the act to approve selections of
land made by the State of Alaska under the
provisions of section 6(b) in instances in
which those selections include land lying
north and west of the line described in section
IO(b) of the act: Provided, that no selection

by the State shall be approved pursuant to
this order, in whole or in part, without the
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense or
his designated representative.
As the Secretary of the Interior may direct,
the Under Secretary of the Interior, an Assist·
ant Secretary of the Interior, the Director of
the Bureau of Land Management, or the
Operations Supervisors of the Bureau of Land
Management in Alaska are severally authorized to exercise the authority vested in the
Secretary by this order.
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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11012

Mar. 28, 1962, 27 F.R. 2983, as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 11230,
June 28, 1965, 30 F.R. 8447.
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES
By virtue of the authority vested in me by
Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States
Code, and as President of the United States,
it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section l. [Superseded by Ex.Ord. No.
11230, § 2(11), June 28, 1965, 30 F.R. 8447)
Sec. 2. The Administrator of General
Services is hereby designated and empowered
to exercise, without the approval, ratification,
or other action of the President, so much of
the authority vested in the President by Section I(b} of the Act of August 2, 1946, ch.
744, 60 Stat. 807 (5 U.S.C. 73b-l(b}) [see
section 5724 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees], as pertains to the
establishment of the rates to be used in reimbursing civilian officers or employees of the
Government on a commuted basis in lieu of
the payment of actual expenses of transportation, packing, crating, temporary storage,
drayage, and unpacking of their household
goods and personal effects in the case of
transfers from one official station to another
within the continental United States for permanent duty.
Sec. 3. The initial regulations to be issued by the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget and by the Administrator of General
Services under the authority delegated to each
of them by this order shall be effective on the
same date and effective as of that date the
following-described Executive orders are revoked:

(a)

Executive Order No. 9778 of September

to, 1946.
(b) Executive Order No. 9805 of November 25, 1946.
(c) Executive Order No. 9933 of February
27, 1948.

(d) Executive Order No. 9997 of September 8, 1948.

(e) Executive Order No. 10069 of July 14,
1949.
CO Executive Order No. 10177 of October
27, 1950.
(g) Executive Order No. 10196 of December 20, 1950.
(h) Executive Order No. 10274 of July 18,
1951.
(i) Executive Order No. 10381 of August
6, 1952.

(j) Executive Order No. 10507 of December 10, 1953.

Sec. 4. Existing regulations prescribed by
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
under the authority of Section l(b) of Executive Order No. 10530, as amended and in
effect immediately prior to the issuance of
this order, shall remain in effect until they are
superseded in pursuance of the provisions of
this order.
1011:-.;
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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11023

May 29, 1962, 27 F.R. 5131
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

•

By virtue of the authority vested in me by
section 301 of title 3 (this section] of the
United States Code, and as President of the
United States, it is ordered as follows:
Section l. The Secretary of Commerce is
hereby designated and empowered to perform
the following described functions without the
approval, ratification, or other action of the
President:
(a) The authority contained in section 6(b)
of the Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 298; 33
U.S.C. 853e(b)) (section 853e(b) of Title 33,
Navigation and Navigable Waters] to revoke
the commissions of ensigns of the Coast and

Geodetic Survey who are found not fully
qualified and to separate such ensigns from
the commissioned service.
(b) The authority vested in the President
by section 12(a} of the Coast and Geodetic
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948,
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C.
853j-l(a}) [section 853j-t(a} of Title 33], to
make temporary appointments in the grade of
ensign in the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
(c) The authority vested in the President
by section 12(b} of the Coast and Geodetic
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948,
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C.
853j-l(b)} [section 853j-l(b) of Title 33], to

•

•

temporarily promote officers in the permanent grade of ensign in the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and to appoint such officers to the
grade of lieutenant junior grade whenever
vacancies exist in higher grades.
(d) The authority vested in the President
by section 12(c) of the Coast and Geodetic
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948,
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C.
853j-l(c)) [section 853j-l(c) of Title 33], to
temporarily promote any officer one grade.
(e) The authority vested in the President
by section 13(b) of the Coast and Geodetic
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948,
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 853k(b))
(section 853k(b) of Title 33], to defer the
retirement of an officer of the Coast and
Geodetic Survey serving in a rank above that
of captain who has attained the age of sixty·
two years.
(f) The authority vested in the President by
section 14 of the Coast and Geodetic Survey
Commissioned Officers Act of 1948, as
amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 853/) (sec·
tion 853/ of Title 33), to retire from the active
service any commissioned officer of the Coast
and Geodetic Survey, upon his own applica·
tion, who has completed twenty years of ac·
tive service in the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
(g) The authority vested in the President
by section 23(a) of the Coast and Geodetic
Survey Commissioned Officers Act of 1948,
as amended (75 Stat. 506; 33 U.S.C. 853t(a))
[section 853t(a) of Title 33), (1) to find that
any officer appointed under section 23 is not
qualified for service, (2) to revoke the com·
missions of officers in respect of whom such
findings are made, and (3) to prescribe the
regulations referred to in that section.
(h) The authority contained in section 1(1)
of the Act of December 3, 1942 (56 Stat.
1038;
33 U.S.C.
854a-l(l)) [section
854a-l(I) of Title 33], to temporarily promote to higher ranks or grades, upon recommendation of the Secretary of the military
department concerned, commissioned officers
of the Coast and Geodetic Survey transferred
to the military departments.
(I) The authority contained in section 1(2)
of the Act of December 3, 1942 (56 Stat.
33 U.S.C. 854a-1(2)), [section
1038;
854a-1(2) of Title 33] to temporarily promote
commissioned officers of the Coast and Geo·
detic Survey to fill vacancies in ranks and
grades caused by transfer of commissioned
officers to the service and jurisdiction of the
military departments.
(j) The authority contained in section 1(3)
of the Act of December 3, 1942 (56 Stat.
1038;
33 U.S.C.
854a-1(3)) [section
854a-1(3) of Title 33] to temporarily appoint

deck officers and junior engineers to the
grade of ensign to fill vacancies caused by
transfer of officers to the military departments.
(k) The authority vested in the President
by section 16 of the Act of May 22, 1917 (40
Stat. 87; 33 U.S.C. 855) [section 855 of Title
33], to transfer to sen·ice and jurisdiction of
the Department of Defense, as he may deem
to be to the best interest of the country,
vessels, equipment, stations, and personnel of
the Coast and Geodetic Survey; but the Secretary of Commerce may effect such transfers
only during the existence of a state of national emergency proclaimed by the President.
Commissioned officers so transferred shall
serve under their commissions in the Coast
and Geodetic Survey and while so serving
shall constitute a part of the active armed
forces of the United States and shall be under
the direct orders of, and shall be subject to
the applicable laws, regulations, and orders
for the government of, the armed forces to
which they are transferred, respectively. The
Secretary of Commerce may return such vessels, equipment, stations, and personnel to the
jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce,
but in time of national emergency such return
shall be effected only with the concurrence of
the Secretary of Defense.
(() The authority vested in the President by
section 8 of the Act of August 6, 1947 (61
Stat. 788; 33 U.S.C. 883h) (section 883h of
Title 33] to employ public vessels, and to give
instructions for regulating their conduct, to
carry out the provisions of the Act of August
6, 1947; but the employment by the Secretary
of Commerce of vessels, except those of the
Department of Commerce or of any subordinate entity thereof, shall require the concurrence of the head of the department or other
executive agency having custody or control of
the vessel.
Sec. 2. Upon receipt by Secretary of
Commerce from the President or from the
President's representative of' information
showing that the Senate has confirmed nomi·
nees of the President for appointment as commissioned officers of the Coast and Geodetic
Survey, and without any further action on t.he
part of the President, (1) the Secretary of the
Commerce or an officer of the Department of
Commerce designated by the Secretary may,
upon completion of statutory requirements
for such appointments, tender offers of appointment to the nominees and upon acceptance such persons shall be deemed to be
appointed accordingly, (2) the Secretary of
Commerce, in the name of the President,
shall issue to each such person a commission
evidencing the appointment of such person
accordingly, and (3) the commissions of such

persons shall be deemed to have been signed
by the President. The effective date specified
in any commission so issued shall be deemed,
for all pur~. to be the date of the appointment evidenced by such commission.
Sec. 3. In connection with making appointments or promotions under authority
delegated to him by subsections (b), (c), (d),
(h), (i), and (j) of section 1 of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce shall issue to each
person appointed or promoted by him thereunder a certificate evidencing the appointment or promotion of such person. Such
certificate may be issued in the name of the
President.
Sec. 4. Any requirement of any provision
of law that commissions of officers under the
direction and control of the Secretary of
Commerce be signed by the President before
the seal of the Department of Commerce may
be affixed thereto shall, in the case of officers
appointed under the procedure set forth in
section 2 of this order and in the case of
officers appointed or promoted under authority delegated by subsections (b), (c), (d), (h),
(i), and (j) of section l of this order, be
deemed to be satisfied by signature of the
commission or certificate by the Secretary of
Commerce, before the departmental seal is
affixed thereto.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of Commerce is
hereby authorized to accept, in the name of
the President, the resignation of a commis-

sioned officer, either permanent or temporary, of the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
Sec. 6. The authority delegated by the
provisions of subsections (b), (c), (d), (h), (i),
and (j) of section l of this order shall be
deemed to include the authority to terminate
any appointment or promotion made under
the provisions of law referred to in those
subsections.
Sec. 7. All actions heretofore taken by
the President with respect to the matters
affected by this order and in force at the time
of issuance of this order, including any regulations prescribed or approved by the President with respect to such matters shall, except as they may be inconsistent with the
provisions of this order, remain in effect until
amended, modified or revoked pursuant to
the authority conferred by this order. The
following are hereby superseded: (l) Letter of
the President to the Secretary of Commerce,
dated April 23, 1929, and relating to the
general subject of section 2 of this order, and
(2) letter of the Secretary to the President,
dated July I, 1919, and directed to the Secretary of Commerce, relating to the general
subject of section S of this order.
Sec. 8. As used in this order the term
"functions" embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority or discretion, and the term
"perform" may be construed to mean "exercise".
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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11110

June 5, 1963, 28 F.R. 5605
AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10289, RELATING TO PERFORMANCE OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
By virtue of the authority vested in me by
section 301 of title 3 of the United States
Code [this section], it is ordered as follows:
Section 1. Executive Order No. 10289 of
September 19, 195 I, as amended [set out as a
note under this section], is hereby further
amended(a) By adding at the end of paragraph 1
thereof the following subparagraph (j):

"(j) The authority vested in the President
by paragraph (b) of section 43 of the Act of
May 12, 1933, as amended (31 U.S.C. 821(b))
(section 82l(b) of Title 31, Money and Finance], to issue silver certificates against any
silver bullion, silver, or standard silver dollars
in the Treasury not then held for redemption

of any outstanding silver certificates, to prescribe the denominations of such silver certificates, and to coin standard silver dollars and
subsidiary silver currency for their redemption," and
(b) By revoking subparagraphs (b) and (c)
of paragraph 2 thereof.

Sec. 2. The amendments made by this
Order shall not affect any act done, or any
right accruing or accrued or any suit or
proceeding had or commenced in any civil or
criminal cause prior to the date of this Order
but all such liabilities shall continue and may
be enforced as if said amendments had not
been made.
JoHN
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SUBCHAPTER I-COMMISSIONS, OATHS, AND RECORDS

2901. Commission of an officer
The President may make out and deliver, after adjournment of
the Senate, the commission of an officer whose appointment has
been confirmed by the Senate.
§

2902. Commission; where recorded
(a) Except as provided by subsections (b) and (c} of this section,
the Secretary of State shall make out and record, and affix the seal
of the United States to, the commission of an officer appointed by
the President. The seal of the United States may not be affixed to
the commission before the commission has been signed by the
President.
(b) The commission of an officer in the civil service or uniformed
services under the control of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a
milital")' department, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary
of the Treasury shall be made out and recorded in the department
in which he is to serve under the seal of that department. The departmental seal may not be affixed to the commission before the
commission has been signed by the President.
(c) The commissions of judicial officers and United States attorneys and marshals, afpointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent o the Senate, and other commissions which
before August 8, 1888, were prepared at the Department of State
on the requisition of the Attorney General, shall be made out and
recorded in the Department of Justice under the seal of that department and countersigned by the Attorney General. The departmental seal may not be affixed to the commission before the commission has been signed by the President.
§ 2903. Oath; authority to administer
(a) The oath of office required by section 3331 of this title may be
administered by an individual authorized by the laws of the United
States or local law to administer oaths in the State, District, or territory or possession of the United States where the oath is adminis~ed.
.
(b) An employee of an Executive agency designated in writing by
the head of the Executive agency, or the Secretary of a military department with respect to an employee of his department, may administer(1) the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title, incident to entrance into the executive branch; or
(2) any other oath required by law in connection with employment in the executive branch.
(c) An oath authorized or required under the laws of the United
States may be administered by(1) the Vice President; or
(2) an individual authorized by local law to administer oaths
in the State, District, or territory or possession of the United
States where the oath is administered.
§

2904. Oath; administered without fees
An employee of an Executive agency who is authorized to administer the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title, or any
other oath required by law in connection with employment in the
executive branch, may not charge or receive a fee or pay for administering the oath.
§

§ 2905. Oath; renewal

(a) An employee of an Executive agency or an individual employed by the government of the District of Columbia who, on original appointment, subscribed to the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title is not required to renew the oath because of a
change in status so long as his service is continuous in the agency
in which he is employed, unless, in the opinion of the head of the
Executive agency, the Secretary of a military department with respect to an employee of his department, or the Commissioners of
the District of Columbia, the public interest so requires.
(b) An individual who, on appointment as an employee of a
House of Congress, subscribed to the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title is not required to renew the oath so long as
his service as an employee of that House of Congress is continuous.
§ 2906. Oath; custody

The oath of office taken by an individual under section 3331 of
this title shall be delivered by him to, and preserved by, the House
of Congress, agency, or court to which the office pertains.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with the provisions of § 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to
you my written declaration that I am presently unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the Off ice of President of the
United States. Pursuant to those provisions, the Vice President,
Albert Gore, Jr., shall discharge those powers and duties as
Acting President during the period of my disability.
Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas s. Foley
Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:
In accordance with the provisions of § 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to
you my written declaration that I am presently unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the Off ice of President of the
United States. Pursuant to those provisions, the Vice President,
Albert Gore, Jr., shall discharge those powers and duties as
Acting President during the period of my disability.
Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert c. Byrd
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, o.c. 20510
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with the provisions of S 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to
you my written declaration that I am able to discharge the powers
and duties of the Off ice of President of the United States.
sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas s. Foley
Speaker
United states House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

•

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:
In accordance with the provisions of § 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to
you my written declaration that I am able to discharge the powers
and duties of the Office of President of the United States.
Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert c. Byrd
President Pro Tempore
United states Senate
Washington, o.c. 20510

••
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THE WHITE HOUSE

•

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, we hereby transmit
to you our written declaration that the President of the United
states, William J. Clinton, is presently unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office. Pursuant to these provisions,
the Vice President, Albert Gore, Jr., shall discharge those
powers and duties as Acting President.
Sincerely,

Albert Gore, Jr •

•

The Honorable Thomas s. Foley
Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:
In accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United states Constitution, we hereby transmit
to you our written declaration that the President of the United
States, William J. Clinton, is presently unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office. Pursuant to these provisions,
the Vice President, Albert Gore, Jr., shall discharge those
powers and duties as Acting President.
Sincerely,

Albert Gore, Jr •

•

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, o.c. 20510

•

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to
you my written declaration that I am able to discharge the powers
and duties of the Off ice of President of the United States and
that I am resuming those powers and duties.
Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas s. Foley
Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:
In accordance with the provisions of § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, I hereby transmit to
you my written declaration that I am able to discharge the powers
and duties of the Off ice of President of the United States and
that I am resuming those powers and duties.
Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert c. Byrd
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

•

•

The Honorable Robert c. Byrd
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. President:
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will be briefly
and temporarily incapable of discharging the Constitutional
powers and duties of the Off ice of the President of the United
states.

•

After consultation with my counsel and the Attorney General, I am
mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th Amendment to
the Constitution and of the uncertainties of its application to
such brief and temporary periods of incapacity •
Not intending to set a precedent binding anyone privileged to
hold this Office in the future, I have determined and it is my
intention and direction that Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.,
shall discharge those powers and duties in my stead commending
with the administration of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine that I
am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and
duties of this off ice.
Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

The Honorable Thomas s. Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, o.c. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will be briefly
and temporarily incapable of discharging the Constitutional
powers and duties of the Office of the President of the United
States.

•

After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney General, I am
mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th Amendment to
the Constitution and of the uncertainties of its application to
such brief and temporary periods of incapacity •
Not intending to set a precedent binding anyone privileged to
hold this Off ice in the future, I have determined and it is my
intention and direction that Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.,
shall discharge those powers and duties in my stead commending
with the administration of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine that I
am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and
duties of this office.
Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C.
20510
Dear Mr. President:
Following up on my letter to you of this date,
please be advised I am able to resume the
discharge of the Constitutional powers and
duties of the Off ice of the President of the
United States.
I have informed the Vice
President of my determination and my resumption
of those powers and duties.
Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:

•

Following up on my letter to you of this date,
please be advised I am able to resume the
discharge of the Constitutional powers and
duties of the Off ice of the President of the
United States.
I have informed the Vice
President of my determination and my resumption
of those powers and duties.
Sincerely,

llnitru §tatrs Erpartmrnt of 3.fustirt
lD<rnl1ingtan. il ffi. 21l33D
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ASSISTANT ATTORNEY CENcRAL
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT AND SUCCESSION TO H.IS DUTIES

PURSUA.N'T TO THE PROVISIONS OF ART. II 1 SEC .. l, _CL. 5, OF
THE CONSTITUTION, IN CASE OF THE "INABILITY" OF THE PRESIDENT
"TO DISCHARGE THE POliERS AND DUTIES OF [HIS] OFFICE," THOSE
POliERS SHALL DEVOLVE ON THE VICE PRESIDENT.

[THE FULL TEXT OF

THIS PROVISION IS ATTACHED HERETO AS APPENDIX l.]

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1 OF THE 25TH. AMENDMENT, "IN CASE OF THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT FROM OFFICE OR OF
HIS DEATH OR RESIGNATION, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME PRESIDENT."

[TF.E FULL TEXT OF TEE 25TH AMENDMENT IS ATTACHED HERETO

AS J..PPENDIX 2] .

PURSUANT TO SECTION 3 OF THE 25TH AMEND:L-lENT, "WHENEVER THE
PRESIDENT TRANSMITS TO THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE AND
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION
THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE,
AND ln\TIL HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE DISCHARGED BY THE VICE
PRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT."

[THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3 HAVE

NEVER BEEN IMPLEMENTED.]

-----

---·· -·--- - ...

-- --- -----··-· --- -·-- -

--

- --- - ---

..
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PURSUANT TO SECTION 4 OF THE 25TH AMENDMENT, "NHENEVER THE
VICE PRESIDENT AND A MAJORITY OF EITHER THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS
OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OR OF SUCH OTHER BODY
.
.AS CONGREss·
MAY BY LAW PROVIDE, TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE
SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR
WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE. TO DISCHARGE THE.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL IMMEDIATELY ASSUME THE POi\'ERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE AS ACTING
PRESIDENT."
IHPLE..'111.ENTED ~l

[THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 HAVE NEVER BEEN
CONGRESS HAS NOT DESIGNATED ANY "OTHER BODY" TO

EXERCISE THE AUTHORITY SPECIFIED IN SECTION 4.

THEREFORE, THE

OPERABLE LANGUAGE WOULD BE "THE VICE PRESIDENT AND A MAJORITY
OF • • • THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS."

IF THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE PRESIDENCY ARE ASSUMED BY
THE VICE

PRESIDE~~T

UNDER SECTION 3, THE PRESIDENT RESUMES HIS

FULL POWERS BY TRANSHITTING.A DECLARATION THAT HE IS ABLE TO
DISCHARGE HIS DUTIES.

'THE SAME IS TRUE UNDER SECTION 4, EXCEPT

THAT IN SUCH A CASE A MECHANISM IS PROVIDED FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE CABINET AND THE CONGRESS TO OVERRIDE THE PRESIDENT.
IN CASE OF SUCH A DISAGREEMENT OVER THE PRESIDENT'S DISABILITY
UNDER SECTION 4, THE VICE PRESIDENT REaAINS ACTING PRESIDENT
UNTIL THE ISSUE IS RESOLVED.

-2-
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SECTION 19 OF TITLE 3 OF THE U.S. CODE [THE FULL TEXT OF
WHICH IS ATTACHED AS APPENDIX 3] SETS FORTR THE STATUTORY LINE
OF SUCCESSION FOR THE DEVOLUTION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AFTER THE
VICE PRESIDENT, AS AUTHORIZED BY .ART. II, SEC. 1, CL. 5.

·THE

STATUTE PROVIDES THAT THE SPECIFIED ORDER OF SUCCESSION APPLIES UPON
DEATH, RESIGNATION, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OR "INABILITY" OF AN INDIVIDUAL ACTING AS PRESIDENT . . SECTION 19 SPECIFIES THAT THE "POWERS
AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT" , IF THERE IS NO VICE
PRESIDENT ABLE TO DISCHARGE THEM, DEVOLVE FIRST UPON THE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

THE..~

UPON THE PRESIDENT PRO TEM.PORE

OF THE SENATE, THEN (IN THE ORDER SPECIFIED) UPON THE SECRETARY OF
STATE, SECRETARY OF TREASURY'· SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL, SECP£TARY OF INTERIOR, SECRE.TARY .OF AGRICULTURE, SE<;RETARY OF COMMERCE,

SECRETA.~Y

OF LABOR, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND

HUM.AN SERVICES, SECRETARY OF HOUSING

Al~D

URBAN DEVELOPMENT,

SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, SECRETARY O? ENERGY, AND SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION.

The following additional considerations may be important
in certain circumstances:
1.

The Vice President does not have to take a new oath ·
of off ice upon assuming the powers and duties of the
President in the case of a President's inability to
act.

The Vice.President assumes only the powers and

duties of the President and the designation "Acti~g
President" in these circu:-;i.stances and does not become
-3-

-
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President.

The legislative history of the 25th Amend-

ment and the actual
this conclusion.

la~gu~ge

of the Amendment support

The answer seems to be "different and

more complex in the case of the subsequent officers in
Title 3, Section 19, treats

the line of succession,

the Legislative Branch successors

sornewh~t

than those in the Executive Branch.·

differently

·The .technicalities

of succession to temporary presidential· authority are
not considered herein beyond the Vice Presidential level.

2.

The written dec"larations of disability and recovery
specified in sections 3 and 4 of the 25th Amendment may
consist of short letters framed in the constitutional
terminology.

3.

The phrase the "principal officers of the Executive
Departments"

in the 25th Amendment includes only

those Cabinet members specified in Title 3 ,· .Sec.tion 19.
Other "cabinet-level" officials might arguably be embraced but the far stronger position is that they are not.

4.

The "transmittal" of the declarations contemplated by
the 25th Amendment is the operative event to effect
the transfer of authority rather than the receipt of
the declaration by the addressees.

Arguments in favor

of the latter circumstance as the operative event are
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not persuasive. ·Transmittal should be made both. "to

.·

the ·offices of the addressees and to them personally.

5.

A

si~gle

·declaration with all the ·nec·essary s:Lgnatures

would not appear to be necessary under Section

4 .0£
.. •

the 25th Amendment.

While this would be the ·preferable ..
course if all s~gnatures were available; _counterpart

-

declarations would be an adequate alternative:

6.

Under Section 4, actual physical signatures on ·the
declarations would not appear to be neces·sary if r for
.

'

example, the critical official was out of town or on
board an· aircraft.
- - name.
h _.:::;,

He could authorize ·another to affix

The imperatives of the.situation wo~ld_govern

t e approach.taken, but if a prompt
i

necessary, the fastest

ge~uine

~ansfer

of authorit:

·expression of

endorse~

ment would be appropriate.

7.

Under Section 3, a· voluntary Pres.idential declaration of
disability should be signed personally by him. if possibl
but a reliable manifestation of his understanding.and
assent should suffice.

In cases of doubt ·regarding

>is capacity to understand and assent, the section 4
procedure should be used.

Theodore B. Olson

-s-
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Re: : Presidential Succession and Delegation in Cases
. of Disabilitv
As a result of the recent assassination attempt on President
Reagan, this Office has researched several issues that relate
to presidential succession ~nd the delegation of pre~idential
power in the event of a temporary disability of the President.
This memorandum sets forth our conclusions on the relevant
1ega1 issues •
I.

Presidential Succession

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
establishes a mechanism for presidential succession in the event
that the President becomes unable to perform his constitutional
duties. Succession may take place in two ways. First, if the
President is able and willing to do so, he may provide for the
temporary assumption of the powers and duties of his office by
the Vice President by "transmit[ting] to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the President." See U.S. Const. , Amend.
XXV, § 3.
When the Pr~sident transmits such a declaration, his powers
and duties devolve upon the Vice President as Acting President .±_/
until the President transmits an additional written declaration
stating that he has become able to perform his responsibilities.
1/ There appears to be no requirement that the Vice President
resign from his position as Vice President or take the President's
oath of office to serve as "Acting President." As a general
rule, an official who is "acting" in a certain capacity need
not vacate the office previously held or take the oath of
off ice ordinarily taken. by the person whose duties he has
temporarily assumed. This conclusion is supported by Hearings
on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of
Vice President Before the 'SU'bcomm. on ConstTtlltional Amendments
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
215, 232 (1965); Hearings on Presidential Inability and Vice
Presidential Vacancy Before-the House Comm. on the Judiciarv,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1965). See also J. Ferrick, The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment 199 (1976)-.-The rule as to resignation
and/or taking the President's oath appears to be different for
those officials further down the line of succession. See 3
U.S.C. § 19. This memorandum does· not address the issues
involved in the devolution of powers beyond the position of
Vice President.
.
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Second, if the President is unable or unwilling to transmit
a declaration of his inability to perform his duties, the Vice
President will become Acting President 2/ if the Vice· President
and a majority of the "principal officers of the executive-departments" transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House a written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. See
U.S. Const., Amend. XXV, § 4. The term "principal officers of the
executive departments" is intended to mean "the Cabinet," although
the term 11 Cabinet" has no precise legal definition. }_/
2/ The Vice President will evidently continue to exercise the .
duties of Vice President while he serves as Acting President.
The Vice President would, however, lose his title ~s President
of the Senate. See 111 Cong. Rec. 3270 (1965) (Sen. Saltonstall);
J. Ferrick, The TW'enty-Fifth Amendment 199 (1965).

3/ See S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1966). We believe
that the "principal officers of the Executive departments, u for
purposes of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, include the Secretary of
State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney·
General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture,
Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,·
Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, and Secretary
of Education. That conclusion is supported by the legislative
history.
See 111 Cong. Rec. 7938 (1965)(Rep. Waggoner); id. at 7941
(Rep. Poff-r;--id. at 7944-45 (Rep. Webster); id. at 7952, 7954
(Rep. Gilbert):" See also J. Ferrick, supra,at 202-203. See
also 5 u.s.c. 101-.~As a practical matter, and in order to avoid any
doubt regarding the sufficiency of any given declaration, i t
would be desirable to obtain the assent of a sufficient number
of 0£ ficials to satisfy any definition of the term "principal office
of the executive departments."
There is some indication that acting heads of departments
may participate in the presidential disability determination.
Al though the legislative history is conflicting, the House Judiciar~·
Committee's report supports this conclusion, see H.R. Rep. No. 203,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 ("1966), as do the Senate debates, ~
111 Cong. Rec. 15380 (June 30, l965)(Sen. Kennedy); id. at·
12385 (July 6, 1965) (Sen. Javits); and a leading commentator on
the Amendment reaches the same conclusion. See J. Ferrick, The
Twentv-Fifth Amendment ·203 (1976). Contra, lll Cong. Rec. 3284
(Feb. 19, 1965)(Rep. Hart).
The contrary view proceeds on the
assumption that such a decision should be made only by persons
whom the President personally selected for his Cabinet. Such
persons are presumably intimately familiar with the President
and are of relatively equal status with the other decisionmakers.
-2-
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We have prepared drafts of appropriate declarations that
might be utilized by the President or the appropriate officers
pursuant to the provisions of sections 3 or 4 of_ the .Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Copies of those drafts are attached.
If, during the period in which the Vice President is Acting
President, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of the TwentyFifth Amendment, the President submits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House a written
declaration that no inability exists, he will ~esume the powers
of his office unless, within four days, the Vice President and a
majority of the Cabinet heads transmit an additional written
declaration stating that the President is unabl~ to discharge
his powers and duties.
At that point, Congress must decide the
issue within specificed time limits.
See U.S. Const., Amend.
XXV, cl. 4. !/

!/

'•

•

Under the Amendment, we believe that there is no requirement
that the requisite writ ten declara t_ions of disabil.i ty be personally
signed by the Vice ·President· and a majority of the heads of
·
·
executive departments. The only requirements are tha-t their assent to the declaration be established in a reliable fashion
and that they direct that their names be ad_ded ·.:.o the document.
Moreover, the Vice President and the Cabinet he~ds may send
separate declarations if necessary.
See Hearir:s on Presidential
Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy-Before ~he-"House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 ( .965).
Finally,
we believe that under both sections 3 and 4 of =he Amendment,
the transfer of authority to the Vice President takes effect
"":"' "immediately" when the declaration is transmitted or sent, and
is not delayed until receipt of the document by the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. Although
the question is not free from doubt, the language aria the history
of the Amendment tend to support this conclusion. See S. Rep. ·
No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965); H.R. Rep.
No. 203, ,~·----89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1965).
But see H.R. Rep. No. 564,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Statement of Managers on the Part of
the House to the effect that "after recei-ot of the President's
written declaration of his inability • • • such powers and duties
would then be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President").
The better construction would allow the devolution of powers
~JJ.>~.~/'.:
"immediately" (the word used in sect ion 4 of the Twenty-Fifth ·,
·
Amendment) upon transmittal. No meaningful pur 1 ~se would be
served by awaiting the arrival of the document.
The alternative
construction allows a more rapid transition of presidentia~
power when the national interests require it •

. ---~-:--:--:-:-.=...;.:..~ .·=--
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II.

Presidential Delegation

Under circumstances in which it is not considered necessary
or appropriate to invoke the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, it may nonetheless be desirable for the President
to delegate certain powers to other officials, including the
Vice President. Under statute, see 3 U.S.C. § 30/1, and under
the Constitution, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117
(1926), the President has broad authority to delegate functions
vested in him by law. At the same time the Constitution and
certain statutory provisions impose limits on the President•s
power to confer his authority on subordinate· officials. The
nature and extent of those limits are considered in this section.
A.

Constitutional Limitations on the President's
Power to Delegate his Functions.

As early as 1855, Attorney General Cushing articulated
the general rule that the functions vested in the President by
the Constitution are not delegable and must be performed by him.
7 Op. A.G. 453, 464-65 (1853) • . The Attorney General opined:

,,

Thus it may be presumed that he, the man
discharging the presidential office, and he alone,
grants reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
United States, not another man, the Attorney General
or anybody else, by delegation of the President.
So he, and he alone, is the supreme commander-inchief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the militia of the several States, when called into the
actual service of the United States. That is a power
constitutionally inherent in the person-of the President.
No act of Congress, no act even of the President
himself, can, by constitutional possibility, authorize
or create any military officer not subordinate to the
President.
So he appoints and removes ambassadors and other
officers of the United States, in the cases and
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with the qualifications indicated by the Constitution.
So he approves or disapproves of bills· which have
passed both Houses of Congress:
that is a personal
act of the President, like the vote of a Senator
or a Representat~ves in Congress, not capable of
performance by a Head .of Department or any other person.
A study prepared by this Office in the 1950 1 s reaches tLe
same conclusions. This study and our research suggest that
the following are nondelegable functions of the President:

1.

The povier to nominate and appoint the officers
of the United States to the extent provided in
Article II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution.

2.

The power to approve or return legislation
pursuant to Art. I,§ 7, cl. 2 and 3, and the
power to call Congress into special session or
to adjourn it according to Article II, § 3.

3.

The power. to make treaties by and with the advic.e
and consent of the Senate. Article II,·§ 2, cl. 2.
It should be noted, however, that the power to
negotiate treaties and the power to enter into
Executive agreements may be delegated.
See 7 Op.
A.G., supra, at 465.

4.

The power to grant pardons.

5.

The power to remove purely executive Presidential
appointees. This pc~er is vested in the President
as an incident of his appointment power.
Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926).

6.

The power to issue Executive Orders.
Only
the President cari issue formal Executive orders
and Proclamations. He can, however, delegate the
power to issue many orders which cover substantially
the same subject matter as Executive
·
orders and Proclamations as long as they are not
so named.·

7.

The powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief
of the Army and Navy.
Article IIr § 2, cl. 1. In vie
of Article I, § 8, cl. 12 and 13, which state that
Congress shall have the power to raise and support·the
Army and to provide and maintain a Navy, many of the

-5-

President's powers as Commander-in-Chief are
statutory in part. To conclude that the President
rnay not delegate his ultimate constitutional
responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief is not
to suggest that he is the only officer of the
Government who may make military decisions in
time of emergency, when immediate response may
be necessary. The President may make formal
or informal arrangements with his civilian and
military subordinates, in order to ensure that
t e
of command will function swiftly and
effectively in time of crisis. Of course, every
military officer must be subordinate· to the
President.

rr---~.,__-

B.

Statutory Limitations on the President's Power
to Delegate his Functions.

The foregoing discussion sets forth the general rule that
the President may not delegate inherent powers that are conferred on him by the Constitution. On the other hand, he may
generally delegate powers that have been conferred on him by
Congress. Congress has so provided in 3 u.s.c. § 3ap.., which
states:
·

i

1

The President of the United Sta tes is authorized
to designate and empower the head of any department
or agency in the executive branch, or any official
thereof who is required to be appointed by and ·
with the advice and consent of the Senate,. to perforl41
without approv~l, ratification, or other action by
the President (1) any function which is vested in
the President by law, or (2) any function which
such officer is required or authorized by law to
perform only with or subject to the approval,
ratification, or other action of the President:
Provided, That nothing contained herein shall relieve
the President of his responsibility in office for
the acts of any such head or other official designatea
by him to perform such functions.
Such designation
and authorization shall be in writing, shall be
published in the Federal Register, shall be subject
to such terms, conditions, and limitations as the
President may deem advisable, and shall be revocable
at any time by the President in whole or in part.
Congress has further provided, in 3 U.S.C.
-6-

§

302, that:

The authority conferred by this chapter shall apply
to any function vested in the President by law if such
law does not affirmatively pr oh ibi t delegation of
the performance of such function as herein provided
for, or specifically designate the officer or
officers to whom it may be delegated. This chapter
shall not be deemed to limit or derogate from any
existing or inherent right of the President to
delegate the performance of functions vested in
him by law, and nothing herein shall be deemed to
require express authorization in any case in which
such an official would be presumed in law to have
acted by authority or direction of the President.
As a result of these statutes, the President is authorized
to delegate any power vested in him by statute unless the
statute "affirmatively prohibit[s] delegation." In our view,
a statute should be construed as an "affirmative" prohibition
of delegation only if it prohibits delegation expressly or by
unmistakable implication. The purpose of sections 301 and 302 is
to facilitate the functioning of the Executive by specifically
authorizing delegation in the great majority of cases. To. this.
end, section 301 states a general rule in favor of delegation.
In light of the breadth of this general rule, the exception in
section 302 should be .narrowly construed. The same_ inference
can be drawn from the fact that Congress took care in section
302 not.to derogate from any "existing or inherent right of
the President to delegate the performance of functions vested
in him by law."
Statutes w~ich do expressly or by unmistakable implication
prohibit delegation are subject to the possible constitutional
objection that the power to delegate is inherent in the Executive
and may not be restricted by Congress. The issue is a difficult
one and has never been resolved in cour~.
In our view, the
wiser course is to comply with any clear congressional intention
to prohibit delegation, in order to avoid testing the limits
of this constitutional question, unless circumstances imperatively
reguire delegation.
In the brief time .we have had to review the matter, we
hQve discovered only a very few statutes that expressly
or by U.'1mistakable implication prohibit delegation. What
follows is a description of categories of statutes that fall
or may fall within this general class.

-7-

1.

Statutes Explicitly Prohibiting Delegntion

The clearest cases are those in which the statute explicitly
prohibits delegation. An example is found in the Export
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2403(e){Supp. III 1979),
which provides that:
The President may delegate the power,
authority, and discretion conferred upon him
by this Act to such departments, agencies,
or officials of the Government as ·· ·
he may consider appropriate, except that no
authority under this Act may be delegated
to, or exercised by, any official of any
department or agency the head of which is
not appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
The
President may not delegate or transfer his
power, authority, and discretion to overrule
or modify any recommendation or decision
made by the Secretary [of Commerce] , the
Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State
pursuant to the provisions of this Act.

•

2.

Statutes Conferring Nondelegable Functions

An unmistakable congressional intent to prohibit delegation
may also be inferred from statutes that impose on the President a
duty or power to exercise a nondelegable function.
For example,
it is conwtonly thought that only the President may issue an
Executive Order or Proclamation.
Statutes that authorize the
President to take an action, but require him to act by way of
Executive Order or Proclamation, can therefore be r~ad as precludinc
delegation.
An example is found in 22 U.S.C. § 44l(a):
·
·wnenever the Pres id en t • • • shall find that
there exists a state of war between foreign
states, and that it is necessary to promote the
security or preserve the peace of the United
States o~ to protect the lives of citizens of
the United States, the President shall issue a
proclamation naming the states involved; and he
shall, from time to time by proclamation, na~e
other states as and when they become involved in the
war.
-8-

3.

Statutes Implicitly Prohibiting Delegation

A broad range of statutes confer power~ on the President
but do not state in terms or in the legislative _history whether
those powers are delegable. In some instances, the character or
importance of the powers in question, or other special circumstances,
may constitute a sufficient indication of a legislative intent
to prohibit delegation.
..
In the brief time available, we have been unable to reach
any firm conclusions regarding particular statutes in this category.
In general, i t would appear that statutory powers that have been
exercised by the President himself on a consistent and longstanding
basis are more likely than others to be held nondelegable. An.
example might be the President's statutory power to enter into
or terminate trade agreements with certain nations under 19

u . s •c •

•

§

13 51 •

A second special circumstance that can give rise ·to an
inference of nondelegability occurs when Congress gives authority
to an agency but subjects that authority to a requirement of
_presidential approval. In this circumstance, it can be argued
that a delegation of the President's approval authority back to
the agency would subvert the evident legislative intent to assure
review by someone outside the agency, while a delegation to
anyone else would conflict with the congressional intent to
centralize prinary administrative responsibility in the agency.For an example of such a statute, see § 12(k) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 l(k). ~/
III.

Delegable Functions

All remaining functions of the President may be delegated
to subordinate officers. Many statutes explicitly authorize
delegation. See, e.g., 22 u.s.c. § 2381 (delegation of certain
foreign affairs-powers).
In the absen~e of specific authorization,
the general delegation statute, 5 u.s.c. §§ 301, 302, explicitly
authorizes delegation except where precluded by statute. It
is beyond the scope of this memorandum to describe the full

5/ We emphasize that the above examples are entirely tentative;
Tt may well be that, upon further examination of the statutes
and their legislative histories, this Office would conclude
that Congress did not intend to prohibit delegation.
-9-
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extent of the presidential powers and responsibilities that
may be delegated. !/ In general, powers which ~ay be delegated
include those of approval, authorization, and assignment; powers
to establish and convene certain administrative commissions, to
designate responsible officers, and to raake certain factual
determinations; powers to direct that certain actions be taken,
to fix compensation of officers, to p~escribe certain rules and
regulations, and to make recommendations or reports.
It bears repetition that the President may_n9~ delegate
his power to delegate his own functions. This is, in our
view, a function that is constitutiona!ly vested in the President
personally. The President may delegate ~is powers if he is
capable of a conscious decision to do so. If,. however, he is
incapable of such a decision, delegation cannot occur.
If
such a situation continues for a substantial period of time,
it would appe~r desirable to initiate procedures for presidential
succession under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. l/
IV.

.

. . ..

Form and Method of Delegation

Whenever a presidential function or power is delegable,
it may be delegated to the head of any department or agency in
the Executive Branch, or any official thereof, if the official
is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.
3 U.S.C.
§ 301.
By statute, such a delegation is ordinarily accomplished
through the preparation and publicatiorr of a written order or
menorandum. The relevant document is normally signed by the
President personally; but there is no express sta~utory requirement

6/ For a description of the President's general authority, see
President's Council on txecutive Organization, The Powers and
Responsibilities of the President (1970).
~-~

21

It might be possible for the President to delegate his powers
contingent upon the occurrence of a specified event such as a
certification by the President's personal physician that the
President is temporarily incapable of making a conscious decision.
We would emphasize, however, that this procedure should not be
used if its effect is contrary to the intent of the procedures
for presidential succession contained in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
-10-
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to that effect. In our opinion, the relevant &tatutory requirement
are satisfied as long as the President actually makes the delegatic
in question and c~uses an appro~riate written memorial to be
prepared and published. He need not sign the document by his
own hand. See United States
Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893); 7
Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 472-73 (1855); 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 82 (1898).
Moreover, the statute does not purport to restrict the President's
constitutional power to delegate his powers and functions. · See
3 u.s.c. § 302. We believe that a President may determine in an
exigent circumstanc~ that it is ·necessary to delegate a power or
function without immediate compliance with the normal. formal
· requisite$ (i.e., publication of a written document).
Such a
delegation is effective if it is necessary to enable the President
to discharge his constitutional duty.

v.

.·

Theodore B. Olson
Off ice of Legal Counsel

..
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FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Prior Presidential Disabilities

This is a summary of prior Presidential disabilities
and the resulting effect on Presidential authority. 1/
1. James Madi son suffered from a severe fever in the
summer of 1813 in the midst of disputes with Congress on how
to pay for the War of 1812. I. Brant, James Madison:
18121836, at 184-94 {1961). Daniel Webster reported at one point
that Madison was too weak to read resolutions brought to his
bedside. Id. at 186-87. Both Houses of Congress became
11
engrossed~or over a month in speculation on the succession, 2/
since the Vice President was.aged and there was a vacancy in the
position of President pro ternpore of the Senate. J. Feerick,
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment 4_.:.5 { 1976) {Feerick). Madison
recovered, however, and no legislation was passed nor were
formal arrangements for the delegation or transfer of power
implemented.

(

1/ Material consulted included the New York Times, S. Rep.
No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) and hearings held in
1958. Presidential Inability: Hearings on S.J. Res. 100,
S.J. Res. 133, S.J. Res. 134, S.J. Res. 141, S.J. Res. 143,
S.J. Res. 144, S. 238, and S. 3113 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciarv,
85th Conq., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Hearingsl.
A list of articles on presidential inability can be found in
the 1958 Hearings, at 41-42.
~/

The first succession act was passed in 1792. Act of March 1,
1792, §§ 9-11, 1 Stat. 239. Unsuccessful efforts to change this
statute occurred in 1820, 1856 and 1881 .

•
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2. William Henry Harrison was inaugurated on March 4,
1841 and died of pneumonia on April 4, 1841. His illness wa~
so short that the question of inability apparently did not
arise. ~/
3. James A. Garfield was wounded on July 2, 1881 by an
assassin and died 80 days later on September 19, 1881. Vice
President Chester A. Arthur did not act in his stead. Arthur
refused to do so because of a fear, shared by many constitutional
scholars of the time, that once he had assumed the powers and
duties of the office, they would "devolve on the Vice President"
permanently, leaving him unable to turn the reins back to the
President. U.S. Const., art. II, sec. 1, cl. 6. See S. Rep.
No. 66, at 26. Al·though the entire Cabinet believed. Garfield
to be unable to carry out his duties, 4/ four of them, including
the Attorney General, agreed with Arthur's analysis.
Secretary
of State James G. Blaine was in fact criticized for attempting
to usurp Presidential powers during Garfield's lengthy illness.
1958 Hearings, at 149-50. ~/
4. Grover Cleveland had two major operations for cancer
of the mouth in July, 1893. He. told almost no one, including
Vice President Adlai Stevenson. The two operations took place
on a friend's yacht, with Cleveland unconscious and strapped
3/ When Harrison died, Secretary of State Daniel Webster
questioned whether the Constitution meant that Vice President
Jbhn Tyler became "Acting President," rather than the President.
Tyler disagreed and took the oath as President, thus establishing
the "Tyler precedent" that the Vice President does succeed
to the off ice of the President when the prior occupant dies.
The deaths of Zachary Taylor (July 9, 1850) and Abraham
Lincoln (April 15, 1865) were apparently so swift that their
Vice Presidents (Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson) assumed
control without trouble.
4/ Garfield was able to conduct only one minor piece of
business -- the signing of an extradition paper.
~/

Arthur, who succeeded Garfield, suffered from an increasingly
debilitating kidney disease while in office. Although he gradually
reduced his schedule, he does not appear to have become completely
incapacitated.
- 2 -
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to a chair propped against the mast.
Ferrick, supra, at 11-12.
The complete secrecy was due to fears that the country might
suffer an economic panic if it knew the President had cancer.
The truth was apparently suppressed until 1917. ~/
5. William McKinley was wounded on Friday, September 6,
1901. He underwent emergency surgery and his doctors issued
optimistic statements about his recovery. So positive was the
outlook that Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt and the Cabinet
members who h3d gathered in Buffalo over the weekend began to
disperse. M. Leech, In the Days of McKinley 598-99 (1959).
.
"[T] he Vice-President was so firmly convinced that the emergency
was over that he went to join his family at a camp. in the
·
Adirondacks, twelve miles· from telegraph or telephone." Id·.·
When McKinley began to fail, a guide was sent up into t h e mountains to fetch Roosevelt. Although he rushed back, Roosevelt
arrived to take the oath of office twelve hours after McKinley's
death on September 14.
6.
Woodrow Wilson was incapacitated from a stroke for
about eight months of his second term. At no time did Vice
President Thomas R. Marshall attempt to take over.
See 1958
Hearings, at 19. The hesitation was due to a fear ~hat such
action would be viewed as an effort to oust Wilson· permanently.
When he recovered, Wilson forced Secretary of State Lans1ng, who
had called Cabinet meetings and suggested .that Marshall take
over as Acting President, to resign, charging him with disloyalty.
Id.

7. Franklin R6osevelt was in declining health during
his last year in office; and died on April 12, 1945.
Vice
President Harry S Truman had had only two conversations with
Roosevelt since the inauguration, neither dealing with
disability.
Perhaps as a reaction to this, Truman supported
a new succession statute, Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 677
(1948).
8. Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered three major illnesses
while in office~ a heart attack (1955), ileitis (1956) and a
"mild" stroke (1957). From the first, Vice President Richard
6/ It was the death of.Cleveland's first Vice President,
Thomas A. Hendricks, in 1885, while Congress was out of session,
which accelerated passage of the Presidential Succession Act,
24 Stat. 1 ( 1886).

-
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Nixon consulted with the Cabinet and developed a procedure
for relaying important matters to the President. A White
House request for an opinion on the temporary delegation of
presidential power was not acted upon because Attorney General
Brownell felt there were sufficient legal arrangements in
place to handle day-to-day operations.
Eis~nhower

was very troubled by the implications of the
disability problem during each of his illnesses.
He asked the
Department of Justice to study the problem and ~ecommend a
solution, urged Congress to act, and entered into an informal
agreement with Mr. Nixon.
Ferrick, supra at 20-22.
The
agreement provided that:
1.
In the event of inability
the President would -- if possible
so inform the Vice President, and the
Vice President would serve as Acting
President, exercising the powers and
duties of the office until the inability
had ended.
2.
In the event of an inability
which would prevent the President from
so communicating with the Vice President,
the Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under
the circumstances, would decide upon the
devolution of the powers and duties of the
off ice and would serve as Acting President
until the inability had ended.

;·

3. Tt2 President, in either event,
would determine when the inability had
ended and at that time would resume the
full exercise of the powers and duties
of the Office.

s.

Rep. No. 66, at 27.

21

Although Congress did hold hearings,

7/ See also N.Y. Times, March 4, 1958, at 1, col. 2.
Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson entered into similar agreements with their
vice-presidents.
s. Rep. No. 66, at 27; N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,
1965, at 13, col. 1. The Johnson-Humphrey agreement was identical to the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement.
The Kennedy agreement
differed only in that it urged the Vice-President to consult
with the Cabinet and the Attorney General "as a matter of wisdom
and sound j udgrnen t."
Id.

- 4 -

hearings, no permanent action was taken.

!f

9. Lyndon B. Johnson was hospitalized four times·, the
first time being for a major bout with the flu (January 23-27,
1965). 9/
In October, 1965 Johnson was hospitalized for gall
bladder-surgery. 10/ He was anesthetized for three to four hours,
after which Press Secretary Moyers announced that Johnson was
again able to make Presidential decisions. 11/_
The same pattern was repeated in November, 1967 when
Johnson underwent simultaneous surgery for a polyp on his vocal
cord and repair of a ventral hernia.
He was anesthetized for
about an hour and a half. Note was made of the agreement that
could make Humphrey 11 Acting President 11 and columni!::.t Tom Wicker
urged that the 25th Amendment be ratified.
In December, 1968, Johnson was again hospitalized for
the flu. The papers, however, said little other than that he
worked on governmen~ papers on one day of his stay.
10. Richard M. Nixon was hospitalized from July 12-20,
1973 for viral pneumonia. The President's.press office said
that he would be able to do necessary work and that he was not
sick enough to require the Vice President to make.special
arrangements.
In an interview, Vice Pres~dent Spiro T. Agnew
~/

See 1958 Hearings and Hearings before the Special Subcommittee
to Study Presidential Disability of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
9/ At the time, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey stated that
there had been discussions of when he would take over and a copy
of the Johnson-Humphrey accord was made available to the press
on January 28.
See n.7 and text.
10/ The accord was again noted by the press and columnist Arthur
Krock urged the states to ratify the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
11/

Citing recent history, Johnson had urged Congress to act
the disability problem in his State of the Union address in .
January, 1965. The proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment was sent to
the states in July, 1965.

on
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said that there was no agreement between the President and
him on what to do in the event of Nixon's disability and. that
the issue had never been discussed.
Although there were persistent rumors about Nixon's
health during the months prior to his resignation, the only
White House announcement was an acknowledgement that.the
President suffered from phlebitis. The operation on his leg
did not occur until September 23, 1974, after his resignation.
11. "Jimmy Carter's scheduled surgery for hemorrhoids
in late December, 1978 was cancelled.
Preparations for the
Vice President to assume power under section 3 of the TwentyFifth Amendment were also cancelled.

Larry L. Simms
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Off ice of Legal Counsel

-
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1975

SUBJECT:

25th Amendment

25th Amendment Provisions
The 25th Amendment provides for Presidential succession in the case of
removal, resignation, or death of a President and stipulates the
procedures for determining both the existence of Presidential incapacity
and the termination of that state of incapacity.
Section 1 of the Amendment specifies that in the case of the death or
resignation of the President or his removal from office, the Vice President
shall become President. Section 2 states that if there is a vacancy in the
office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who would take office upon being confirmed by a majority vote of both
houses of Congress.
Section 3 provides for a Presidential declaration of incapacity. Under
this Section, the President transmits a written statement to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives declaring that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office. Upon that action, the Vice President becomes Acting
President, discharging the powers and duties of the office of the
President, until such time as the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House a written declaration
that he has regained his ability to execute the responsibilities of his
office. The President then resumes the powers and duties of his office.

•

•
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Section 4 provides for a situation in which the President either is unable
or unwilling to declare his own incapacity. In such a case, the Vice
President and a majority of the Secretaries of the Ex1.cutive Departments,
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, can transmit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office. Upon this occurrence, the Vice President
immediately assumes the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President. The President can regain his authority by transmitting a
written declaration to the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the
House that no incapacity exists. He then resumes his powers and duties
unless the Vice President and a majority of the Executive Department
Secretaries transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House their written declaration that the
President remains unable to discharge the responsibilities of his office.
In that event, the Congress must decide the issue, with the requirement
that it assemble within 48 hours for that purpose if it is not in session.
A decision must be reached within 21 days after receipt of the written
declaration or the date of assembly when Congress is not in session. If
Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both houses that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall continue to discharge those duties as Acting
President. If the Congress does not vote by two-thirds of each house,
the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
Implementation of the 25th Amendment
The 25th Amendment was ratified on February 10, 1967. Its provisions
have been utilized twice, once upon Ford's nomination and confirmation as
Vice President and once upon Ford's succession to the Presidency upon
President Nixon's resignation. Despite the fact that the 25th Amendment
was in effect during the last two years of Lyndon Johnson's Presidency,
there is no record of his modifying the written agreement on incapacity
between himself and Vice President Humphrey to reflect the provisions of
the Amendment.

1

The Congress has not provided by legislation for any other system.
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As a result of President Eisenhower's heart attack in 1955 and his ileitis
attack during the start of his second term, the President and Vice
President Nixon reached an agreement on the temporary devolution of
Presidential authority in the event of an inability rendering the President
incapable of exercising the powers and duties of his office. This
agreement was in effect during President Eisenhower's stroke in 1957, and
its existence was not made publicly known until a written agreement was
released in March, 1958.
Following the Eisenhower example, President Kennedy and Vice President
Johnson signed an incapacity agreement which was publicly released in
August, 1961. President Johnson and Speaker of the House McCormick
signed an agreement in December, 1963, and President Johnson and Vice
President Humphrey signed an agreement in January, 1965. The
Johnson /McCormick agreement was not made public, and the Johnson I
Humphrey agreement was not publicly released until the President's gall
bladder operation in October, 1965. All the written agreements, attached
at Tab A, were identical. President Kennedy, however, in his accompanying press release, specifically stated that he and the Vice President
had agreed on the wisdom of Cabinet concurrence in and Attorney General
legal support for the incapacity judgment.
The principal difference between the aforementioned agreements and the
~5th Amendment is that the agreements made no provision for resolving a
dispute between the President and Vice President on the question of
incapacity. Rather, as one would expect in any voluntary agreement
signed by a President, control over determination of the existence of
incapacity rested solely with the President, as long as he could
communicate, and control over termination of the incapacity rested solely
with the President, even if it was the Vice President who had declared
the existence of the incapacity due to the President's inability to
communicate at that time.
The pre-25th Amendment agreements were written in order to circumvent
Constitutional ambiguity and thus overcome Vice Presidential reluctance to
exercise the Presidential power necessary to preserve continuity in
executive leadership. There were a number of inadequacies with relying
solely on the operation of a personal agreement between a President and
Vice President: ( 1) it only applied to the terms of office of the
signatories; (2) it did not carry the force of law and could be
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challenged; and (3) it authorized the Vice President to act without the
protection of unequivocal Constitutional authority. This uncertainty and
the very serious implication of a Vice Presidential assumption of
Presidential power were the focus of arguments in favor of a
Constitutional amendment.

Issues
There are a number of issues which can be of concern in relation to the
25th Amendment:
( 1) Under Section 3, when a President voluntarily declares his own
inability to govern, he alone has the power to declare that the inability
no longer exists. There is no recourse under the Amendment for the
Vice President, the Cabinet Secretaries, or the Congress to block his
resumption of power by disagreeing with the termination of that inability.
( 2) Under Section 4, when a President is either unable or unwilling to
declare his own incapacity, what standards must the Vice President and a
majority of the Cabinet Secretaries use to make their determination that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office?
The legislative history of the Amendment does not provide guidance in
this area.
(3) Must the incapacity of the President be physical or mental or can it
result from outside events, ~. _g:. , a mechanical inability to communicate?
The legislative history is not clear on this point. The issue of disability
which is neither mental nor physical was only mentioned in passing a few
times during the Committee hearings and was never focused on. However, there is nothing to preclude a President and Vice President from
voluntarily entering into a written agreement which would include
provisions for dealing with a non-mental and non-physical disability.
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( 4) Under Section 4, Congress has 21 days in which to make a
determination on the continuation or termination of Presidential incapacity,
if the President did not himself declare the original incapacity and the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet Secretaries disagree with the
President's declaration of an end to his incapacity. Who governs during
this period? The legislative history of the Amendment indicates that the
Vice President continues to exercise the powers and duties of the office
of the President during the 4-day period for transmittal of an objection to
resumption of power by the President and during the 21-day period in
which Congress must act. However, during both those periods of time, it
would be very difficult to avoid a feeling of serious uncertainty and this
atmosphere could be debilitating to the exercise of executive leadership.
( 5) Under Section 4, if the Congress votes that the Presidential
incapacity is continuing, may the President ask for another vote at any
time by resubmitting his written declaration that no inability exists?
According to the legislative history, the answer would seem to be in the
affirmative .

•

( 6) Under Section 4, the Amendment requires a majority vote of the
Congress for Vice Presidential confirmation; the vote of the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet Secretaries to declare Presidential
incapacity when the President is unable or unwilling to declare his own
incapacity; and the vote of the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet Secretaries, together with a two-thirds vote of the Congress, to
prevent the President, on the grounds of continuing incapacity, from
resuming the powers and duties of his office.
Are these votes to be based on the body's total membership or only
on those present and voting, a quorum being present? In voting on
Ford's confirmation as Vice President, the Congress interpreted a majority
vote as requiring a simple majority of those present and voting. In his
1965 testimony before both the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments,
Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach stated that the votes required
by the Amendment were based on those present and voting, a quorum
being present. He asserted that this interpretation was consistent with
long standing precedent. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports
support that view. In specific reference to the two-thirds of Congress

•
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required under Section 4, both Reports note that this vote is in
conformity with the Constitutional provision on impeachments. That
provision provides for a two-thirds vote in the Senate of those members
present. Given the legislative history and legal precedents, a challenge
to this interpretation would have very little, if any, chance of prevailing.
Presidential/Vice Presidential Written Agreement

••

A written agreement between you and Vice President Rockefeller might be
beneficial for two reasons: ( 1) to clarify for your own operating
procedures the ambiguities raised by some of the provisions of the
25th Amendment; and (2) if you should choose to release the agreement,
to educate the public and foreign nations as to the procedures that will
be followed to insure continuity of executive leadership during a period of
Presidential incapacity. Such an agreement should list the procedures
provided for in the Amendment, emphasizing the specific powers of the
President, Vice President, Cabinet Secretaries and Congress in relation to
incapacity, and should set standards for the Vice President and Cabinet
Secretaries to follow pursuant to Section 4 in the event that the President
is unable or unwilling to declare his own incapacity. In establishing such
standards, the agreement would define, to the extent possible, what
constitutes an incapacity. The agreements written prior to the 25th
Amendment did not attempt to define incapacity, but they also did not
provide for Vice Presidential disagreement with the President over the
issue of incapacity. Since the ratification of the 25th Amendment allows
for a Vice Presidential and Cabinet Secretarial challenge to the President,
it is prudent in our opinion to provide a written Presidential/Vice
Presidential agreement on the subject.
Recommendations
It is the recommendation of the Counsel's Office that you and Vice
President Rockefeller sign a written agreement on incapacity.

Disapprove
Comment

•

~~~~~~~~~-

Johnson/Humphrey

Procedures for Use in the Event of
Presidential Inability
Announcement of Procedures Agreed Upon
by President Johnson and Vice Presiclent Humphrey.
October 5, 1965

••

The following procedures, which are identical to the
procedures adopted by President Eisenhower and Vice
President Nixon as well as President Kennedy and Vice
President Johnson, have been agreed upon by President
Johnson and Vice President Humphrey:
( 1) In the event of inability the President would-if
possible-so infol"I!l the Vice President, and the Vice
President would serve as Acting President, exercising the
powers and duties of the Office until the inability had
ended.
( 2) In the e\'ent of an inability which would prevent
the President from so communicating with the Vice Pres. ident, the Vice President, after such consultation as seems
to him appropriate under the circumstances, would
decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of
the Office and would serve as Acting President until the
inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event, would determine
when the inability had ended and at that time would
resume the full exercise of the powers and duties of the
Office.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958

40
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CdI Agreement Between the President and the

Vice President as to Procedures in the Event of
Presidential Disability. A1arch 3, r 958
TI-IE PRESIDENT and the Vice President have agreed that the following procedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of Article
2, Section 1, of the Constitution, dealing with Presidential inability.
They believe that these procedures, which are intended to apply to
themselves only, are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution
but are consistent with its present provisions and imp1ement its clear
intent.
( 1) In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting
President, exercising the powers and duties of the Office until the inability
had ended.
( !2) In the e\"ent of an inability which would preYcnt the President
from so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President,
after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of
the Office and would serve as Acting President until the inability had
ended.
( 3) The President, in either event, would determine when the inabilitv had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the
' and duties of the Office.
powers
·
. .'
!\On:: This is the text of agreement as set forth in a 'Vhite House news release. of
this date.

.
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/oh11 F. Ke11nedy, 1961

\

m:itters when our information is so faulty,
so incomplete.
[ :z3.] Q. Mr. PrcsiJent, in connection
with the Berlin crisis, there has been quite
a bit of speculation about one or more
summit conferences. \Vould you tell us
wh:it your attitude is at this time toward
summit negoti:itions?
THE PRESIDENT. \Veil, the attitude which
I h<tYe held and still hold is that no summit
between East and West is useful unless the
groundwork has been laid beforehand which
will insure some success. As far as a summit
of \Vestern leaders, I think that if it should
pro\'e important in coordinating our policy
on any matter, Berlin, I think that that
meeting should be held and would be
prepared to do so.
[24.] Q. Mr. President, during the foreign aid debate, there has been some concern expressed by legislators based upon the
reports from MonteYideo that some of the
L::itin American nations are not, apparently,
e:iger to institute the self-help measures
which you've made a condition of your
progr:im, and that the administration m:iy
not mmt upon those conditions. Do you
intend to insist upon those conditions?

319

Aug.

10

[319]

THE PRESIDENT. We're prepared to make a
major effort in this regard and we're hopeful that other countries who also have high
living stand:irds will do so. Bue of course
it would be completely useless unless an
effort were made by all concerned. One of
the proposals which have been made in
Montevideo which is of particular interest
is that under the aegis of the Inter-American
Bank, that a study by independent experts
be made of each country's economic planning
and progress and commitment, and it seems
· to me that this is a great basis for ·a hemispheric effort. We're not interested in making the contributions which I think we have
to make unless we feel that they're going to
improYe the life of the people. And, there·
fore, there's a responsibility on us all, for
us to contribute to the success of this goal
and for the countries involved to make
sure that this effort hdps the people, because
otherwise the effort will fail and those societies will inevitably be wiped away-unless
some real progress is made.
Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President.
Non: The Presidc:nt's fifteenth news conference was
held in the State Department Auditorium at 10
o'clock on Thursday morning, August 10, 1961.

\Vhite House Statement and Text of Agreement Between the
President and the Vice President on Procedures in the Event of
Presidential Inability. August ro, 1961

THE PRESIDENT and the Vice President
have agreed to adhere to procedures identical to those which former President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon adopted
with rcgJrd to any questions of Presidential
in:ibility. Those procedures are as follows:
( r) In tl1e event of inability the President
would-if possible-so inform the Vice Preside:-.t, and the Vice President would serve

as Acting President, exercising the powers
and duties of the Office until the inability
had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which
would prevent the President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation :is
seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution
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of the powers and duties of the Office and
would serve as Acting President until the
inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event, would
determine when the inability had ended and
at that time would resume the full exercise
of the powers and duties of the Office.
After consultation with the Attorney General, it is the understanding of the President
and the Vice President that these procedures
reflect the correct interpretation to be ·given
to Article II, Section I, clause 5 of the Constitution. This was also the view of the
prior Administration and is supported by
the great ·majority of constitutional scholars.
The relevant constitutional provision is:
..In Case of the Removal of the President
from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties
of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress
m.'.ly by Law provide for the Case of Removal,. Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, :md such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or
a Presi<len~ shall be elected."
Under this proYision, upon a proper determin:nion of Presidential inability, the
Vice President succeeds tempor.'.lrily to the
powers and duties of the Presidency until
such time as the President is enabled to act
again. Unlike the case of remov.:il, death,
or resignation, the Vice President does not
permanently become President.

Under the arrangement quoted above, the
Vice President agrees to serve as Acting
President "after such consultation as seems
to him appropriate under the circumstan~es."
There is no provision of the
Constitution or of law prescribing any procedure of consultation, but the President and
Vice President felt, as a matter of wisdom .
and soun_d judgment, that the Vice President
would wish to have the support of the
Cabinet as to ~e necessity and desirability·
of disch.:irging the powers and duties of the
Presidency as Acting Pres!dent as well as
legal advice from the Attorney General that
the circumstances would, under the Constitution, justify his doing so. The understanding between the President and the Vice
President authorizes the Vice President to
consult with these officials with a free mind
that this is what the President intended in
the event of a crisis.
Prior to the Eisenhower-Nixon arrangement, there were no similar understandings·
of a public nature. For this reason, prior
Vice Presidents haYe hesit..lted to take any
initiative durinf; the period when the President was dis:ibled. Obviously, this is a risk
which cannot· be t.:iken in these times, and
it is for that reason th.lt President Kenned)'
and Vice President Johnson have agreed to
follow the precedent established by the past
Administration.
NOT.E: The: Attorney Gener::i!'s op:nion upon th::
construction to be given to the: Presidential in::ibilit;clausc: of the: Com:.itution was sub:ninc:d to the
President in a letter d:ned Au~us: :: (::7 pp., Government Printinf! O:'Ece, 1961).
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THE WHITE HOUSE
'\\'ASHINGTON

December Z3, 1963

Confirming our oral agreement regarding the
procedures to be followed in the event of my
inability to exercise the powers and duties of the
Presidency, I am reducing the agreement to
writing and would appreciate your signing the
original of this letter and returning it to me for
safekeeping in the Presidential files. Enclosed
for your use is a signed duplicate original. The
terms of the agreement are as follows:

\

1. In the ·event of inability, the President would
if possible -- so inform the Speaker of the House,
and the Speaker of the House would serve as Acting
President, exercising the powers and duties of the
Office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent
the President from communicating with the Speaker
of the House, the Speaker of the House, after such
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the
circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of
the powers and duties of the Office and would serve
as Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President. in either event, would determine
when the inability had ended and at that time would
resume the full exercise of the powers am duties of
the Office.

Page l of 2 pages.
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-z4. After being informed by the President o! his
inability or, in the event o! an inability which would
prevent the President from communicating with th~
Speaker of the House, after the latter satisfies himself
that such inability exists, the Speaker of the House will
resign as Speaker and as Representative in Congress
before undertaking to act as President.

,.
I

Honorable John W. McCormack
Speaker of .the House of Representatives
.. Washington, D. C.

Page 2 of 2 pages.
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MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:

RE:

Michael Berman

Rob~rt

Tor.ricelH

·-q

Presidential Succession and the Ambiguities
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

INTRODUCTION

•

Serious ambiguiEies in the Twenty-Fifth Amenement create
the need for a state~ent of definitions and principles. Without
the President and Vice President concluding such a joint statement, serious problgms of interpretation could arise in a number
of circumstances .
It a?pears that no attention has been given to these
potential difficulties. This memorandum seeks to identify the
Constitution's ambiguities, outline previous Administration's
solutions and propose an advisable course of action.
A)

Previous President/Vice President Agreements on Succession
and Disability
---There are five documented instances where written agreements have been signed on this issue. ·Since the public release
of such understandings has been a recent development, i t is possible that other Ad'11inistrations dealt with this problem as well.
Procedural understandings relating to Presidential succession
can be divided into two categories:
1.

i·1ri tten agreements before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The purpose of these signed memoranda was to establish
a orocedure for Presidential succession in the event
of· a Presidential disability. The first in a modern
series of such accords was drafted in 1957. The
Eisenhower/Nixon Administration feared the uncertainties of leadership that arose during the crit~cal
illnesses of Presidents Garfield and Wilson.
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Succeeding Administrations continued the Eisenhower
precedent. Similar agreements were entered into by
Kennedy/Johnson, Johnson/McCormick and Johnson/Humphrey.
2.

Written Agreements after the Twenty-Fifth Amendment_
The Johnson/Humphrey agreement remained in effect
after the Constitution was amended in 1967 . . The
Nixon Administration made no public acknowledgement
of any similar understanding.
In 1975, however, the
President's Counsel proposed to President Ford that·
he ente~·into such an accord with Vice President
Rockefeller. The Counsel's Office advised President
Ford that, despite the passage of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendmen~, serious ques~ions regarding succession
still persisted.*

B)

•

Summary of Previous Written Agreements ·

Each of the prior agreements can be easily characterized~
Power was specificaJly granted to the Vice President to assume
the position of "Acting President" if the President should become
disabled and unable to communicate his condition.
The power to
reassume the office was always vested entirely in the President.
Since the Kennedy/Johnson memorandum in 1961 each succeeding docu~
ment provided that the Vice President consult with the "appropriate"
persons before initiating the succession process.
Each of these
agreements appe1rs to have been adequate at the time.
The enactment of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, however, raises additional
procedural and definitional problems due to the complex process
of succession that i t establishes.
C)

Possible Problems of Interpretation of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment

Potential conflicts arising out of the use of this amendment appear in three major instances.
It was these same potential
problems that prompted the Counsel's Office memorandum to President
Ford.
1.

*

Section 3 of the Amendment provides for the
President temporarily removing himself from office
due to a_disability.
Only the President's own
actions are required.
Upon the transmittal of an
appropriate written statement to the Congressional
leadership, the Vice President becomes "Acting
President".

I am awaiting your authorization before researching the
eventual disposition of this advice.

- - - - - - - - - - --------- --------·
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The area of concern is the means by which the
President reassumes the Office of President.
If the President voluntarily removes himself from
office he can reassume office at will. No concurrent opinions as to his mental or physical
condition are required. Other members of the
government would be without recourse under the
provisions of the Amendment if they disagreed with
the President as to his condition.
2.

•

The actual language of the Anendrnent does not reveal
who presides as President curing the twenty-one day
challenge period. The legislative history of the
amendment strongly suggests that the Vice President
continues as Acting President. The possibility of a
period of uncertainty as to the nation's leadership
would continue, however, illltil the matter was litigated.
3.

-----··.
·---··-~

Section 4 of the Amendment provides for those
instances when the President is unable or unwilling
to declare his d~_sability.
In such a situation the
Cabinet and Vice President, by majority vote, are
entitled to appoint the Vice President as Acting
President. When the Presicent considers himself
well enough to reassume the Presidency he may ·do so.
If the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet
do not feel that the President is sufficiently ·able,
they may challenge his resumption of office. _The
challenge must be made within four days of the President's attempted resumption of office and the Congress
must vote upon the challenge within twenty-one days.·

-

Both Sections 3 and 4 refer to the "disabilities" of
the President. It is not clear what types of illnesses
or impairments were intended to be included as "disabilities" for purposes of this amendment. The Ford
Administration seemed to conclude that both the language
and the legislative history of the anendr!lent were unclear as to any definition.
It is uncertain, therefore,
under what conditions each of these procecures for a
shift in executory power arise and when they revert.
Once again, the potential difficulty is the uncertain
status of executive leadership while the definition of
these terms is litigated.

----- --

---------------.--

~---

---·---~---·---·-~

...
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D)

Recommendations

The specific contents of any written agreement between
the President and_~ice President must include the following:
1.

A stipul"ation of the procedures which will be
followed before the President reassumes office
after removing himself under Section 3. While
such an agreement would not have a sufficient force
of law
prevent a disabled President from re. suming office, it is necessary. · International
fears about the possible resumption of office by a
disabled President could be quelled by the. release
of such a document during the period of disability.
The fact that such an understanding is in force
could be extremely useful in preserving a clear
continum of leadership and reassuring any doubts.
As previously stated, such a document might not
succeed in preventing a resumption of power, but
it would lessen speculation and doubt during the
disability period.

to

•

2.

An expression by the .President and Vice President
as to their interpretation of Section 4 is also
necessary.
If a President's resumption of office
under Se~tion 4 is challenged, tremendous uncertainty would result. A statement that makes it clear that
the Vice President was intended to continue in office
during the Congress' deliberations would be of great
value.
While the legislative history of the amendment suggests t.he eventual determination, a mutual
expression would be of considerable use in both
answering the public's fears and in aiding the eventual
outcome of the litigation.

3.

Definitional problems are certain to arise whenever
Section 3 or 4 of the Amendment is used.
It appears
that the public, the Congress, and the courts will
have little to rely on in interpreting the legislative intent. There is even a question as to whether
mental or emotional illnesses were contemplated.
The record of the hearings reveals no definitions of
"disability", "unable", "no inability" and "Acting
President". The process for determining the legal
definitions of these terms might be lengthy.
Serious
questions as to the status of the nation's leadership
could arise. A signed statement of definitions would
certainly not be any more controlling in this context
than in others. However, the public release of such

•
·-
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a previously concluded agreement would greatly
add to the stability of the nation.
Such a
statement, for example, need only list those instances considered to be disabling. The history
of President/Vice President agreerrents reveals
considerable fear that a Vice President would
hesitate to assume power if there was doubt as to
the existence of the necessary circumstances. A
memorandum to this effect would eliminate some
of this apprehension while reassuring the public
about the· cont in um of leadership.
E)

Conclusion

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment seems to have created almost as
many questions ·as it has answered. The timing of modern events
will not allow for the uncertainty that arises from a lo__ng process
of legal interpretation..
The nation and the world must never be
put in a position of having to speculate as to the nation's leadership.
From a legal vantage point there may be no way of pro·
tecting against a certain degree of uncertainty.
However, the
public's perception about the immediate right to exercise power
can be influenced and reinforced·by the proper written agreement.
An agreement of this nature can be withheld from the public

and released only w~en necessary to address the anticipated situation.
Alternatively, the agreement could be released upon its signing
as most recent Administrations have done. A public acknowledgement
has two advantages. First, it evidences the close and trusting
relationship between the President and the Vice President. Second,
it serves to show the Administration's concern about every contingency surrounding the continum of leadership.
The impact of
this reassurance would seem to be considerable on both the domestic
and international scene.
The need for an agreement of this type might not appear as
necessary today as it did when the President was disabled in 1957
or 1965, however, such documents have a way of being used by succeeding Administrations. By continuing the use of such safeguards,
we will be enhancing the chance of their future use while protecting
ourselves against remote circumstances.
I would recommend that you raise these issues with the
Vice President ·and then offer an outline of the major issues to
the President's Counsel.
cc:

Marilyn Haft
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MEMORANDUM FOR:

MIKE BERMAN

FR.OM:

FRANK WIGGINS

I

"The 25th Amendment and Beyond_

RE:

What follows addresses two categories of problems associated
with succession to the Presidency. I take up ~i~st problems. sur.rounding the mechanics of the Ar.iendment.and, in part II, broader
concerns.
I.

Gaps in the operation of the 25th Amendment

A. Desc=iption, brief history and some g~neral thoughts
on the valu~ of a letter of understanding.
The 25th .Amend.Inent provides two mechanisms for temporarily vesting
the Vice President with Presidential powers:

!

I
!

1
I

l

{

_,
I

•

1. The President may declare himself unable to discharge
his duties, and act which deeds Presidential power to the Vice
President u.itil the President issues a countermanding statement
asser~ing that his inability is at an end.
2.
The Vice President and a majority of the cabinet
may declare that the President is unable to discharge his duties.
This action.also devolves Presidential powers upon the Vice President l
until the President issues a writing indicating that he believes
~
himself able to perform.
If, upon the issuance of such a PresiI
dential decla=ation, the V.P. and a majority of the cabinet disagree with.the President's appraisal they may put the question
i
of fit.iess to a resolution by the Congress.
This step is effected
r
l
by the issuance of a letter within four days of the President's
.r
avowal of fitness which triggers a 21-day (somewhat longer if
Congress is not in session) period during which the Congress can,
by the vote of a 2/3 majority, uphold the Vice President and cabinet.
Should that congressional action not be forthcoming, the
Preside~t will then res~~e his off ice. _!./

I

It was suggested by the CotL~sel to the President during the Ford
Administration t.li.at certain of the mechanics of this process should
be clarified in a letter of agreement running between the President
and Vice Preside~t Rockefeller. That suggestion did not mature
into an agreement but does raise a possibility which ought to at
least be conside~ed.

r

I
l

f
'

r.
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Agreement between the principals clarifying matters left
uncertain by the terms.of the 25th Amendment will proveof little or no legal significance.
The powers i!_I)d pro-·._.
cddures given expression in the Amendment are not subject
to alteration through negotiation.
Similarly, the readi~g- ·
given the Amendment by those to whom the powers devolve and-.
procedures apply is not really germane to the meaning intended by those who gave the measure force through the
ratification process. Those conclusions are not, however,.
very responsive to the question of the advisability of. an
articulation of understanding; hard core legalism-m.iSses =-===~:::::. =.the mark.
·
·:_-,..:_==~
·--·- ~.::.=- .
Litigation and the consequent niceities of courtly analysis·.·
could grow out of the circumstances which call for appl~
cation of the Amendment -- for example, as challenges to
the legality of actions undertaken by a party__exerci~ing
power under the authority of the thing -- but_ the most. . .
.
important and surely most immediate focus must rest=on- :..:..===.::.=z·
encouraging the abatement of anxiety and confusion which
will inevitably accompany any occasion for employing the-·
Amendment.
It is, then, efficacy in portraying-a sense--~--.
of legitimacy in troubled times.which ought to be the
standard by which perfecting an agreement should.be judged •.
Cast that way, i t would seem wise to pursue agreement where-~
uncertainities, even sma11· ones, are likely to be-decreasea:=-~
or eliminated thereby in the first moments of the Amendment 1 s application. ·rt remains important that any accord
be not only pacifying but also consonant with predictions--~~
of legal outcomes, but insofar as both ambi tions-·can -be:-- ---·-...:.accomoda ted the former is surely ascendant. With that - - - =- --- standard in head, I turn to specific areas which might be-:~
clarified.
B.

Defining "Inability"

The most obviously troublesorreprovision of the A.uenCL~ent is
t.~e use of the indefinite phrase "unable to discharge the=
·
po·,.;ers and duties of his office" to describe the appropriat~
occasion for involuntary removal of the President from· nis :....._:;.
position.
The primary focus of the Ford Administration's·
suggestion for agreement encouraged more precise definition. __
I am not persuaded that an at.tempt at a more refined formula-·
tion would be proquctive.
The chief difficulty with such an attempt is the ominous portent
of an under-inclusive description.
A pre-existing accord which
pretended to be exhaustive would only exacerbate difficulties
if it omitted an arguably disqualifying condition which became the ground for an exercise of the Amendment.
And the
likelihood of bei~g under-iP-clusive in any definition seems
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Once one gets beyond a comatose state, .or perhaps,
massive"paraiysis, defining "inability~is likely to necessitate some reference to the urgency-of surrounding circumstances_.
Ther~ was .. suggestion in the _hearings preceeding
congressional ·actiori ori:the Joint.Resolution which was ratified
as ·the ·2sth Amendment,_
e·xample, _that the period of.·convalesence following President Eisenhower's heart attack did
not signific·ant"Iy di~iupt-the "government largely because
nothing _much __was happenin·g, whereas .the period of similarly
constricted acti"vity during ·the .Wilson Administration had
much broader impact because of the ~endency_ o~ the-Oecision
on P.articipation in the· -League of Nations. -Even were one to
conclude that reference to outside events could so~ehow be
elided, charting disabling.occurences would __ have a chance
-- at su'fficient breadth ·only~_it: lt- took-.-the- form--of a schedule
of capabilities _necessary ·to- _conduct of presidential duties.·
And measuring those capabili tie-s against_ -the huge number of
combinations of· affliction- which might. come into play would
be a difficult,_exhausting_and somewhat macabre affair. When·
one shifts from physical disabiilty to mental problems both
of the difficulties which .I've.suggested above escalate to
the level of near impossibility.
Though I have not consulted
with· anyone claiming expertis·e on this particular question
my own experience in the appiication of statutes authorizing
civil co~~itment for rne~tally disordered individuals -- an
analogous endeavor from the vantage of formulating standards
persuades me that doing an adequately good job is beyond the
range of the disciplines involved.

The Ford memorandum, and some of the discussion prior to
ratification, suggests a third variety--of- disabling event
denoted as neither physical or mental but "-(the) result of
outside events, e.g., a mechanical inability to communicate."
At least as prominently here as when one is dealing with
physical or mental difficulties, the range of possible instances for the invocation of the Amendment is so great as
to make ready description very difficult.
~~ough

I think it unarguable that tha trauma almost certain
to be linked to ouster of a President would be mitigated
if the Vice President ~nd Cabinet could point back to an
agreement, the difficulties in forming a pact which would
substantially foreclose the risks of omission, overcome
that value.
The Senate Report which accompanied the Amendment to the floor noted that the mechanisms recommended were
not "mechanical or procedural solution(s) (to) provide a
complete answer" but depended "upon public opinion with
a possession of 'constitutional morality.'"
I think that
invocation of that mood is about as precise as one can be.

I
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Matters of Time

There are two questions involving the timing of transition in the Presidential power which do not raise such intractibJ
definitional questions. Both revolve around the process of disputing the re-assumption of power by a President who contends
that his period of disability has passed.
Recall that· the
Vice President and Cabinet may .take four days following transmittal .of the· Presidential letter asserting fitness to challenge
that conclusion and, thereby, put the matter before the Congress.
Congress then has twenty-one days (or sornewhat·longer if not in
session) to resolve the matter. The Ford White House thought
there to. be sufficient ambiguity in the Amendment's ·response
to the question of who was to have Presidential authority during
the four days, and the subsequent 21 days to recommend clarification by agreement.
. .
The matter of the 21 days, the time during which Congress must
vote to uphold the assertion of unfitness, does not seem doubtful at all. The structure of the language of the Amendment runs
as follows:

~)~

""When the President transmits (his avowal of fitness)
he shall resume (office} unless the V.P. and (Cabinet)
transmit (their conclusion to the contrary} ••• thereupon Congress shall decide."

The resumption is made conditional upon the absence of action
by the Vice President and Cabinet: if such action is·forthcoming resumption must await the Congressi~~al decision.
Support for this reading goes beyond syntax; the Senate Report · 2
is unequivocal -- "the intent .•• is that ._the Vice President is
to continue to exercise the powers and duties of the office •••
until a determination ·an the President's inability is made by
Congress" -- the conclusion was endorsed by, inter alia, Senator Bayh and Representative Cellar, the floor managers of t~e
Resolution, and logic would dictate that when substantial
question has been raised as to the President's abilities he
ought not to be moved back into power until the Congress has
resolved those questions.

..

l:,..

r-~-·- __ ·

Thus, I think that a letter of agreement on the matter of who
presides during the 21-day period is simply unnecessary. Such
an agreement would not, however, do any harm and just might
provide some balm should occasion for its invocation arise.

Page Four
The matter of the four days is less clear. Here the
structure of the Amendment's language is not so helpful because the "unless" condition to resumption is
its elf qualified by-the-four--day.-period. One could
read the language to provide.~i~her for immediate·_
resumption defeasible by the-maturing ~f the condi~=--~~
~=-=-~:~
tion or· to support resumption only after the unless._· _
. -~-·:...:~condition could--not be fulfilled, resumption after .. ··
_
- -- the· four days for challenging action· had passed.
. __ :: .:::_::.=·
The latter construction makes more sense if contin··
_uity is a primary value.
Passing the sceptre un-- .--..:· ---- - -··--....,._
necessarily often,, particularly -in an atmosphere of:.:::..-~-,_.-. -=-- ·:- . --=-··-:- ..
some· discord, is .probably _not to be preferred. Se?ator_ ·
_. =-::-==~Bayh endorsed this reading on the Senate floor~
.
·- ..
as did Congressman Cellar in the House. _._4/ BU:t some - - - .- ___ .:_:_ -uncertainty is raised by Senator Dirksen' s. wondering.
. -·: -· - ~-:. ··
on the question -- both in his dissenting position.
in the Cammi ttee Report and again ori the floor _..;.. and-=-::::;._-:: - ---·-- - - --in a confusing exchange in the Senate occasioned by an
amendment to this t~ming provision offered by Senator
Hruska. -2.I
·
·
·.... --·- -Though I am fairly confident that a court would adopt
the reading leaving control in the Vice President until
the four day period had elapsed and doubt, in all events,
that i t would ever be necessary for the Vice President
and Cabinet to defer the· issuance of their challenge
letter for such a protracted period, i t may be advisable
to remove a11· doubts by dealing with the matter in a letter
of agrea~ent.
The impediment to this course is that the
President may well be disinclined to commit himself--tcr· it-;
One can easily hypothesize circumstances in which a ~esident would think i t advisable to immediately resume power
without the specter of a waiting·period imposed by a recalcitrant Vice President. Because this may prove a
touc~y question, I think that before drafting the language
of an agreement the matter should be raised with the Presi- .
dent's people.
If this question is coupled with the relatively
more clear-cut business of the twenty-one days and the
voting matter discussed below perhaps the pac~age can be
characterized as nothing more than an abundantly cautious
step to remove all vestiges of doubt about fairly certain
matters.

•
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D. Voting Problems=

-

.

~-.=--=-:- .:._-~.
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A third variety of mechanical question_~aised by
the Arnendment_centers on the .two voting processes which it
embodies.
It. was .. passingly suggested in the ~oJ;_c;l -rnemorandum
that there is some ambiguity to_the descriptio~_of the congressional vote.
The history seems to-me quite~Glearly to
indicate that two-thirds means .two-thi:i::.ds ..Of-those present
and voting, a quorum-having.been assempled and-the two chambers
voting separately. .Moreover, an agreement between the President and th"'e Vice President. purporting to ;establis.h rules_~
for the Congress woul.d_be out of 1ine •. ..: __:_~:
.. .::~=:.=
.
·- - - .. - . The only genuine uncertainty which I~sea..:.in the business of
voting concerns the .vote of ·the Cabinet. ~ Becaus-e.-that body
has no statutory·-or .other. official .recognition~..:rules for
voting on other matters are not -available _for analogy. The ~.
history is somewhat.· two-sided on how one .. counts a majority
in the Cabinet •.. In ..explaining ..the Conunittee amendment which
had exchanged the phrase "heads of the executive departmentsR
for the evantually ratified language "the principal officer
in each of the executive departments," the House Report notes
t.'1-iat, "in case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness
of the head of any executive department, the acting-head of
the department would be authorized to participate in.a presidential inavility determination." __§_/ This suggests that a
majority would necessarily consist of the expressions of more
than one-half of the executive departments through some ~pokes
person. On the Senate floor, however, Senator Bayh r~ad the
measure d_ifferently:
_ . __ _ - -

-

MR. HART.
Is it the understanding of the Sena~e,
in taking this action, that the Under Secretary,
in the event of a vacancy in the office of Secretary,
shall be empowered as would the Secretary himself, in
participating· in the decision with respect to ability
or disability?
BAYH:
It is the opinion of the junion Senator
from Indiana that it is not. ·

MR.

HART:
This would
Secretaries as may be
with respect to those
Cabinet decision.
Is
M,.q.

reduce it by as many Under
involved in the situation
who would participate in the
that correct?

l

..

.....A.
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The point pressed-by-Senator-Hart was that the decision
on disability could end up in the hands of a very small
group.· While neither construction leads to the contretemps which you suggested -- the situation in which a
.
disability· decision could not be reached because fewer=~~ . __ _
than half of the Cabinet members are able to participat~-~~-:-:_-
it might well be appropriate to supply clarification
through agreement. _
-~ - ~-
I am not persua_ded _that there is either __a _"_right"_ answe_r
or a preferable position on this question.
Unless - you..:.
~ ---:have powerful feelings in one drrection or the other·, . ~, - ~~-·
this might be something to give the White House people
in trade for the four day provision.
. _ __

-

II.·

l

r
~'.

·-----

Beyond the 25th Amendmen1:

f

. -- _f

J
t

•

------

There is a second sort of question raised by the _- - - __
problems of Presidential inavility which is really beyortq ___ _
the purport of the 25th ~.rnendment. What is to happen if-=-· both t.~e President and the Vice President are unable to
function? Though the enquiry was not lost on the Congress
neit.~er was there any attempt to deal with the problem.
A very weak statutory response is available. The Succession to the Presidency Act, codified at 3 U.S.C. 19, provides that,
"if by reason of • • • inability • • • there is neither a Presi- .
dent nor a Vice President to discharge the powers and duties
of the Office of the President, then the Sepaker of the House •••
shall ••• act as President ••. until the removal of the disability
of one of the individuals." There are two overarching difficulties
with reading this language as an escape mechanism.
First, it
necessarily contemplates a determination of Presidential -- and
perhaps Vice Presidential -- inability which is at odds with the
25th Amendment procedure.
This is so because of the role of the
Vice President in the ~.mendment. Quite as crushingly, there are
no procedures articulated for the decision, even were it constitutionally permissible. This second flaw might conceivably
be remedied by statute, but even putting aside the problems of
conflict with the 25th Amendment, the wisdom and legality of
dealing with the matter of removal for inability by legislation
is very questionable. _E/

--------

l
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In addition to the problem of how to provide for·an incapacitated Vice President; there are .hard questions· of
what any such pr.ovision should. contain •.. I am persuaded
and Marilyn concurs with this- :--· that .. the Speaker and· the
Cabinet ought to make- the-decision. to:: oust the Vice President.
- Obviously the President_should~be;~onsulted in the circumstances
of a sound President, but-making some-act by the President a
part of the procedure·will:foil·the-process if both the Vice·
President and ~he President are incapacitated. And the provision should apply as well to a situation in which the Vice
President is dead and the·. President. is either unable or unwilling to make an appointment.- under ..§. 2 of the 25th Amendment.
Here, as in the .. case of. allegations· of Presi"dential inability, there ought to be·a resumption/challenge mechanism
but here both the Vice .President..:who is being supplanted and.
the President, who has a right to fill a vacancy in that·office,
should be permitted to make the challenge. Something along the
following lines seems to~meet;~though.rather cumbersomely, those
amb:i tions_:___ ·--- · ·
If the Speaker of the House of-Representatives
(1) and a majority of .the principal officers of
the.executive departments (2) (or of s~ch otherbody as Congress may be law provide) {3} evidence··
by a signed declaration their determination that,
by reason of either death (4) or inability, the
Vice President is unable to discharge the powersand duties of his.office or if the Vice President
transmits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President a written declaration of
such inability ( 5) •.. -The Speaker of the House of
Representatives may; after appropriate consultation-with the President, (6) assume and discharge such
powers and duties as Acting Vice President.
If, thereafter, either the President or the Vice
President transmits to the Acting Vice President,
the President's pro tempore of the Senate and the
6f the House of Representatives
(7) a declaration that powers and duties of the
Vice President ought no longer to be discharged
by the .-a.cting Vice President ( 8) the Acting Vice-·Pres ident will be relieved of those powers and
duties four days after such declaration unless,
within that time, the Acting Vice Pr~sident and
a majority of the principal officers of the
.....,.....,,....__~---,~-:-~~-,-~~
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executive departments (or such other body as
Congress may by law provide) transmit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the ·
of the House of Representatives:~ ·a written declaration of their contrary con-:~-~--
clusion. Thereupon Congress shall decide the
issue, assembling within forty-eight hours
-~
- ~~-=~
for that purpose if not in session. · -If the __:..; - _ :-_-: _ :---=-.: ~
Congress within. twenty-one days after receipt :· __ ~ :- ··:
of the latter written declaration, or,· if the-.Congress is not in session within twenty-one
days after Congress is required to assemble,
,. . _
determines by two-thirds vote of each-House ··-.··"
_ that the Acting Vice President ought to .continue .:-:.~:.:.
discharging the powers and duties of Vice Presi~-..:·-::.. :-:dent, he shall continue sn to dischrage them: = -"'" - ·--: :-. . :. ..;_
otherwise his powers and duties as Acting Vice __ --: . _ :_-__
President shall be at an end.

- . --=-==--

-------------------------~----------__,;;~~--------------------------~·

.

Before turning "to questions of implementing such ·a-:-pl:an;:..:--··- -:~:: z: a few further words of explication ~ay be helpful.
MY

•

COMMENTS TRACK THE NUMBERS IN THE TEXT •

• . If both the .President and Vi~e President are dead, neither
this nor the inability provisions of the 25th Amendment
apply, and the Spea~er ta~es over. That argues for the
·speaker's place in this proposal for, should the 25th..
Amendment disabjlity provision be employed on top· of.;
this suggestion, he.would, symetrically, be the Acting
·
President. There may be some small doubt about the availability of that .;equence. The· 2Sth-·Amendment calls for
the participation of the Vice President in relieving .the :.
President and under this scheme there could be a (disabled)
Vice President with the Acting Vice President/Speaker purporting to play the Vice Presidential part.. This varianc~
could be cured by express provision if the new procedure
takes the form of a constitutional amendment, otherwise
I see no remediation other than the application-of good
sense.
2.

This is modeled after the 25th Amendment and, unless paranoia
generated by the possibility of a Cabinet-Congress COUE moves
you, seems sensible for the same reaons as in that measure.

-----
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3. The parenthetical phrase makes sense only in a constitutional amendment and there only to parallel the
25th Amendment.
In either an agreement or a statute
the language should be deleted.
·4. The provisi~n for declaration of death, though odd, is
included to provide for a Vice President to invoke the
disability provision of the 25th Amendment. The difficulty here is that there is a distinct tension with the
President's 25th Amendment right to appoint.a Vice President when the office is vacant. My sop --- and it is little
more than that --- is to insist on consultation. (Text.at (6)).
One must assume that neither the Cabinet nor, if the interjection were contested by th~ President, the Congress would
go along with the Speaker were there some. good reason for
deferral of appointment by the President.~

-

included~

5.

Voluntary action by the Vice President ought to be

6.

I don't suppose that this requirement has.any but a symbolic
import.
Surely in the case of a dead Vice President the
Speaker and the Cabinet would talk with the President before trying to give him an Acting Vice President. The word
"appropriate" is included to permit truncated or even nonextant consultation where it would prove unavailing or ·
impossible.

7.

Since I have not insisted, as the Succession to the Presidency
Ac~ does, that the Speaker resign before becoming Acting Vice
President -- and, perhaps, such provision should be made -it is not clear that there will be a Speaker or Acting Speaker
in the House. Who best will serve as a recepticle .for the
various notices?

8.

This is a much looser standard than the "unable due to death
or inability" by which the Speaker and Cabinet are to make
their decision.
The greater latitude is in recognition that
one may be dealing with a President -- perhaps reinstated after
a period of 25th Amendment disability -- who is now ready to
aoooint a Vice President.
It also seems to me that, given
th~ difficulties of defining inability, i t makes scant different how one verbalizes the basis for what will; in all events,
be a political judgment.
As to the question of mechanics, it strikes me, for reasons
previously stated,· that only a constitutional. arne.ndment will
be effective in establishing such a procedure.
Given the time
required for that step, however, little injury could be done by
first articulating the process in a letter of agreement running
between the Presiden~, Vice President and (though his participation
would not be obligatory) the Speaker.
Such a step could be
integrated with the clarification agreement discussed in Part I.

_, -...------_,...--.
...

--·

~--~~

- - - - - - --· -.....------~~------

FOOTNOTES

----

,..;._

----::.

....1/...:::---The full text of the amendment-=-=j_:.S--a,"ppended:-=- ·-==.:
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S. Rept. 89-66, 89th Cong., 1st _s_ess._,_ (1965) at p.3.
Excepting their respective introduc_tory passages-,· the
House Report {H. Rept. 89-203~ 89~~- Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965)) is identical. Though in the discussion that
follows I cite to the customart historic sources to.
adduce meaning for equivocal language ·in the Amendment,
two cautionary statements are in _ordei".~ The history-~
a· constitutional Amendment properly -includes -the deliberations surrounding the ratificat1onprocess at the state
level as well as that in Congr·es·s .:__ I have not consulted any of that broader history.
Indeed my survey of tne
congressional history has not he.en -exhaustive. My lack
of rigor sterns from my feeling that the questions here
raised will not be resolved in a court but in elevated--·
political circles and in public opinion~ ·

_]_/

111

_!/

id at 7939.
The positioh is further buttressed, albeit·
in a somewhat backhanded fashion, by the comments of·
Rep. Love who had introduced a Resolution which made
explicit the conclusion that the Vice President was to
be in chrage during the challenge period.
Though his
language was not approved by the Committee, he indicated,
on the floor, that he read the language adopted.as reaching the same result.
id at 7958-9:
. --· .. - - .
id at 3274.

'(

21

Cong.~Record

3285.
•• 4:1

-

~/

H. Rept. at 3.
This language appears in the intoductory
explanation of Committee amendments and is not present in
the Senate Report.

_]./

The Constitution provides that "congress may be law provide
for the case of ••. inability ••• both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as
President .•• " Art. II, Sec. ·1·, Clause 5.
The word "both"
was seized-on by proponents to argue that a "mere statute"
would not work to provide for succession in the event of a
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Footnotes Continued

of a Presidential disability. (See, e.g., s. Rept. at-· ·8-9). This literal reading would equally debar legislation providing for replacement of a disabled Vice
President. Even more persuasive are the sentiment
expressed during discussion of the 25th Amendment that
a statutory remedy would always be clouded by uncertainty and that matters going so clearly to the legitimacy
of the country's leadership should not be.susceptible to·
congressional alteration.
-~ - . ~
· ·
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PRESIDENTIAL IN ABILITY AND VACANCIES ·IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

FEBRUARY

:\Ir.

BAYII,

10, 1965.-0rdered to be printed

from the Committee on the .Jud.icin.ry, submitted
the following

REPORT
together with

INDIVIDUAL \'JEWS
[To accompany S. J. Res. 1]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the resolutiou (S.J. Iles. i), prnposing au u.111enllmenL Lo Lhe Con::>Litut,ion
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Yice-Presiclen~v nnd to cases 'vhere the President is unable to discharze the po~,·ers and duties of his office, having considered the
same. report.s f:n·nrnbly thereon with amendments and recommends
that the resolution ns amended be agreed to.
A:.IIE::\D:\IE:-;TS

On pn.ge '.2, in line 14, strike "If the President declares in writing"
nn<l insert in lieu thereof: "\Thene-ver the President trnnsmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatins his written clecbrntion".
Oc pn.ge '.2. st,ike the entire text of section 4, and insert in lieu
thereof tl.ie folloYv·ing:
\\henever the Vice President, and a majority of the princiPtcl officers of the executive departments or such other bo<ly
as Con~rnss may by hw pronde. trnnsmit to the President
of the Senate :.m<l the Speaker of the House of Representn.ti n~s their written clechtL1tion that the Presillent is un~ble
to disch·c.r~c thQ powers and duties of his office, the Yice
Pre,;~cbnt shall immediately tLssume the powers :incl duties
of the office as ~\.cting President.
:;;:J-f_1lV-G~1

-.
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On pag-e :3, in lines 1 and 2, strike the word "Con- gress" and iusert
in lieu thereof the followiug:
President of the Senate ancl the Speaker of the House of
H.epresentati \·es
On page 3, in line 5, strike the word "heads" and insert in lieu
thereof the following: "principal officers".
On page 3, in line 9, strike the words "will immediately" and insert
in lieu thereof "sh1lll immediately proceed to".
PliRPOSE OF A::\IE);'D)lE:S-TS

•

•

TLe text of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, requires, under
certain contingencies, for a written declaration to be mude by the
President, under section 3, n.nd by the Vice President and principal
officers of the executive depustments under section 4, and by the
President, the Vice President and principal officers of the executirn
departments under section 5. It is the intention of the committee
that for the best interests of the country to be sen-ed, notice by all
parties should be public notice. The committee feels that notice by
transmittal to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of RepresentatiYes guarantees notice to the entire country.
The committee is concerned about the pos:>ibility that such written
declaration might be transmitted during a period in \',-hich Congress
was not in session. In this e\·ent the committee feels that transmittal
f such written declaration to the presiding officers of both Houses,
!le President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repreentati\·es, would be sufficient transmittal under the terms of this
amendment.
It is the opinion of the committee that, under the language of
section 5, Congress i::; cmpowereJ tu reconveue iu sµeciul se::;siou to
consider any disability question arising under this section. Furthermore, under the language of this section, the President of the Senate
and tlie Speaker of the House of Repre::;entati\·e5 would be required
to cull a. special session of the Congres:> to consider the q ue::;tion of
presidential inability wheneYer the President's ability to perform the
pO\Yers and duties of his office are questioned under the terms of
section 5. Ho\Ve\·er, nothing: contained in this proposed amendment
shoulll be construed to limit tile power of the President from exercising
his existin;; constitutional authority to call for a. special session of
the Con2:ress.
It is further understood bv the committee that should the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatfres not be
found in their offices at the time the declarn.tion 'vas transmitted that
transmittal to the office of such presiding officers would suffice for
sufficient notice under the terms of this amendment.
It is the judgment of the committee that the language "principal
officers of the executiYe departments" more adequately com·eys the
intended meaning of sections 4 and 5, that only those members of the
Pre::i<le11t's official Cabinet were to participate in any decision of
cli:>a bi litY referred to under these sections. This hn<rurwe finds
precedent under urticle II, section 2, cbuse 1, of the C~nstitution.
The pcrti11e11 t language there refl.ds as follO\YS:
!te rnay require the Opinion, in i;rritin~, of the principal
OHirer in f'flch of the executii;·e Dep1trtments,
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111 its di::::cussion of the nunifieations of sectio11 5, the committee
t:011:0iclercd it important to add ucl<litional stre::;s to the interpretntiuu
of tm1 que;-;tions ,,·h.ich might arise:
(1 l \Ylw has the powers and duties of the office of the President
while the pru,·isions of section ,j <tre being implemented'?
(2) Cnder wh:tt sense of urgency is Congress required to act in
c11rr::i1!g out pnwision::; of this section?
Under the terms of section 3 n. President who .-oluntarih- transfers
his powers and duties to the Vice President ffi<ty resume th..e::;e powers
and dutie:-> by m1tking a written declaration of his ability to perform
the flO\Hrs and duties of his office and transmitting such cleclarntion
to tbe Presi<lent of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representati,·e::;. This will reduce the reluctirnce of the President to utilize
the nro,-i::;ions of this section in the event he fe;m; it would be difficult
for him to regain his powers r.nd duties once he has voluntarilv
relinquished them.
•
HoweYer, the intent of section 5 is that the Vice President is to
continue to exercise the po\vers and duties of the offica of Acting President until il. determination on the President's inability is made by
Conc;ress. It is also the intention of the eommittee that the Congres~ should act swiftly in mu.king this determination, but with sufficient opportunity to gu.ther whatever e\·idence it determined necessary
to make such a final determination. The language, u.s amended, reads
1ts fullows:
!'hereupon Congress shall immediately proceed to decide the
i:->sue.

It was the opinion of the committee that the words "Thereupon",
"o;lrnll", nncl "immediately" ;vere sufficiently strong to indicate the
necessity for prompt action.
Fr2ccLlt•11cc fur tl1·~ use o[ Ll1e \\'UrLl "inuite<li::i.teh" <!llJ Llie iuLerprC't~"ttion thereof mfLy be fonnd in the use of this.same word, "immediatd\-" in the 12th amendment to the Constitution. In the 12th
:tllll'!idment, in the; eYcnt. no orndidate for President reeeins a
majorit~· of the electoral ,·otes, the House of Representatives "shall
choose i1Hrnedia tely, ". The committee ·,,-as of the opinion that the
s:uHe seme of urgency nttendant to the use of the word "immediatelv"
in the 12th an{emlinent when Congress was in fact decidincr w·ho
\\·ould be the Pre:sident of the united States should be nttend~nt in
proceedin~s in \\·hich the Congress was deciding whether the President
<•f I be C11ited Stat(:'S should he rerno,·ed from his office because of
his in:'..hility tCJ perform the powers and duties thereof.
ThP <.:ommittee is concerned th1:.t cou~ressional action under the
tcr:m of srction 5 should be taken un<ler the greatest sense of urgencY.
IImn' \·er, bemuse c1f t be complexities in \'oh-eel in determining different
type-: of disability. it is felt ttnwise to prescribe any specific time
lirnit:dion to con'.:;ressionnl deliberation thereupon. Indeed. the
t'(J: 11rnittee feels tG·,Lt Congress should be permitt.e<l to collect all
ncccs,;ary c•:iclencP :rnd to participate in the cleb:tte needed to make
a cunsiderecl j ud~men t.
The c\i,,c;u,:oion of the committee m:tde it abnnlbnth- dear that the
pr<H:ecdin~..; in the Con~re:::::; pre;;cribecl in ~ection 5 \\·r.>ulcl be pursued
ur1dn rule,.; prc:-:cribecl, or to he prescribed, by the Co11gres::; itself.
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The purpose of Seuate Joint Resolutiou 1, as amencle<l, is to pro\~ide
for <.:ontinuity in tlie office of tlie Chief Executive [in the e\·ent that
the President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the
office] and further, to pro\ide for the filling of vacancies in the office
of the Vice President whenever such vacancies may occur.
STATEME:-<T

The const.itutional wovisions
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains pro>isions relating to the continuity of the executi'e
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a President. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the Office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5 reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resi~nation or Inability,
both of the President and Yice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Coustitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
vu Style. ~/hen th~s po1tion cf the C0nstituti()!l ':(Tf!.S s11bmit.tecJ t.o
that Committee it rea<l as follows:
In case of his (the Presidenfs) remornl as aforesaid,
death, al>sence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
pmvers of duties of his office, the Yice President shall exercise those powers and cluties until a not her President be
chosen. or until the inability of the President be removed.
The· Leffi5lature maY dechre by b,w v.-11at officer of the
United SDttes shall act. as President, in case of the death,
resi~nation. or disal.>i lity of the President and Yice President:
n.n<l~ such o.flicer slrnJl act accordin~:lY. until such disabilitv
be removed, or a President shall be· ~lecte<l.
·
\YL..ile the Committee on Stvle was giv-en no authoritv to change the
substance of prior <letermin:1tions of ~the Com·ention, ·it is clear that
this portion of the elm.ft \Yllich that Committee ultimately submitted
\'>:::1s a considern.ble altemtion of the proposal which the Committee
bad recei ve<l.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the pro,·isions as they relate to inabilit:r.
As a mnttcr of Llet, tbe records of the Convention cont:i.in onl!- one
!lpparcnt reference to the :~spects of this clause which cleal \\ith the
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question of disability. It was 1fr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 17S7, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disabilitv" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farra!'ld, "Record:; of-the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convention
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice President John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United States.
While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator
William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognized
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, 1fay 31June 1, 1841).
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on se\·en
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
oolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this
anner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a
Dl'el:'edent. t.h~.t., in one of the contingenci.e~ under ~xt.ide IJ. $t?Cti.on J.
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of th~
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation. removal from office, or
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
same shall devoh·e on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, lil;:ewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, .North American Review,"
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)
The Tyler precedent, therefore, has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the Junctions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
\\?here both the President and Vice President are incup,1ble of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare \vhat officer
shall <LCt fl.S President "until the disabilitv is removed."
These considerations a.ppfl.rently moved persons such as Daniel
\"Yebster, \\·ho w:1::; Secretary of State 'vhen Tyler took office ns President, to declare that the powers of the office are insepa.rnble from the
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office itself n.ncl that a recovered President could not displace n Vice
Pre:;iclcnt who h~Ld assumed the prerogati\·c::; of the Presiclencv. This
interpretn.tion gains support by imi)licMion from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5 of the Constitution which provides thu.t:
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also n.
President pro tempore, in tile absence of the Vice President,
or when he sh.i.11 exercise the office of President of the united
Stt1tes. [Italic snpplierl.)
The doubt engendered by precedent 'vas so strong that on two
occasions in the historv of the united States it has contributed mnteriallv to the failure of Vi.ce Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of the:;e occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during v,·hich he
performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive dep.-1.rtrnent at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. Commissions v..-ere to be issued to officers of the
united States. The foreign relation::; of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail fraud:; involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet onl:.· such business a.s could be disposed of by the
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision,
wrrs handled. Yice President .Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the clay wns divided upon the ability of the President to
re::;nme the du ties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler a.nd Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidenti:.1.l Inability, Korth .:\.merican Review,"
'.'ol.1:33, pp. ·il7-44fi (18Sl)-)
The <li\·ision of leg;tl authority on this question apparently extended
t(i the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notubly the l\ew York
Herald, the :\" ew York Tribune, and the l\ ew York Times contnin
accounts stating- tb.11.t the Cabinet considered the question of the
ad\·isability of the Yice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Yice President .. This group reportedly
included the then Attornev General of the Umted St.-1.te:>. :\Ir. \VaYne
:\IacVettzh. .:\.11 cif G:1.rfielcl's c.1binet were of the ,-iew that it would
he cle:;irable for the Yice President to act but since thev could not.
as:ree upon the :ibility of the Pre::;iclent to resume his· office upon
recovery, and heca.u:;e the President's condition pre-;entecl them from
presenting: the issue to him directly the matter wus dropped.
It wa::; nnt until Pre:::ident \Voodrow \Vibon suffered :t severe stroke
in Hl19 that the matter became one of pressing urgencr :-tguin. This
cbntu!le to Pre~iclent \Vibon·s health came at a time when the struggle
cunc:crnin~ the po:::ition of the united States in tl1e Leitgue of Katl"r)ns
was at it:; height. ;,Ltjor matters of foreign policy such as the Shantung :Settlement were unre:;uh-ed. The British .:\mb:1.ssuclor spent
4 month::; in 1.Yashinc:ton \\"it hnu t being recei nd h;.· the President.
TwPntY-e\c;ht :1cts o( Congrc:-;,.; became' law without tbe Prc:siclent's
si:::nri.tt!re -(Lincls~lY H.o'.!ers. "Presidenti:Ll Inahilit:.·, the Rc\·iew,"
:.lay S, 19:20: reprinted in 1\J.:iS hcn.rin~s before Senate ~)ubcommittee
on Con:::t it 11 tion:tl .:\tnendmen ts, pp. 202-~:\ii). The l'rcsiden t's
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wif c :lllll :l ~roup of White House ussoci<ttes acted :b a screeningbo:1rd on decisions \Yhich could Ge submitted to the Pre:;ident without
impairment of his he,1lth. (See Edith Bolling \Vibon, ":'-.I,- :'-.Iemoirs,"
pp. :2~S-2DO; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White House," pp.
105-lOG; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
A::: in lSS 1, the C,1binet considered the ad Yi:mbility of asking tb.e
Yice "Pre,;ident to act as President. This time, there \Yas consider:tble
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
of tbe President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
of that day that he repro<lched the Secretary of State for suggesting
such n. possibility (,Joseph P. Tumulty, ''"~Voodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the
Pre:sident caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged clisloyalt:;- to the President (Tumulty, "Woodrow
\Yilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents
im-ol ving the physical he:ilth of the President sernd to focus attention
on the inu bilitY clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in the
Constitution relative to Presidential inability, and he attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with Vice
President l\i.xon. The ri.greement provided:
1. In the event. of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President. exercising the powers and duties of the
office until the inabilitv had ended.
2. In the event o( an inability which would prevent the
President from so communic,1ting with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of thG po~,vers r. nd duties of tl1c cffi~e and y~-vald scr7e as
Acting President until the inability h:1d ended.
:). The Pre.3iclent, in either event, would determine when the
inu.bility hacl ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the nuwer,:; and duties of the Office.
President Kennecly entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President J0hnson its did President ,Johnson with Speaker John
.\IcCorm:Lck .rnJ Vice Pre:;iclent Hubert Humphrey. Such informal
agreements c:mnot be co;isidered an adequate solution to the problem
hec:wse: (A) Tb.cir oper;i.tion would differ according to tb.e relationship h3t.,veen the p'.lrtir.nbr holders of the offices; (B) a private
ag;·eemeat c:1nnot gi\'e the Yice President clear authority to discharge powers conferred on the President by the Constitution,
trn;tties, or ~t:ttntes; (C) no provision is m:lde for the situation in
which :t dispute exi,;ts m·er whether or not the Presiclerrt is disti.bled.
Fnr:-ner Attor:i.ev-.,; Gener:ll Brownell <tnd Rogers as well [13 Attornev
General Kenn~'.i.v :1~ree tll.:1t the only definitive methoi to ::;ettle thve
probl~m is by a1e'.rn::> of :1 co:istitutioru,l amea.t.lme!:lt.
THE

~EEO

FOR

CHA~GE

The l1i'it•Jrical re,·iew of the interpret.1tion of article II, section 1,
r:bu,;c 5, su~~esL,; the~ difficulties \\"hich it has already presented.
The bnguag-e of the cl:tuse i:; unclear, it,.; application uncertain. The
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clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or remo...-al from office, with inability, n, contingency
,..,-hich may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination of inability to any indi-vidual or group, nor does it define
inability so that the existence of such a status may be open and
notorious. It lea-ves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails to
define the period during which the Vice President seITes. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives
of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechn.nism for determining whether a President has in fact recovered
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented from
doing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive authority is
more important today than ever before. The concern which has been
mainfested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world:
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presiclencv. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional prov:'ision has not been utilized because
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience
·.ritli the Constitutiou the i.u.r..bility ~buse re!!:!.!1ins an imte:;;te<l provision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF

CHA~GE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enablin~ constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representatives :Madden, Rogers, and :i\Id.rthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, February 26 rmd :Vforch 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has incret\sed in intensity among Con;ressmen and
constitutional scholars who ha-ve considered the presidential inability
problem.
Those who feel that Conzre~s does not have the authoritv to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does no"t support a
rcasonitble inference that Congress is empowered to 10~islate. They
point out that article TI, section 1, cl:lllse 5 of the Constitution authorized Con~ress to pro\-ide by stfltnte for the c:1se \vhere hoth the Presifknt and Vice Prr;;ident arc incap:tble of setTing. By implication
Cun~rcss does not h:n-e the authority to legislate with regard to the
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situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute clea.ling with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause u, which was
enncted by contempornries of the framers of the Con::;titution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of 1farch 1, 1792, 1Stat.239).
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine
inability, or to decide the term <luring which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and aL what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
that article I, section 8, clause IS gives the Congress the authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment isnecessury, and that o. mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
nece;;sary. In addition to the American Bar Association and the
ericun Association of Law Schools, the following organizations
e agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
rrexns, Virgioln.., \ 1ermcnt; ~nd the brr~ ~sscci:::.tic~s cf Dcn~er, CclD.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York;
Pnssaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
1Iilwaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have ~een raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment
which would dis tinctlv enumerate the proceedings for determination·
of the commencement~ and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the Office of the President
While the records of the Consititutional Convention disclosed
little insight OB the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, :f any.
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing
days of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
wns considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
t.he President of the Senate. the Chief Justice and e\en a council of
ad >'isers, us persons who wo,uld direct the executive branch should a
pse of Executive authority come to pass;
S, Itept. GG, Et•-1-'..!
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On September 4, 1787, a Committee of Ele\·en, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which hacl been postponed, recommended that an office of Vice President be created and thut he be
elected with the President by an electornl college. On ~eptember 7,
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency u.n<l the duties to
be performed by the occupant of the office. Although much deliberu.tion ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
thought seems to lrnve been given to the succession of the Vice President to the office of President in case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style of uud arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and
(2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of his
death, resignation, removal, or inability.
While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, the
importance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparent
by article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provision
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stn.ture to the President .
The intent of the Convention, however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest. of 1800, and in 1804 the 12tb nnrnndment. rnodiflPd the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment rernoYed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its ptlssage, coupled with the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appease
disappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in ensuing years to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority and
disparugemen t.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplt1.ted he should entertain.
THE NEED FOR

CHA~GE

The death of President Kennedv and the accession of President
Johnson in 19G3 pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
executi,-e brunch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Si..xteen
times the United States of America has been without a Viee President,
totaling 37 years during our.history.
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As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Com-ention in its
wisdom forc5aw the need to luwe n. qualified and able occupant of the
Yice President'::; office should the President die. They did not,
howe\·er, proYi.de the mechanics \vhereby a. Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerntions which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However,
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many indinduals. We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
The argument that ConO'ress can designate a Vice President bv law
is at best~a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is measured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6 which states thatthe Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disfl.bility be removed, or a President shall be elected.
his is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
and oowers of the office of President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor Vice .President to act.
To stand by ready for the pO\vers and duties of the Presidential
office to deYol ve upon him at the time of death or inability of the
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is dear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
thn.t function \Vhen ~the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has clone so iH each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President
than there is to designating as Pr~sident the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for
which clesignt1.tion there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The :rnswer to that question is "Yes." The Constitution has given
the \~ice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. A..rticle I, section 2, clause 4,
pro ,-ides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and chuse ii provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers
including a "President pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is ven- difficult to argue that a person designated \-ice
Pre:;ident hy Con~ress, or selected 'in any way other than ~by the proced 1.1re;; oullined in amendments 12 and 22 can be, the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of \-ice President
wh~n it becomes ,·acant is tu permit the person next in line to become
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familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serrn on the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential succession law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
designates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations leading to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice-Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure whatever it be.
Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argument
in favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority concerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With this
division in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolute
legitimacy was needed.
ANALYSIS

jnability
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers an<l duties of the said office" dernl ve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inabilitv. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability Is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. ·It separates the provisions relating to inability
from tho~e relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section t, ·clause 5.
Sections 3, 4, and -5 embrace the procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has
heretofore been carried out by informal ugreemen ts between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such ::i.n occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President .
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By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes
clen.r that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the
office" that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the
status of the Vice President during the period when he is dischar(J'in(J'
0
0
the powers and duties of a disabled President.
Section 4 is the first step, of two, that embraces the most difficult
problem of inability-the factual determination of whether or not
inability exists. Under this section, if a President does not declare
that an inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the President is dis!!.bled shall, with the written approval of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of the
powers and duties of the Office as Acting President upon the transmission of such declaration to the Congress.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpM.tlon. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes we shall alwavs be dealing with "reasonable men" at the
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
eeks and balances between the executive, legislative, and ·judicial
anches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
resident, both politically and physically, and presumably most
familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
be w.ude 011ly afte1· udequuLe \;Of1:iulLa.Liou w-iLli medical a.-..pa:rts "ho
were intricatelv familifir with the President's physical and mental
con di ti on.
•
There are many distinguished advocates for a. specially constituted
group in the nature of n. factfin<ling body to determine presidential
inability rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannot
declare his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relatively simple. No need would exist for a special factfinding
body. N" or is a factfinding body necessary if the President can and
does <leclare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
P.round him diner as to whether he does su.ffer from an inability which
he is unwillin(J' to admit, then n. critical dispute exists. But this dispute should n"'ot be determined by a special commission composed of
pers0ns outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of comin"' out with a split decision. What would be the effect,
for example, if ~i commission of seven voted 4 to 3 that the President was fit and able to perform his Office? What power could he
exert durincr the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
chunge of o~e yote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his Office? If the vote were the
other way and the Yice President were installed as Acting President,
what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other wu \" could cause his surrunu1T removal from the exercise
of Prc.oidenti;l powers? If the man acting as President were placed
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in this a,.,,-kwnrd, completely untenable and impotent pos1t10n, the
effect on dome-;tic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
Ho,,·ever, in the interest of providing fie:-..ibility for the future, the
amendment v.-ould authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience.
Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President
to resume the powers and duties of the office upon his transmission
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of his written declaration that no inability existed. However, should the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then
they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties
of the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 clays. Once the declaration of the President stating
no inabilitv exists has been transmitted to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then the issue is
squarely joined. At this point the pr~pos~l recommends that the
Congress shall make the final determmat10n on the e:-..istence of
inability. If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable, then the Vice President continues
as Acting President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner to cast a vote of two-thirds or more i11 both Houses supporting the
position that the President was unable to perform the powers and
duties of his office, then the President would resume the powers and
duties of the office. The recommendation for a vote of two-thirds
is in conformity with the provision of article I, section 3, clause 6, of
the Constitution relating to impeachments.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate originn.l trnnsf er
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the origiuul intent of the [rnmers of the Constitutio1:i itnd wiLh
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vacancies
Section 2 is intended to virtuallv assure us that the N n.tion will
always possess a Vice President. "rt would require n. President to
nominate a person \vho meets the existing constitutional qualifications
to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office as Vice President once he had been
confirme<l by a mu.jority vote in both Huu::;es of the Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it w11s obsernd that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most imoortant
positions in our country. The days are long past when it was. largely
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
For more than u decade the Vice President has borne specific and
important responsibilities in the execm.i,-e branch of Government.
He has come to share and participate in the exe uti,·e functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy, there would be 11P
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Ne,-er has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterrupted
assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B ..Johnson.
·
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It i;:; witltfJut contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person 'vho is compat iblr wit Ii the President. The importance of this compatibility
is rece>;;nized in the mo<lern pructice of both major politic1ll parties
in according the presidential can<li<late a voice in choosing his running
mute subject to convention approval. This proposal would permit
the Presidcr1t to choose his Vice President subject to congressional
nppron1l. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice President of the s;une politicn.l party ns the President, someone who would
presumably i';ork in harmony with the basic policies of the President.
CONCLUSION

This amendment seeks to remove a vexatious constitutional problem from the re.1lm of national concern. It seeks to concisely clarify
the ambiguities of the present provision in the Constitution. In so
doillg. it rec<;gniY.es the vast importance of the office invoked, and the
necessity to maintain continuity of the Executive power of the United
States.
The c:ommittee approved this proposal after its subcommittee heard
testimony aud received written statements from many distinguished
student:> on the subject. Last year the subcommittee also had the
benefit of collsi<lerable study reflected in congressional doclllllen ts
previuusly published on this subject. In the light of all this material
and c\·idence, and for the fact that 7G Senators have sponsored Senate
iint Resolution 1, the committee believes that a serious constitutional
p exists with regard to Presi<lential inability and vacancies in the
ffice of the Vice President, and that the proposal which is now
presented is the best solution to the problem.
REC0:-1:\IENDA TION

The committee, after considering the several proposals now pending
licforc it relating to the matter of Presidential inability, reports favorablv (1!1 Senate .Joint Resolution 1 and recommends its submission to
the' lezislatures of the several States of the United States so that it
may i-;ecorne a part of the Constitution of the United States.
CO:ID!ITTEE .-\:llE:C-·:D:IIENTS TO SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING
0:.11;,;sroxs, NEW :IIATTER AND RETAINED WORDING

The committee amendments to the Senate joint resolution are shown
as follows: ProYisions of the resolution as introduced which are
omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics,
pro \·is ions iu which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
"ArticleSEc. 1. In case of the removal of the President from
uffice or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
l 1~co111e Prcsi<lent.
:)Ee. 2. \Yhcnever there is 11 rncancv in the office of the
\"ice hc:0idcnt the Prcsi<lent shall nomlnftte a Vice President
1
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who shall take office upon confirmn.tion by a majority vote
of both Houses of Con;:i:ress.
SEc. ~{. [If the Prcsi~lent <leclares in writing] lFhenever the
President transmits to the Pres1'dent of the Senate and the
Speaker oj the Hoitse of Representatives ·his 11.m'tten declaration

that he is unable t8 discharge the powers and duties of his
Office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting President.
SEc. 4. [If the Presrdent does not so declare, and the]
lVhenever the Vice President, ['Yith the written concurrence
of] and t1 majority of the [heads] principal officers of the
executive departments or such other body as Concrress may
by law provide, transmit [s] to the [Congress ills]""President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the HCYUse of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to

•

discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
SEc. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the [Congress] President of the Senate and the Speaker of the HO'use of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, \vith the written concurrence of a
majority of the [heads] principal officers of the executive
departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers n.nd duties of his office. Thereupon Congress
[will] shall imm~diately proceed to decide the issue. If the
Uoncrress ~determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses
LWt.~ Lile rres1uenL is uuau1e Lu u1s1:uurge cue powei'~ auu
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to
discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
•1
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INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
SEi\ATOR EVERETT :\IcKIXLEY DIRKSE:\"
\\uen the Congress considers amendments to the Constitution, it
deal:; not with the problems of today, or yesterday, or tomorrow, but
in terms of tue grand sweep of our Nation's history and future. The
Constitution is the basic chu.rter of our Government. It, is appropriate to keep its function separate from the various laws we derive
from it, laws that are designed to meet specific problems as they may
arise. The Constitution must meet the test of time. It can do this
only if it provides the means by which the Congress may meet the
neec.b of the moment, not the solution to specific problems.
The questions of Presidential succession and Presidential inabilitv
are not new to the Senate. It has been v.-restling with them for many
years. Time and again it has tried its hand at contri \"i.ng an amendment to the Constitution to deal with the problems. But each time
when the Senute almost reaches a conclusion as to language for the
amendment it becomes aware that its labors h:.1.ve been so narrowly
irerted to the problems arising out of particular eYents that it hu-s
iled to think and write in the broad fundamental concepts which are
eressarv to a constitutional amendment. And then, because it
realizes the clangers of a job half clone, it does nothing ut ull.
Co11g:re:;s cannot go along that way any further. It must deal with
Llie pruulern::. 0f I'i-t~si<leu tial successi8n ~!:!.d Presid.enfr:i 1 innbil i tv hv a
constitutional amendment. It is necessary that the pertine1{t p-roYision of the Constitution dealing with i;acancy or inability, article
II, section 1, that reads as follows:
In case of the Rcmoni.l of the Pre::;i<lent from Office, or of
his Death, Re:;ignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Dutie:; of the said Office, the ;)ame shall de·rnlve on the
\"ice President, and the Con::rress may by law pro\-ide for the
Case of Remo·n1l, Death, Hesig:nation or Inability, both of
the Pre:-;ident and the Vice President. dec:laring \vhat 0£5.cer
shall then act a::; Pre:;ident. and such Officer sh'RU act fl.ccorcling;l~-, until the Disability be remon<l, or a President shall
he elected.
he ;i.mcndecl to darifr whether the dernlution is of the Office of the
Pre~iclent (ir only o( his po\vers and duties. Presumably it is the
former in the ease of death or resicmation and the latter in c:1se of
inalJilitY. Be that us it rnaY, it l;as been the uncertainty of construction of thi:; bn;;uage that in the past has prevented Y'ice Presidents from assuming autuority during foe periods of c1i:;ability of
VtHiiHb Presidents. l\ext, it is essential that the Constitution prO\-ide
n rnc:rns uf dc:din~ with the other matters ew:omp:1ssecl in ::3enate
,Toit~'. Rl-.~fllnrion l.
But the arnendrnent should not <led with cletaik
Tltr>_,. ran be l1aa<llcd by statute ancl rif,:htly should lJe.
17
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This solution wa::; well bid out before this committee last Year nnd 2
n'1u·::; a<::.·o hv the then Deputy Attorney General of the United States,

\Ir. K;ttzcr1hach. His entire ::;t;i,tement in the 196'.3 hearings, incorpornted ag1tin in the 1964 he1uings, slioulJ be read by enryone who
i~ considering this problem. Let me only emphu::;ize his concluding
thou~hts:

Apart from the \visdom of loading the Constitution down
hy \\Titing detailed procedural and substantive provisions
into it has been ques tionecl by many scholars and statesmen.
The framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom of using
broad and expanding concepts and principles that could be
ndjusted to keep pace with current needs. The changes are
that supplemental legislation would be required in any event.
In addition, crucial and urgent new situations may arise
in the changing future--not covered by Senate Joint Resolution '.28 1-where it may be of importance that Congress,
wi.th the President's approval, should be able to act promptlv
without being required to resort to still another amendment to the Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution 35 1
make:; this possible; Senate Joint Resolution 28 1 cloes not.
~ince it i::; difficult to fore::;ee all of the pos::;ible circumstances in which the Presidential inability problem could
arise, we are oppo:;ed to any constitutional amendment
which attempts to solve all these que:;tions by a series of
complex procedures. YYe think that the best solution to
the basic problems that remain \vould be a sin1ple constitutional amendment, such as Senate Joint Re::;olution 35, 1
which treats the con tingencY of inabilitv diff erentlv from
situations such as death, removal, or resignation: ·which
states that the Yice President in case of Presidential innbilit>- succeeds only to the powers and ciutie:s uf Lue Office
ns Acting President and not to the Office itself, and which
deebres that the commencement and termination of nny
inabilit:.- may be determined by such methods as Congress
by law shall provide. ~uch an amendment would supply
the flexibility which we think is indispensable and, at the
same time, put to rest what legal problems may exist under
the present provisions of the Constitution as supplemented
by prnctice and understanding.
:::en:Hc .foint Resolution 35, referred to by :.Ir. Katzenbach, now
the c\..ttorne': General, ,tml modified in accordance ·.·.ith his suggestions
reads as follows:
'~
.Article--

I
I

I

l

II

111 c:tse of the rerr.ovnl of the President from office or of
his cle,1th or resignution, the said office shall dernh-e on the
\-ice Pre:;ident. in c:tse of the inubilitv of the President to
<lisdwrgc the pmver:; and duties of th e s«id office, the s:1icl
powers and dutie::; shall <lernh-e on the \"ice President as
c\..ctinz President until the inability be remcl\·ed. The Cong-re:;::; 'i11ay by bw pro,·ide for the C1l::ie of rcn10,·al, death,
re:::i~ndion (Ir iwtbility, both of the Prc:;ident :cud Yice
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l'rc,.;idcnl. dcclnrin'.2: wh:1L officer shall tlien be Pre::;ident,
or in C<l:'C of in~ibllitY, <\Ct as Pre::;ident, ancl ~uch officer
,.;\wll be <ir act 11:-: Pr~·.~idcnt acC<)rcling:ly, until a Prc,;ident
shall be elected or. in c1ise of inabilitv, until the ina.bilitv
sha.11 be c;ulier rern~ved. The commericernent and terrniw~
tion of rrnv irrnbilitY m<tY be determined bv such method as
Congreso; shall by l~w p1:0Yicle.
-

•

I, therefore. propose tlrnt we a.dopt us a constitutional amendment
tlii:o proposal -which not only bears the imprimatur of the two <listin~ui,;hecl men who were then :\Iembers of the Senate, Senator Kefauver
ancl Senator !\:ca.ting, but \\·hich wa.s so persua.sively supportecl by the
Atturne,· General. He has confirmed to me that he still holds those
,-ie\Ys. "And in his testimonv this vear he said onlv that he \Voulcl
llCJt iusist on the preference t:e had expressed in the past.
But such a constitutional amendment would be only the beginning.
\Ye must then prepare specific legislation to establis!.i the mechanics
an<l the detaib of Pre:oiclential succession and inabilitv. It coulcl he
i11 much the sume bng-uage <ls that proposed by tlie Senator from
Indiana for :c constitutio:ial amendment.
This course of action has one ad\·antag:e above all others. It
removes the fear that we may embed in the Constitution procedures
which may not turn out to be workable. If they are in a statute we
can change them. If they become u part of the Constitution, it
would t<tkc allother constitutional amendment to chancre them .
Indeed the events of the pnst few dnys have created a'=' presumption
n<l perhaps a C<Jnclusin~ presumption that a constitutional amendment in the form reported will be ill a<l.-ised. fo te,;timony before
the Committee on the .Tudiciur~- of the other body, the Attorney
Ge11er:il ha,; ~-i,·i;>.n f1.1rthi:r indi<'.ntion of doubts he holds about the
acle<1t1;tc\· of
Lrn'.?:ua~te of Senate .Joint Resolution 1. Is section 3
per1i1iltu1g: the Prc;iclent to dechlre his inability if he transmit;; a
declarntion in ·,niting tcJ the Scn11te and the House to be used when
tlic Presiclen t is h:n·in~ a toot ft pulled·: Is it to he use<l when be is
out nf the country on a .-isit to ~Ie::-.ico or to a ::\ATO meeting, or
periiap,.; when lte is in the air at any time? If so, then we hu ve
irnpo,;etl in t!te Constitution :t ve1'>· cumbersome procedure for him
tu t1l!;:e ba<"k liis pcrn·ers <llHl Juties. \Ye have provided the same
meclwnic,.; for an inabilit~· of a few minutes, or a few hours, as we
lian• for long periocl,.; of illness.
Tlien, to(). as hus been suggested by those who ha,-e studied Senate
.ToinL Resohttion 1 in the form repc·ned hy the committee, there n.re
mun.- thinC?:s \\·hich <He not con~red by the detailed lan'.!unze of this
a:1!ei1dme11t which perh:i.ps shc1uld be c~were<l if we are going'into such
detuil it1:;te:1d of ndnpting broad constitutiorrnl hnguu~e wliich can be
applied li~- statHte to sit1tations as they may arise. If one of the purJW;::es nl' tlte :unenclment is to provide to the greatest extent possible
fur the llllin~ of the OHice ,if \"ice President. h<lVe we clone so? n·hat
h:i p1w1i::; if t lie President is d i,.;1t bled for m·any mon tbs a :id t be Yice
Fresiden t :;:::si:m es hi:; pcrn·ero; an cl d ll ties as Acting Pre;.;iden t '? C:rn
lie :1p:ioint :l \"ice Pre~i,_lcnt. or must th;1t Ofli.ce rem:tin empty?
Sure!\· tlH·re is ;ts 111L:<'~l d1a11ce that sume ill lll<LY hef.tll the rnnrt.11
\'\1111 l.3 j.<·tifl~ l'rr~side11t due tu the clis,1bility ot' the i'resiJent <lS there
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would he if he succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the
President. By moving into this area \vith a constitutional amendment contflining such specifics dealing with the one case we may have
foreclosed ourselves from dealing by statute ,.,-ith other parts of the
proLlem. On the other hand the broader language of Senate Joint
Resolution ;),j, 88th Congress, would permit us to deal with this whole
problem by statute.
An<l, let us never forget, that it is often argued that been.use situations of great >ariety and complexity may arise at any time in the
conduct of our foreign relations and in the administration of the laws
which we pass, we ~hould not too tightly or too rigidly control the
exercise of discretion by those who must deal with the problems. But
by writing such specifics into the Constitution as are proposed by
Senate Joint Resolution 1 as reported, \Ve are even more tightly and
more rigidly binding ourselves in dealing with the details of problems
of Presidential succession and inability.
We should certainlv heed the wisdom of the Attornev General when
he testified on the merits of the various proposals last year and the year
before. And ,,-e should give thought to the implications of all the
assumptions the Attorney General felt constrained to make when he
testified this year. Let us see \vhat he said:
First, J assume that in using the phrase "majority vote of
both Houses of Congress" in section 2, and "two-thirds vote
of both Houses" in section 5, what is meant is a majority and
two-thirds Yote, respectively, of those Members in each House
present and Yo ting, a quorum being present. This interpretation would be consistent with longstanding precedent (see,
e.g., iJii~su11ri Pac. R?J. Co. -..-. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919)).
Second, I assume that the procedure established by section
5 for rcstorinz the President to the powers and duties of his
office is applicable only to instances where the .!:'resident Las
been <leclare<l disabled without his consent, as provided in
section 4; and that, where the President lrns voluntarilv
declared himself unn.ble to act, in n.ccorcl:.mce with the procedure established bv section 3. he could restore himself innnedin.tely to the po\\;ers and dt~ties of his office hy declaring in
writing that his inability has ended. The subcommittee mav
,,-id1 to co1:sider \vhether language to insure this interpretation should be added to section 3.
Third, I as:0ume that eYen where disability was established
originally pursuant to section 4, the President could resume
the powers and duties of his Office immediately with the
concurreHce of the Acting Pre::iident, and would not be
obliged t1J await the expiration of the 2-day period
mentinne<l in section 5.
Fourth, I a::;sume that transmission to the Congress of the
written (~eclarations referred to in section 5 would, if Congress
were not then in session, operute to conYene the Congress in
special se;;;;iou so that the mutter could be immediately
resohed. In this regard, section ;) might be construed as
irnpli(•dly requiring the Acting President to conYene a special
scs:::iu11 in order to ruise an issue n.s to the Pre::;ident's inabilitv
pursuant to section 5.
"
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Further in this connection. I a;;sume tlrnt the language used
5ection 5 to the effect that Congress "will immediatelv
decide" the issue means that if a decision were not reached
bv the Congress immediately, the powers and duties of the
Office would renrt to the President. This construction is
rnfficiently doubtful, howeyer, and the term "immediately"
is sufficientlv n.gue, that tile subcommittee may wish to
consider adcling certainty by including more precise language
in section :j or hy taking action looking toward the making
of a.ppropriate provision in the rules of the House and Senate.
In my testimony during the hearings of 1963, I expressed
the view that the specific procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of the President's inability
should not be written into the Constitution, but instead
should be left to Congress so that the Constitution would
not be encumbered by detail.
The fact that we give heed and thought to these suggestions does
not mean that we do nothing about the problem of presidential
succession n.ud disability. Indeed, we must do something. Let us
do it with the sweep of history in our mind and pen rather than the
shackles of specifics.
i11
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Agrrcments cle\ised by the Prl'siden t and his Yice Pre':iiden t in pa:;t
ad111ini::>trations to cope with nn inability crisi:; are not satisfactory
wl11tio11::;. Recent historv has also made us ven· much awt:.re of the
ncPd for filling the Office· of Yice Pre:;iclen t when a "'VU8anc1; arises.
It i::; abundantly clear tlrnt, rather than continue these informal
agreements, the only sound approach is the adoption of a con::;titut io 11al arnenclrn ent.
The hearings, which have been held on this important ::;ubject in
recent. yeurs and in which this Senator has had the opportunity to
p11rticipate, have led me t0 prefer a different approach than the
present one. As in other legislative matters, the finished product
requires the refinement of indi\i<luul prefereP..ces. In the spirit of
thi:-1 simple reality, I shall support the proposed amendment. It is
my earnest. hope that the Congress and the State legislatures will
approve und ratify it promptly. There is, howe\'er, one amendment
which I would urge, as discussed at a later point.
There are two major reasons for my acceptance cf the proposed
amendment.
The first is the urgent need for a solution. Differences of opinion
in Congress have <leprfred us of a solution for for too long. It is
time that these constitutional shortcomings be met.
Secondly, the proposed lan~uage approaches the product which
would have resulted under the proposal which I had urged, so tb.at
thi.~ amendment is acceptable.
N evertheles:-;;; it, is in order to stn.te the \Jases of my earlier µrel'erence anll the preference of three Attorneys General.
The proposed amendment would <li::;tinguish the inability situation
from the three other contingencies of permanent nature; death, resignation, uncl removal frum office, and would recognize that, in the first
instunee, the Yice President becomes Acting President only.
At this point, we encoun tcr the first major difference of opinion.
Some would nth·ocate spelling out the procedure for determining
innhility within the language of the proposed amendment. 1 disagree ''ith the method of locking into the Constitution those procedure,; deemed appropriate today but which, in the li~ht of greater
knowledge and experience may he found wanting tomorrow.
Tlie preferred eourse would be for the amendment to authorize the
Coti.'2:ress to est:!blish an appropriate procedure by bw. This practice
parallels the situation of Presidential succe::;sion, \Vherein the power is
delineated by the Constitution but the detail is left for Liter determinution.
l would abo add one fundamental limitation to the process.
I refer to the doctrine of sep<trution of powers. The m;tintenancc
of the three distinct brnnches of Go,·ernment, eoequ:tl in character,
lrn.'i long hee11 <lcceptecl as one _of tile most important s.1fe~uar<ls for
the prc;;etT•ttior1 of the H.epublic.
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Tlic exeeuti\·e brnurh should cleti>rmine the presence of and termination vf the i1rnhility of the Pre:0ident. It i:0 my view tliitt u method
which would involrn neither the judicial nor the leo·islatin' Lrn.nch of
the Gcfferrnnent would be the better course.
"'
Thi> dcterrninn,tion of Presidenti,11 inahilitv and its termination is
oh,·ioush- ft factu«l matter. Ko policv i:0 "inrnlw<l. TLe issue is
simply \\:hether a specific indi,·ichwl with certain physicn.l, mental, or
emotional impairments possesses the ability to continue as the Chief
Executi\·e or whether hi:; infirmitv is so serious and :;e,·ere as to render
him incupuble of executing the cli1ties of his Office.
Injecting Congress into the factual question of inability does create
a secondary impen.chment procedure, although limited, in which the
conduct of the Pre:0iclent would not be the test.
The impeachment trial of President .Andrew Johnson affords a
clear illustration of the dangers presented when Congress performs u
j udiciul function. The intrigue and interplay within the Congress
during the impeachment trial serves as a warni.ng of dear and present
dangers which exist when Congress is called upon to consider where to
place the mantle of the presidential powers.
An additional compelling argument for restricting this authority
to the executive branch is that this determination must be made \vith
a minimum of delay. Although this objection has been alle\iated in
the present language, the executiv~ bruf!-ch is clearly best equipped to
respond promptly as well as effectively m the face of such a crisis .
Obviously, such a decision must rest on the relevant and reliable
ts regardin~ the President's physical or mental faculties. It must
di»orced from any thoughts of political advantage, personal
•
prejudice, or other extraneous factors. Those possessing such firsthand
infornution about the Chief Execnt.ive, or most accessible to it on a
pcrscn~l basi::i, are founu wilhiu the e.\.ecutive 1Jruuch aml uoL ebewhere.
We must be mindful that the President is chosen by the people
of the entire ?\ation. It is their wish :rnd their riczht thnt he sen·e
as President for the term for which he was chosen. EHrT sen~ible and
sympathetic construction favoring his continued performance of
presidential duties should be accorded him. Indeed, were error to
be committed, it should be in Ln·or of his continuation in office or,
were it interrupted by a di:3ability, by hi:0 resumption of the office at
the earliest possible moment upon recoyery. The members of the
executi\·e branch are best situated to protect that interest.
\Ylt,~t briefly has heen developed is the basis of my \iew tlrn.t
Congress should not be injected into the clecisionmaking proces:; in
C<lSe;; (Jf presiclenti:d inability or recoYery.
Consiclerahle reference hits been made in the discussion of Senate
Joint Resolution 1 to the 7G cosp(Jnsors of the proposed resolution.
Cusponsl)rship of a pmp(Jsal does not rne:m acceptunce of det11il and
the exc<ct. text. I am certnin th11t Ct)Spunsors do not consider themsdves hnund li)- a proposal ns introducecl. Cosponsorship does not
in die ate a desire to proceed \\-i thout !ten rings, delihPra ti on. <lllli amendments in committee us well :1s on the floor of the Senate. Refinements 111;1dc 1i-_· the committee on this rne,1sure illustr,tte tlwt \\·hether
:i prnp(1::;,ll Jins a si11g:le sponsor or 99 cosp<•nsors, it must be ex.tmined
in !~eLiil before it is co11siderccl by the '.:ien:tte v:itli a ,-ie\\- r0 elwnge
t"""'"ln>enl ,,,. ,uh,lilntion.
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The refinements that luwe been made on the original lano-ua()'e of
Senate Joint Resolution 1 v.-ill chi.rify the detailed procedu~e t;-; be
followed in a case of disability.
The role of Congress is n:U'r·ow. It is us an apperrl open to the
President from the decision of the Vice President and the members
of the Cabinet. It \Vill be brought into the matter only in those
limited circumstances where the Vice President, wi.th a majority of
the principal officers of the executive departments, and the President
disagree on the question of inability. It is important to note that
Congress will not have the power to initiate a challenge of the President's ability.
The procedure by which Congress shall act is properly left to later
determination within rules of each branch thereof. A point of possible
conflict is resolved in the understanding that Congress shall act as
separate bodies and within their respective rules.
The language that "* * * Congress shall immediately proceed to
decide the issue" leaves to Congress the determination of \Vhat, in
li()'ht of the circumstances then existing, must be examined in decidin()'
the issue. Thus, the matter will be examined on the evi.dence avail~
able. It is desirable that the matter be examined with a sympathetic
eye toward the President who, after all, is the choice of the electorate.
It is apparent that Senate Joint Resolution 1 does have aspects
which allevi.ate the dangers attendant to a crisis in presidential
inability. Nevertheless, it is felt by this member of the committee
that caution and restraint will be demanded should this inability
measure be called into application.
A time does arrive, however, when we must fill the vacuum. The
points which I have emphasized and previ.ously insisted upon are
important; but havi.ng a solution at this point is more than important,
it is urgent. For thi~ reason, I support Senate Joint Resolution 1
and urge its
passage.
I hope that,•r-it will
be given expeditious approvalr
t..
L
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AMEND~IENT

Section 5 gi,·es the majority of the Cabinet and the Vice President
only 2 days in which to challenge the President's declaration that his
inabilitv has terminated.
This 1s not enough time considering the gravi.ty of the situation and
the circumstances which might exist.
·
In the discharge of their duties, members of the Cabinet often travel
wi<lelv. There are also long periods of time in which thev ma\· not
have ·had an opportunity to observe and vi.sit with the Presl.dent. so as
to judze whether he has recovered sufficiently to resume hi.B duties.
Such periods of inaccessibility might even be longer, in the event of the
President's illness.
The '.2-clay period should be extended to properly allow for these
factors. I urge amendment of this point to pro>ide additional time.
Ro:-.rAx L. HRUSKA.
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PRESIDENTIAL I~ ABILITY AND V.ACANCIES IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDEXT

M.u:cH 24, 1965.-Referred-to the House C:i.lendar sncl ordered to be printed

1fr. :McCULLOCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted
the following

REPORT
[To accompany H.J. Res. l]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the joint
resolution (H.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United Stn.tes relatmg to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of bis office, having considered the same,
report fo:rnr,1.bly thereon with an amendment e.nd recommend that
the joint resolution do pass.
The nmendment is as follows:·
·
Strike all after the enacting_ clause and insert in lieu thereof the
following:
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution
of the united States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of
the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States nit.bin seven ye.:i.rs from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"Article -

his

"~EcTJON 1. In case of the removal of the Pre;;ident from office or of
death
re~:i:;n::ition, the Yice President shall become President.
"SF.c. 2. '";"henevcr there is a \"acruJcy in the office of the Vice President, the
Prcsic!cn t sh::ill no!nir.ate a Yice President v.·ho shall take office upon confirmation
by ::i majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
·
"Si:c. 3. '\Vbenever the Presid~ot transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Sen:i.te anci the Speaker of the House of Representatives his v.Titten declaration tlJ.:J.t he is uo:i.ble to dischar;e the power;;; and duties of his office, and until
he trar:~mits a written decl:i.ration to the contrary, such powers and duties slui.ll
be discharged by the Vice President as Actiilg Pre:;ident.
"Si:c. 4. WheneYcr the Vice President :rnd a majority of the principal officers
of the e~:ccutive departments, or such other bo•Jy as Congress may by law pro\·ide, trJ.nsmit to the President pro tcmpore of the Senate and the $peaker of
the House of P.cpresent:i.tiYes their writtt.:!n drclaration that the President is
un~ble to di~charge the po..,·ers and cluties of hi3 office, the Vice Pre:;ident shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President..

or
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"There:ifter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Reprcsentath"es his written declaration that no inability exists, he shnll resume the powers and duties of his office
unle~s the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive
departments, or such other body as Congre:ss may by law proYide, transmit within
two days to the Pn:;iident pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
Hou:;e of Representatives their written decl:lrntion that the President is unable
to disch!ll'ge the po~vers aod duties of his office. Thereupon Congress ~hall decide
the issue, immediately assembling for that purpose it not in seosion. I! the Conwrss, within ten days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice
Prcsidt:nt and a majority of the principal officers of the e:o1:ecutive departments,
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, detennioes by two-thirds
vote of both Hou.ses that the President is unable to dischar:;;e the powers and
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to di:;cnarge the same as
Acting Presirleut; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and duties
of bis office."
PURPOSE OF THE.AMENDMENT

The principal purpose of the amendment is to distinguish between
inability voluntaril;Y declared by the President himself and ino.bility
declared without his consent. In the former case, the President can
resume his duties by making a simple declaration that the inability has
ceased; in the latter, the measure pro\·ides procedures for promptly
determining the presence or absence of inability '""hen that issue is
present.
The amendment makes no chancres in sections 1 and 2 of the constitutional amendment proposed by 'Rouse Joint Resolution 1 as introduced; it does make changes ip. sections 3 and 4 and it eliminates
section 5 by merging the substance of that section with that of
section 4.
The changes made by the amendment in section 3 clarify- the
procedw·e o.nd clarify the consequences when the President hrmself
declares his inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
There are two: First, the amendment indicates the officio.ls to whom
the President's written declaration of inability shn.ll be transmitted,
namely the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. The committee deemed it desiro.ble
to add this specification which wns absent from the joint resolution as
introduced. Second, the amendment makes clear that, in co.se of
such voluntary self-disqualification by the President, the President's
subsequent transmittal to the same officials of a written declaration
to the contrary, i.e., a 'vritten declaration that no inability e.-ci.sts,
terminates the Vice President's exercise of the Presidential powers
and duties, and that the President shall thereupon resume them.
In short, it is the intent of the committee that >oluntary self-disqualification by the President shall be terminated hv the President's
own declaration that no inability exists, without further ado. To
·permit the Vice Presid.ent ai:id the Cabinet. to cbRllenge such _!ill
assertion of recovery might discourn~e a President from voluntarily
relinquishing his powers in cnse of illness. The right of challenge
would be resen·ed for cases in "'hich the Vice President and Cabinet,
without the President's consent, had found him unRble to discharge
his powers nncl duties.
Sections 4 and 5 of the amendment proposed by House Joint Resolution 1, n.s introduced, dealt resl'ectively with the de>olution upon
the Vice President, as Actin~ President, of the President's powers and
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dnties pnrsunnt to n dednrntion of his innbility mnde by the Vice
Presi<lent nnd other officials, nnd mth the procedure upon subsequent
declarn lion by the President thnt no inllbility exists.
The amendment places the substnnce of former section 5 into section
4, in order to emphasize the commiLtee's intent thnt the procedure
prav'i<lt>d by former section 5 relates only to cnses in which Presidential
mnbility hn.s Leen <lechred by others thun the President. Two i<lenticnl chnnges n.re made in former sections 4 and 5. First, the term
" rincioRl officers of the executive de 11rtments" is substituted for the
term ' en so
e executive e 11r
o ma e it c earer t n.t o
a ID et rnn - s oul art1c1 a em e ec s10n e.s ow e er
re:::1~.ent1a ma
i v
_· c::
The su stitu ec nngunge ollows more
closely a.rttc e II, section 2, of the Constitution, which provides that
t.he President mu.y reqci,re the opinion in light "of the principal officers
in ench of the executive departments * • *." The intent of the committee is that the Presidential appointees\yho direct th 10 execut1'
ep::i.nmen name in 5
v
artment
n s n
, wou part1 -pa e, w1 .
e 'ice res1 en , m aetermmmg ma'6ility. · In case of the death, resignation, nbseoce, or sickness of the beRd of any executive department, the acting head of the
depa.rtment would be authorized to participate in a pr~sidentia.l
innLility determination.
:
The second change made in former sections 4 nnd 5 is to sJ>_ecify
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Rcpresentntives ns the congressionnl officials to whom declaration
concerning Presidential inability shall be transmitted, as is done in
section 3.
TLe language of former section 5 of Hou.;e Joint Resolution 1 is
furthe1· amended to make clear that if Congress is not in session a.t
the time of receipt by the President pro tempore of the Senate a.nd
the Spe:i.ker of the House of Representatives of a written declaration
by the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments contradicting n. Presidential declaration tha.t
no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble for the purpose of deciding: the i55ue. Fionlly, the langun.ge of former section 5
is further nmeoded by providing thnt in such event the President shall
resu:ne the powers and duties of his office unless the Congress within
10 d:::.ys after receipt o{ such declarntion of Presidential inability dedetermines by two-thirds vote of bot.h Houses that the President is in
fact unable to discharge the powers n.nd duties of bis office.
The corrunittee deems it essential in the interest of stability of
go\·ernment to limit to t.he smn.llest possible period the time during
which the >itnl issue of the executive power can remain in doubt_
Under the bill, following n Presidential declaration that the disability
preYiomly declared by others no longer exists, a challenge to such
dcd.iration must be ma.de within 2 days of its receipt by the heads of
the Houses of Congress and must be finully determined within the
follomn.~, 10 days. 9tber-ITT.se the Presi~ent, having_d~clared himself
nble, Will re.sume bis powers. an~ ~uties. An u~lun1ted pO\ver in
Con::,-rcss might uffor~ nn irre;;1s~ible temptation to temporize
with respect to restoring the President's powers. In this highly
char:;c<l area there is no room for cquh-ocntion or delay.
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For ils report herein the committee adopts in substn.ntin.l measure
the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to nccompnny
Senate Joint Re.solution 1, namely, Senate Report ~o. 66, 8!}th Congress, 1st session:
The constitutional provisions
The Constitution of the United Stn.tes, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the Executive
power s.t times of deR.th, resignation, innbility, or removal of a President. No replacement prov-ision is made in the Constitution where a
vncimcy occurs in the office of the Vice President. _.Uticle II, section
1, clause 5, reads as _follows:
In Case of the Remova.i of the President. from Office, or
at bis Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the ·
PO\vers nod Duties of the said Office, the SA.me shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability r
both of the President and Vice President; decl11ring what
Officer shill then a.ct as President, nnd such Officer shall net
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutiona.l Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
·
In cn.se of his (the President's)· removal as aforesaid,
dee.th, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may decbre by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the des.th,
resicna.tion, or disability of the President and Vice President;
anl' such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be remo>ed, or a President shall be elected.
\Vhile the Committee on Style was given no authority to change
the substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear
that this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately
submitted \Vas a. considerable alteration of the proposal which the
Committee bud received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
.
. The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain :my
explicit interpreto.tion of the provisions as they relate to inability.
As a m:.i.tter of foct, the records of the Convention conto.in only one
appn.rent reference to the aspects of this clo.use which deal with the
question of clis::i.bility. It was 1\fr. John Dickinson, of Del::i.wn.re, who,
on August '27, 1787, nsked:
Wbnt is the extent of the term "disability" o.nd who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Con,·ention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
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The question is not nnswered so fu1· as the records of the Con'\'ention
disclose.
It '\\n.s not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution wns called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that yenr President William Henry Ha.rrison died, 1md Yice President John T·der faced the determina.tion as to whether, under this
proYis!on of the Constitution, he must ser~e ns ActinO' Presicent or
whether he becnme the President of the 'United States. '\tice President
Tyler ga. ,.e answer by taking the on th n.s President of the United States.
While this e~oked some protest nt the time, noticeably that of Sens.tor
Willi.11n Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was b.ter recognized
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol.· 10, pp. 3-5, May 31Jnne 1, 1841).
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Yice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roo.se\o·elt,
Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson nll became President in this
manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have serred to establish a
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
cln.use 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
.
· The clause \vhich I?rovicles for succession in cnse of death also
applies to succession m case of resignation, removal from office. or
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President." •
Thus it is said that whatever deYolves upon the Yice President
upon death of the President, likewise devokes upon him by reason of
the resignntion, inability, or removal from office of the President.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability," North .American Re·dew,
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)
The Tyler precedent, therefore, has serred to cause doubt on the
abilitv of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office· upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later beeame president
oi Yale Uninrsity, found further basis for this argument in the fe.ct
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and
dntie,;; of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon reco,·ery.
\lbere both the President and Vice President are incapable of serring,
t.be Constitution grn.nts Con~ess the power to declare what officer
sbP..11 act 21s President "until tne disabilitv is removed."
These consiclerntions apparently moved persons such as ,;Danii:J
"IT'ebster, \Vho was Secretn.ry of State when Tyler took office as PreSJ.dent, to <lecbre that the powers of the ofilce a.re inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a "\''ice
Pn·sident "Who had assumed the prerognti.-es of the Presidency. This
internretntion gains support by implication from the language of
artide I, section 3, cll:!.use 5, of the Constitution which pro>i<les that:
The Senn t e sb!!.ll clrnse their other Officers, nr.d also a
President pro tempore, in the nbsence of the Vice President,
or when he sb!lll exercise the office of President of the United
Stutes. [Italic supplied.]
·
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The doubt engendered by precedent wn.s so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United Stutes it hu.s contributed materinlly to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President wus disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of nn n.ssa.ssin's
bulle.t. President Garfield lingered for some SO days dwin~ which he
performed but one official net, the signing of an e:ll.-tradit1on paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
e:xecuti>e department 11.t that time \Vbich requll-ed the n.ttention of a
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United Stn.tes. The foreign relntions of this Nation required n.ttention.
There was evidenc~ of mail frnuds involving officialS of the Federal
Go,ernment. Yet only such business ns could be disposed of by the
heads of Go,·ernment deJ?artments, without Presidential supervision,
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
<?Pinion of the dny was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler, and Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North .American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this que:;tion n.pparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that dayJ ·not.ably the New York
Hern.Id, the New York Tribune, and the N e\v York Times contain
accountS stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President n.cting during the period of the
President's incapncity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion thn.t there coul~ be no temporary deyolution
of Pre::;idcntial power on the Vice President. This group reportedly
includeJ the then Attorney General of the United States, 1-fr. Ws.YJ?.e
1facVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet \vere of the Yiew that it would
be desirable. for the Vice President to a.ct but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition pre'\"ented them from
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. This.
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time ''hen the struggle
concerning the position of the United Stntes in the League of Nations
\\S.s at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such a.s the Shantung Settlement were unresolved. The British -~bassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the President.
T'rnnty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
!:ignature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"..
~·fay s, rn20; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's
,nfe and a group of \Vhite House associates ncted as a screening
bonr<l on decisions which could be submitted to the President 'vithout
irupuirment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "~1y ?\Iemoirs,"
pp. 2SS-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the \\llite House," pp.
105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
A.s in lSSl, the Cabinet considered the n.clnsability of asking the
Vice President to act as Pre.sident. This time, there wn.s considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
to the Pre.sident. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
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of tbnt day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such I\ possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodro\v Wilson as 1 Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate reconry, the
President ca.used the <lispla.cement of the Secretary of Stn.te for
rensous of allege<l disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "W'oodrow
"-ilson ns I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occnsions durinu the Eisenho,ver ndm.inistrn.tion, incidents·
involving the physic::i.l health of the President ser>ed to focus attention
on the inability clause.
·
President Eisenhower becnme concerned about the gap in the.
Constitution relati>e to Presidential inability, n.nd he attempted to
reduce the haznrds by means of an informs.I agreement with Vice
President Ni....:on. The agreement provided:
'
1. In the event of inability the President would, if J>Ossible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President wowd serve
ns Actin~ President, exercisin~ the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had enoed.
.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the·
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him a.ppropriu.te under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting Presi<lent until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the
inability bo.d ended and at that time would resume the full
exerci:;e of the powers and duties of the office.
.
P1·esident Kennedy entered into a similar ugreement with Vice.
President Johnson as <lid President Johnson with Speaker John·
11cCorrunck and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Such informal
agreements cn.nnot be consiclered an adequate solution to the problem
been.use: (A) Their operation ''ould cliffer according to the relation~
ship between the particular holders of the offices; (B) a. private
n;;reement cannot gi>e the Vice President clear authority to dischurge pO\vers conferred on the President by the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for the situation in
~·bich a dispute exists over whet.her or not the President is disabled.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Ro~ers as well as Attorney
General Kennedy agree tha.t the only definit.i>e method t-0 settle the
problem is by means of a. constitutional amendment.
· .
THE

~EED

FOR CH.'\NGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section l;
clause 5, sug;;ests the difficulties which it hns already presented.
The lungnn...,.e of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The'
cl;rn::;e coupfes the contingencies of a. permanent nature such as des.th,
reEignn.tion, or removnl from office, with inability, a contingency
whi<'h may be temporary. It does not clell.rly commit the determin11tion of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define
innLility so that the existence of such n. status may be open and
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice Presi_.
<lent acts during n. period of inn.bility of the President. It fails to
<lcfine the period during which the Vice President serves.· It doe$
not specify that a recovered President mo.y regain the prerogatives
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of his office if he hos relinquished them. It foils to provide any
mechanism for determining whether n. Pre$i<lent hns in fact recovered
from his inubility, nor does it indicate how n. President, who sourht to
recover his prerogatives while still di.sabled, might be preYented from
doing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperu.tive if continuity of E::ecutive power is to be presernd with a minimum of turbulence nt times
when a. President is disabled. Continuity of Executive authority is
more important today thau e\·er before. TLe concern which hns been
manifested on previous or.ca.sions when n. President WilS disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world.
This increased concern hns in turn manifested o.n inteu.si.fied exnmination of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly tra.n:;(er
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
renssurin~. The constitutional provision has not been utilized been.use
its procectures hnve not been clear. After 175 yenrs o( experience
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested pro
vision of uncertain a.pplicntion.
:METHOD OF CH...\;:-:GE

(:.

In previous inst~nces ~n history when this question has a.risen, one
of the mnjor cons1dern.t1ons bas been ''bether Congress could constitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enablin~ constitutional nmendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, wnen the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representn.tives Madden, Rogers, and Mc.Arthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by stn.tute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
wn.s of the opinion that Congress wn.s not authorized to a.ct under the
Constitution, and that un amendment would first hnve to be adopted
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, February 26 and ~larch 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholn.rs who have considered the Presidential inability
problem.
.
Those who feel that Congress does not hn>e the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Consti.tution does not support a.
reusonable inference that Congress is empm>ered to legislate. They
point out that n.rticle II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution authorized Congress to provide by statute for the case \\here both the President and Vice President are incapable of sernng. By implication
Congress does not hn.>e the authority to le&i_slate with regard to the
situation which concerns only n. disabled rresident, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper coustruction, becnuse the first stiltute dealin;; with Presi<len ti.a.I succession under article II, section 1, clnuse 6, "·hich was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of ?-.farch 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
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Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shell
act, or to determine whether nnd o.t what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
tbnt article I, section 8, els.use 18, gives the Congress the authority
to m11ke n.ll la.\VS which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent ye:i.rs, there seems to have been a. strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is necessary, and that a. mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The lo.st three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorne7
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment IS
necessary. In nddition to the American Bar Association and the
American Association of L.e.,,v Schools, the following organizations
hn.ve Rgreed n.n amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona., Arkansn.s, California., Colorado, Connecticut Hawaii,
Indiana., Iowa, Knnsas, Louisiana., Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texns, Virginia., Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
the :qist.rict of Columbia; Dade Cou?ty, Fla.; city of New York;
Passn.1c County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
:Milwaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without. :i.n amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
t.be most critical time-that is, either 'vhen a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to a.dopt an amendment
which "'ould distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the commencement and termination of dis:i.bility.
Filling of vacancies in the office of the President
\\7bile the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the frnmers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevn.iled
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. II he was
needed, what were to be bis official duties, if any.
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing
davs of the Cc,nstitutional Convention. Although such a position
was con>'i<lered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and even a council of
adyisers, ns persons who would direct the executive branch should a
·
lupse of ExecutiYe a.uthority come to pass.
On September 4, 1787, :i Committee of Eleven, selected to deh'berate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recommended that un (lffice of Yice President be created and that he be
e1ectcd with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,
1787, the Com· en tion discussed the Vice-Presidency an<l the duties to
be performed by the uccupant of the Office. Although much deliberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
H. Rept. 203, S9-l-2
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thought.seems to -h~ve be·e~ .gi;~n 'io. the successio~ of th.e Vice President to the office of President in"ca.se of the death of the President..
A committee, desiQ.'!lated to revise the style of and arrang.e the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a <lTaft which for nil practical purposes was to pecome the
Constitution ·of th..:i United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Yi'ce President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
cap?-city _he would. vote .when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing the >Otes of the presidential electors, and
(2) to discharge the. powers. and duties of the President in case of his
death, resignation, removal, or inability.
·
.
.
. 'Whil~. the Constitution does not address itseU in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice·President. as was the case for the President, the
importance of the office in .view of the Convention is made apparent
by article II, section 1, clatise·3. ·.This clause, the original provisio~
for the election.of the President.and the Vice President, made it clear
that it. wii,s designed to insure that the Vice President \Vas a perso~
equal in stature to. the .President. :
. .
. .
..
. The intent Of the.Convention, howe\"er, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguiSh he tween the two votes which article
II, section l_, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
wns made painfully apparent .in the famolis Jefferson-Burr election
contest.of 1800, ·and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
: ...
vot.ing to pre\•ent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment remoYed a serious defect
from. ~he Qo:nstitUtion:,. . · Howeve_r, i.ts passa~, ~oupled with U:1e
growing political pract.ice of nominatm~ Vice Presidents to appease
disappointed factions of the parties, Began a. decline that was in
ensuing yetU"S to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority
and disparagement. ·. . . .. · · . . · .
.
.....
Fortunately, this century saw a. gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency .. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, ·chairman .of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy: for the President. He has in the eyes of Government re~ained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE URGENCY OF AMEND!.tENT
..

The death of P1esident Kennedy and the acces.sion of President
Johnson in 1963 pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
executive branch 'vhen there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen
times the United States of America has been without a Vice President,
totaling 37 years during our history.
As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
'risdom fore.saw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice Pre:sident's office should the President die. They did not,
ho~ever, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions .for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
meant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional
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auiendment are simifar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about President.ialinability provisions. "In bot.h ca.Ses,:
there is some opinion that Congress ha.s authority to act. However,.
t.he nrguments that o.n amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many indi>idua13. '\Ve must not gamble \\;th tbe·constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executi>e branch. TVhen" a.
President or a Vice President of the United State:S°~sumes bis office.:
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
sur.ply the necessary air of legitimacy. · ·· ·: ··· · -··· ·
· ·
: ·.
fhe R.rgument that Congress can designate a. Vice President by law:.·
is A.t best a ''enk one. Th~ power of Congress in this regard is meas-··
ured principally by article II, sectio~ 1; clause. 6,° which states that:-:..;.··.
the Conaress may by la\v provid~ for ·th~'Case.of Rem~val. - ·' .•
Death, ftesignation~ or Inability, both of the President and.
Yice President, declaring what officer shall then act as Presi.,. ., .. _
dent, and such officer. shall act. accordingly, . until. the.:· .··. :.>
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. ... : ... : .:·,. ·~.
This is not in ~pecific terms a power to· declare:what officer shall: be ;
Vice P1·esident. It is a power to declare upon what officer thei "dutiE?S··'and pO\vers of the office of President shall devolve 'vhen there is .
neither President nor Vice President to a.ct.
·• · ',·::.;~ 1 ~
To stand by ready !or the power5 and duties oC the Pre:>"identi&l
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability :of the.'·
President, is the principe.l constitutional function of the Vice Presider.it:'~
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function· when the office of Vice President. is "\"'acant.. Indeed·;
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession. Acts. Should"
there be any more objection to designating· that officer Yice President :
than there is to designating a.s President the Vice President upon .. :
whom devolve the powers and duties of· a deceased President;. for'··
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization? . ·
The answer to that quest.ion is "Yes."-. The Constitution has gi>en ..
the Yic~ President n.n?tJ:er ~uty and sets for.th specific .instructions e.S '.
to who 1S to perform 1t m his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4, ·.
pro·ddes that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 _provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers.
including s. "President. pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice Presi-·:
dent or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is very difficult to argue that a person. designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the procedw·es outlined in amendments 12 and 22, can be the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President
when it bec:omes vu.cant is to permit the person next in line t.o become·
familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to sen-eon the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings nnd take part m other top-le>el discussions
which lend to nn.tional policymal-ing decisions. Those who consider
a lnw o;11fficient to pro\ide for filling a. Vice Presidential Yacancy point
out tliu.t the Constitution says nothing about such duties and t.here is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
•••
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the officer it designates as ne:tt in liue in whatever Presidential succt?,;sing law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held a.t the time of
hi~ designation n.s Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices a.t the same time.
'Vb.en, to all these weaknesses, one adds the !a.ct that no matter
what 111.ws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
designates to act a.s Vice President, the extent to which the President
tiikes him into his confidence or shares with him the delibers.tions leading to executive decisions is to be determined larO'ely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would' seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Yice Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given a.n active role in the procedure whatever it be.
· Finally, as in the·case of inability, the most I?ersuasi~e argument in
favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority concerning the authority of Con!lress to 11.ct on this subject. With this
division in existence it wou1J' seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to. criticism and challenge at a. time when absolute.
legitimacy was needed.
., .
ANALYSIS.

Inability

. .

.

The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a. constitutional amendment for the reasons 'vhich have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. ·The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability IS, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice bv which a.
Vice President has become President upon the death of the l'resident,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relatina to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or remoYnl, thereby eliminating any ambiguity in the language of the present pron.sion in
article II, section 1, clause 5. ·
·
Sections 3 and 4 embrace the procedures for determining the com- ·
mencement and termination of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes .Acting President.
By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes clear
that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the office"
thn.t devoh-e on the Vice President and further clarifies the status of
the Vice President during the period when he is discharging the
powers and duties of a disabled President.
The amendment to section 3 makes certain that in cases in which
a President himself declares his inability, the period of his disability
would be terminated by a simple Presidential notice to both Houses
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of Congress. To permit the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge
such an assertion of recovery might discourage a President Crom \"Olun t:Lrily relinquishing hi~ powers in case of illness. The ri(7ht of challenge would be reser'>ed for cases in which the Vice PX:sident and
the Cabinet, ~;thout the President's consent, bad found him unable·
to discharge his powers and duties.
. ..
Section 4 of the proposed constitutional amendment deals with the '
most difficult problem of inability-the factual determination of
whether or not inability exists. It provides that whene>er the Yice
President and a. majority of the principal officers of the executh·e.
departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, '
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representati•es their .mitten declaration that the·
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately a.Ssume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuit;r in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a possess10n of a. sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a f~eling of r~ponsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against .·
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes we shall alwn.ys be dealing 'vith "reasonable men" at the
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the e."'tecutive, Iegislati>e, and judicial
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
President, both politically and physically, and presumably most
familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision "ould
be ro!!.de only after adequate consultation with medical experts wb,o
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distinguished advocates for a. specially constituted
group in the nature of e. factfindina body to determine presidenti4}
ir:s.bility rather than the Cabinet. ftowever, such a. group would face
mauy dilemmas. II the President is so incapacitated that he cannot
declb.re his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relo.ti>ely simple. No need would exist for a. ~ecial fact-finding
body. Nor is a factfindin~ body necessary if the President can and
does declli.re his O\V1l inability. If, howe>er, the President n.nd those
:~round him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical d.isfute e.."'tists. But this dispute should not be determined by a specie. commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chn.nce of coming out with a srlit decision. What ,.-oulcl be the etfect,
for example, if a commission o seven ..-oted four to three that the President was .fit and able to perform his office? Wbat power could be
exert during the rest of his term \>hen, by common knowledge, a
chan:zc of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet <leny him
the r!'aht to exercise the powers Of his office? If the Yote were the
other ~ay and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
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whnt powers could he e..xert when everyone would know that one vote
the other wny could ca.use his summnry removnl from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President-\vere placed
in this nwkwnrd, completely untenable !lnd impotent position, the
effect on domestic affnirs would be bad enough; the ~ffect on the in-.
terna.tionu.l position of the United States might \Vell be catastrophic.:·
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemed desirable in li~ht of subsequent experience.
The second para.graph of section 4 of the proposed amendment
would permit the President to resume the powers and duties of the•·
office upon his trn.nsmis3ion to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of R~rescntath·es of his m-itten· declaration
that no inability existed. However, should the Vice President and
a majority of the principal officers of the executi•e-depsrtments feel
that the President is unable, then they could preYent the President ·
from resnmincr the powei"S and duties of the office by transmitting
their written declaration so stating to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days;'' Once
the declaration of the President stating no inability exists has been'·
transmitted to the President of the Senate· and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, then the issue is squarely jomed.. ·At this
point the proposal recommends that the Congress shall make ·the·
final determination on the existence of inability. If within 10 days:.i
the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses that the
President is unable, then the Vice President continues as Acting
President. However, should the Congl"ess fail hi any manner to cast·
a. .vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the position .·.
that the President was unable to perform the powers and duties of
his office, then the President would resume after the expiration of
10 clays the powers and duties of the office. The recommendation
for a rnte of two-thirds is in conformity with the provision of article I,
section 3, du.use 6, of the Constitution relating to impeachments.
The committee contempla~s that Yates taken pursuant to the pronsions of the proposed constitutionnl amendment will be conducted
in e.ccorda.nce with the rules of the House and Senate, respectively,
and that record votes may be ta.ken when in conformity with such rules.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vacancies
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always pos3ess a. Vice President. It "Would require a. President to
nominnte a person \vho meets the existing constitutional qualifications
to be Vice President \vhenever a vn.cancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office n.s Vice President once he has been
confirmed by a mn.jority vote in both Houses of the Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was obserred that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important
positions in our country. The days are long pnst when it was largely
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
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For more· t.ha.n o. decade the Vice President hns borne specific and
import.ant responsibilities in the cxecuti•e branch of Government.
He hns come to sb!lre and pRrticipn.te in the executive functioning of
our Government, so thst in the ennt of tr.ngedy there would be no
break in the informed exercise of executive authoritv. Never has
this been more a<lequn.tely exemplified than by the· uninterrupted
assumption·of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
.
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the nssurnnce of a person 'vho is compatible with the President. The importance of this compatability
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political parties
in according the presidential CR.ndidn.te a major voice in choosing his
running mate subject fo convention appro\"'al. This proposal 'vould
permit the President to choose his Vice President subject to congressional approvaL In· this. way the country would be assured of a Vice
President of the same political party as the President, someone who
would presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the
President. . .
· ·· ' ·.
The committee recommends .adoption of the joint resolution as
fl.mended.
·
. ·,

..
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COMMITI'EE AME.~DMEN'TS TO HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTIO~ 1 SHOWING
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER, AND RETAINED WORDl?'lG

··-

The com~ittee am:end~ents to the House joint resolution a.re
shown as follows: Provisions of the resolution a.s introduced which
arc omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in
italic, provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
Article'

t.
I

\{

I

I

i

i

SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
SEc. 2. Whenever there is a. vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a. Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
SEc 3. [If the President declares in writing] TVhenez:er the
President transmits to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate

and the Speaker of the House of Representatius his uTitten ·
dularation that he is unable to discharge the powers and
d11ties of his office, a.nd until he transmits a wriJ;ten declaration
to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by

the Vice President as Acting President.
SEc. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President with the written concurrence of a. majority of the
bc:1ds of the executive departments or such other body as
Co.:igress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his]
W7,wez:er the Vice President and a majority of the principal.
officers of the c:ucutfre departments, or such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President Pro
T£mpore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of RepresrntatiL·es their written declaration tho.t the President is

-
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nnA.ble to discho.rge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice Pr<.'sident shall immediately assume the powen; ·and
duties of the office as Acting President.
[SEc. 5.] Thereafter, when[ever] the President transmits
to the [Congress] PresUle-it Pro Tempore of the Senate and
th.e Speaker of the House oj Representatives his written declaration tho.t no ina.hility exists, he shall resume the powers and
duties of bis office unless the Vice President, [with the
written·concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may_b:v law
· provide, transmits within two days to the Congress bis] and
a ma1on"ty of the principal officers o.f the eucuiit e departments, ·
or s-uch other body a.\ Congress may by law pro1 ide, transmit
within two days tn the Pres'i<lent Pro Tempore of the Seno.te and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives tkeir written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall
[unmedia.tely] decide the issue, immediately assembling for , ...
that pttrpose if 1LOt in session. If the Congress, within ten ..
days after the. receipt of the written declaration of th.e Vice '
President and a majority of the principal officers of the eucuti-ce departments, or such other body as Congress may by law
pro-r:ide, determines by two-thirds vote of "Doth Houses that ·. ;
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
snme as Acting President; otherwise the President sbnll
and duties of his office;
resume the powers
. .
.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE
EDWARD HUTCHINSON
House Joint Resolution 1, ns reported, would rntify the Tyler
precedent of succession to the office of President by the Vice President
npon the death of the President; it would provide for filling a. vacancy
in the office of Vice President; and it would incorporate into the
Constitution a <letn.iled procedure for the trn.nsfer of Executive power
from the President to "the Vice President in times of the President's
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
THE TYLER PRECEDENT

No reasonn.ble question any longer exists about the constitutional
succession to the office of President by the Vice President upon the
deilth of the President. Vice President Tyler's claim to the office
as well as its powers and duties, upon the death of President W. H.
Enrrison in 1841, has without exception been asserted ori every
subsequent like occasion. The country would not now accept any
different construction of the constitutional provision, nor would any
difierent construction be warranted. There is no disagreement over
section 1 of House Joint Resolution 1. It makes clear that whenever
a YRcn.ncy in the office of President occurs, whether by removal, death
or resignation, the Vice President will assu.nie the office as well as its
pO\Yers an<l duties.
FILLI!\'G A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL V.\.C.\.::iCY

S2ction 2 of House Joint Resolution 1 would empower and direct
the Pre5ident to nominate a Vice President when that office is vacant,
ancl the citizen so nominated would take office when confirmed by a
m!ljority >ote of both Houses of Congress.
.
·
\\hile it is generally assumed each House would act separately,
the language employed requires a majority vote of both Houses, not
each House, to confirm. If, sometime in the future, pres.sure is brought
to beur for congressional con.firmn.tion in joint convention·, as some
proponents of this meR.sure now ad-vocate, the language of section
2 may be construed to require only n. majority of both Houses combine<l, in thti.t way diluting the vote of Senators. In my opinion,
this pos5ibility would be lessened if the language directed the mn.jority
·rnte in each House instead of a. majority vote of both Houses.
..\ltl.iough the section is silent on the point, it is expected that the
majority Yote required, so long as each House acts separately, is a
m:--.jority of the ,·otes cast in en.ch House, a quorum being present.
There is no requirement for n. record >ote, but one-fifth of those
prl'sent c0uld require it. A secret ballot could not be ordered over
their objections.
I'mcc<lure for confirmation of nominations by the President by
both Houses is unique in our experience. All other appointments nre
17
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submitted only to the Senate, for advice and consent. A good case
could be made for submission of this nominution to the Senate alone.
After all, the sole constitutional duty of the Vice President remains
that of President of the Senate; and \vitbin the purnew of the Constitution, the President, by nominating a Vice President, is choo::;ing
their Presiding_ Officer. Senate approval of his nominee, as in the
case of other Presidential appointments, certainly would huve been
thought sufficient in earlier periods of our history, and may be sufficient
today.
The case for Senate action alone also can be buttressed by an
analogy. In those cases where a Vice Pre::;ident is not elected, because
of a failure of a majority of the electoral .-ote, the Constitution
directs the Senate to elect one from the candidates who received the
two highest numbers.
Finally, in the case for Senate confirmation alone, it may be observed
that our constitutional proce::;ses for the selection of our Presidents
and Vice Presidents are Federal in nature. Presidential electors,
chosen in each State in such manner as the legislature may direct,
meet in their respective States and there cast the votes to which their
State is entitled_ The Senate, too, is a body Federal in nature. Ea.ch
State has an equal vote in the Senate. The Senate represents the
States in our legislative branch. It would be wholly consistent with
the preservation of the Federal structure if the Senate were vested
with power either to elect a Vice President to fill a vacancy, or to
advise and consent to the nomination of the President for that purpose.
Thus far in our history there has been a. vacancv in the office of Vice
President during a part of 16 different terms.- One vacancy was
ca.used by resignation of the Vice President. Seven died in office and
the other eight succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the
President.
On those occasions when the Vice President's office becomes vacant
through removal, death, or resignation, it is possible that some division
in Congress might occur over confirmation of a President's nomination
of a successor. But on those occasions when a >acancy is due to a.
Vice President's succession to the Presidency, and the new President,
so recently a Vice President himself, is called upon to nominate
another, the temper of the country and of the Congress is likely to
be such as to make congressional confirmation of the appointment
pro form.a. Under such circumstances, how meaningful really is the
function of congressional confirmation? The new President might
as well be empowered to appoint a new Vice President outright.
Consider the terrible pressures that will immediately come to bear
on n. newly elevated President to choose a. Vice President. No time
1s speciJied \'rithin which the nomination must be made, but it would
be a mistake to believe the new President could relieve the pressure
by putting the matter off. As soon as he enters the presidential stage,
the new President will see prospective Vice Presidents and their supporters in the wings. In addition to all of the other cures, duties,
ruid responsibilities thrust upon him, he will also have to deal with
those who aspire to the second highest office of the la.ncl-t he largest
plum within his hands.
A better solution to the problem of succession to the office of Vice
President would be to provide thri.t the bolder of some other office in
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the administration should nutomntically succeed to the VicePrcsideucy.
It is ha.rd enough for the country to go through the sad e"'i>erience
of a change of administration at the time of the death of n. President,
''hen the succession i.s automatic. That is the situation now and as
it bus been. Since 1792 there has always Leen a. known successor to
the office of President when there was no Vice President. But upon
the ratification of this proposed n.mendment, there will be an air of
uncertainty, at least for the time during which it takes a new President
to nominate and obtain confirmation of his choice-and this uncertainty will be e:\.-perienced H.t a time when the country can least bear it.
PRESIDE:-iTIAL HV.. BILITY

I'.

House Joint Resolution 1 would incorporate into the Constitution
a detailed procedure for the transfer of Executive power from the
President to the Vice President in times of the President's inability to
discharge the po,vers and duties of his office. Such transfer can occur
mth the President's consent or over his protest. The la~wiage of the
resolution offers no hint that the determination of inability shall be
based on medical or psychiatric evidence. Instead, the determination
will be a political one; and here lies a. danger in the proposal. · .
Words written into the Constitution in the past are now found to
have vested powers to extents and in ways not intended by their
authors. We should be extremely careful, lest we unwittingly pro>ide tools of power we \Vould ourselves oppose.
Do the pronsions of section 4 of this resolution in effect create a.
new way in which a President might be rem"oved from office? Might
it be possible for a Vice President, sometime in the future, to form a
cab:il with ::i. majority of the President's Cabinet nnd size power from
him? Are we, by incorporating these words into the Constitution,
provi<ling the machinery by which the stability of the office of Presi<lcn t might be undermined? All it tn.kes, under section 4, is for the
Vice President and a. majo1ity of the Cabinet to file their written
declaration of the President's inability with the President pro tempore
of the Sene.te and the Speaker of the House, and the \"ice President
becomes Acting President. Then the President, dislo<lged by this
maneuver from his a\vesome powers, is put in the position of having
to win back his position by persuading Congress of his fitness. Here
ag::i.in the decision will be a. political one. There is no suggestion that
medical or psychiatric evidence even be considered. .And, if an
unpopular President should foil to find support among at least a
third of the Sen;ltors und Representath-es m Congress, he would
<:ontinue in name only, shorn of his powers nnd duties. He could
apparently make repeated attempts to regain the powers of his office
until his term e.:<:pires. W' ould these circumstance lend stability to
the country or un<le.rmine it?
On the other band, suppose an unpopular President is upheld by the
Congress ,,;th more than one-third, but less thn.n a ma3ority of the
:'.\1embers sustaining his contention of ability to serre. Is it not
po~sible the sauie cabal might try ago.in? The President would
break it up, iI possible, by changes in his Cu.binet, providing he could
\•:in the advice and consent of the Senate for his new appointees, but
under such circumstancP.s he might not obtain confirmation of his
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Cnbinet chnnges. Would these circumi;tances tend to lend sto.bility
to the Government or undermine it?
Other nssumptions mi~ht be made to illustrate further how the
machinery we no\v offer tne country might sometime be used by meo.
ambitions for power.
We should keep in mind thnt we are fashioning tools i\ hich could
be used to unsettle the stnbilitV" of our Government while we mean to
promote it.
Section 4 is certainly not intended to provide the tools for power to
enl men. Its drafters had in mind an nltogetber different situation.
They suppose an ill Prcsidenthphisically unnble to .$i•e his consent for
the assumption of power by t e \ice President. "Coder these circumstances some alternative to his consent must be <lensed if the Government is to carry -on. Thereafter, when the President bas reco•ered
sufficiently to resume bis duties, or thinks he has, the drafters wnnted
to be sure of machinery whereby he could reco>er his powers from a.
Vice President and Cabinet who might disagree il;th his own assess·
ment of recovery.
·
Supporters of this proposal call the power of public opinion to their
defense and sav a. Vice President nnd Cabinet would not dare seize
power from a President physically and mentally able, nor withhold
power from him once recovered.:- But public opinion can be molded,
and some Presidents in our history haYe been most unpopular in
office, and probably there will be some in the future.
·
There is no definition of inability or disability in the proposed
amendment, nor is there any provision for the definition of this term.
If there has existed an uncerto.inty of con~essional power to define
it under existing constitutional provisions, it is clear Congress will be
without power to define an inability n{ter House Joint Resolution 1
is incorporated into the Constitution.
The proposal ·will leave to the President in section 3, and to the
Yice President and Cabinet majority in section 4, complete power to
treat anv condition or circumstance thev choose as a disability. It is
enn concei ,.u.ble, though I hope not likely, that some President might
declare himself mrnble, and stnte no reason therefor (since no reason is
required by the language) in order to a.void responsibility for some
unpopular act, dernh-ing the powers of his office upon the Vice
President for the t.ime beinu to accomplish that purpose. After
ratificn.tion of House Joint ltesolution 1, the Congress definitely
Cfrnnot define by liiw \vhnt constitutes Presidentiu.l clis11bility. I think
a good cns·e can be made to vest that power of definition in Congress.
Here would be nuother check and balance in our system, built in to
guard against nbuse of power.
It rras suggested in the hearings that the Pre:5ident might declare
bis inabilitv because of absence from the countrV'. It seems unlikely
thn.t he would do so because he would \'1\.nt to go abroad with full
powers of bis office, as Presidents have done in the past. But members
should know that in the minds of some, the language of this proposi;i.l
"\\ill permit n. future President to rclie,·e himself of the burdens of his
office, at will, bv a declaration of inability due to ab;;ence.
The provisions of House Joint Resolution l leave many questions
unresoh--ed. For example, it does not nddress itself to the problem of
what happens if an -~cting Prcsidc11t suff:.:.rs an inability. It ondooks
w
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the possibility of n Presidential inability :lt a time \\'hen there is no
Vice Pre;:;ident., which might occur soon ufter n new President succeeded
to office R.lld before be nominated fL new Vice President. How could
the machinery of sect.ion 4 work then? Under the lnngu1\ge of that
s~ction, it would o.ppear essential tlrnt there be n. Vice President to
trigger t.he machinery of thnt section.
In my opinion it would be better to 'vork out the answers to these
problems R.nd others before submitting this p&oposed amendment for
rntificat.ion. There is no res.I urgency. We no'v hnve a Vice President,
aud an executive understanding between him nnd the President on the
mo.tter of Presidential disability. We should not rush this proposal
on its way until it is as perfect as we co.n make it. These other
problems will rems.in unsoh"ed o.nd those who are concerned about a
certainty of succession and ability mil continue to press for further
amendments.
It \'rul be trngic if we have unWittingly deprh·ed Con~e5s of power
to move into any breach in the structure here being f n.suioned.
Respectfully submitted. . .
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DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENT.A.l'IVE CHARLES :McC.
~1ATHIAS, JR.

·(

I dissent from the views of the majority of the committee with
respect to the grant of power to the President to nominate his heir. I
oppose such power as oeino- in conflict with the basic principles of the
Republic nod the philosopbv of the Constitution which tends to disperse, rnther than to centralize, power.
The Presidency has always been considered an elective office, but it
m.ll not be purely elective ii this amendment is adopted.
The Constitutional Convention, as we know it tbrouah :\fadison's
Journal, woul~ s~ely have reje~ted an app?ip.ted Vic~ cpresident. on
grounds of pnnc1ple a.lone. Modem cond1t1ons, while compelling,.
do not dictate that we a.bandone principle when we provide a modern
method of successiOn.
The Constitution seeks means to interpose legal safe&11ards between
the weakness, the temptations, and the eVil of men nnd tne opportunity
to injure the state. We do the same in private life when we ask an
honest debtor to execute a mortgage or an honorable man to state his
promise or covenant in writing.
By permitting the President to name a. Vice President, House Joint
Resolution 1 operates on the opposite /rinciple, assuming that a.
President ,n.n always be enlightened an disinterested in naming a.
Vice President. While this optimism reflects well on the 20th Century's opinion of itself in contrast to the pragmatic 18th century
estimate of human frailty, it may not be a prudent basis for constitutional law.
Congressional confi.rmnt.ion of a. nee-presidential nominee would be
only a mild check and, in my judgment, would be a mere formality
in a period of national emotional stress. !\fost of us who were hera
in the last dn.rk da.ys of November 1963 would confirm that almost
an-v such request mn.de by President Johnson \Vould have been favorably received by the Congress in our desire to support and stabilize his
n<lministration.
Gh-i.ng the President exclusive power to nominate a Vice President
has been justified by a false analogy to the broad discretion allowed
modern presidential nominees to express a preference for their running
mates. But a presidentin.l nominee and an incumbent President are
verv different men-even if they inha.bit the same :mortal frame-and
the)· may be mo,·ed by very different motives. A President secure
in the "White House will ba•e undergone a metamorphosis from his
earlier self, insecurely and temporarily occupying the presidential
suite at the Blackstone or the 1fark Hopkins during the climax of a
national conYention.
If the presidential nominee really is allowed a personal choice of
ruuninrr mates, be \\ill seek a candidate to complement his own candidacy :nd to strengthen the ticket. He will want an nttractive,
>igorous, and patently able n.ssociate. The electability of the vice22
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presid<>ntinl cau<lido.te is a Corm of accountability for the head of the
tic.kct. By 'my of e."to.mple, recnll the ~robable motins of Senator
John F. Kennedy in choosing Lyndon B. Johnson for his running
m:lte and consider whether the sa.me moth·es would have been decisive
with President John F. Kenuedy.
Furthermore, the analogy used to justify this amendment would
crystllllize contem2orary political custom int.o organic lu.w. Current
prnctice o.t nationtil. political conventions and conventions themselves
a.re the crcR.tures of custom only. Customs C.'\D and should change as
socinl, political a.nd technological changes nffect our way of living.
The Constitution cannot and should not be so fle..xible.
The public todn.y is all too ready to impugn t.he motives of a
President dea.lina with his Vice President. It is hinted that & Presid~nt is cons!a.ntfy .t~mpt~d to relegate the Yice Presiden~ to !" sub~r
dms.t.e role m {>Olitlca:l life. If such mot1'\'"es are credible m daily
('l'o~ernmentnl relations, how much more would they be present in the
~election of nn heir and successor..
Couple this consideration to the provisions of House Joint Resolution l mt.h respect to Presidential inability and the considerations
that might move a President to nominate o. respectable, but pallid,
Vice President. If the heir apparent is to go.in certain powers of
deposition as well as natural succession, a President may indeed hesitate in seeking s. vigorous and aggressive Vice President.. Such &
ds.nO'er would not have escaped e..xam.ination by the framers of the
Con~titution and should be considered by those who propose to
a.mend it.
CHARLES Mee.. MA.THlls, Jr.
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No. 554

PHESJDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Jt;XE

~fr.

CELLER,

20, 1065.-0rdered to be prll!ted

from the committee of conference, submitted the
following

CONFERENCE REPORT
[fo accompany S.J. Re:i. l}

".

Tl1e commit tee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the t\vo
Hon:-:es on the amendment of tbe House to the joint resolution (S.J.
Res. 1) proposiug an amendment to the Comtitution of the United
St<ltc.s reluting to successirm to the Presidency nnd Vice-Presidency
and to <::1scs where the President is unable to di5chnrge the powers
and <l11t~es of his office, h:n·ing met, after full and free conference,
U:l\"e :1~rcccl to recommend and do recommend to their respective
H O\!::cs n.s follow.:;:
Tb'.t the Senate recede from its disagreement to the u.mend.ment of
the Hou:;e and ngree to the sume with Rn n.mendment as follows:
In lieu of the nutter proposed to be inserted by the Honse amendment i;;sert the following:
AR'f'ICLE -

SrcTIO?I" 1. In case oft/;e removal of the Pres1"dentfrom office or of Ms

clf'ltf,. or N:&1.anation. tlie Fice President shall become President.
SEc. 2. Tf"/;cnt~·u th.ac is a racancy in the office of the \."'ice President,
tl,e I're~·iJent shall nolt!inr:!te a Fice President wlto shall tal.:e office upon
co1Jirrnation &ya 11;ujorit~· rnie of both Houses of Congress.
Src. 3. lT"l1t11t !'fi° the l'rfsidtnf tra~ismits to tl,e Pre.~·idutt pro tempore
of t,'lf Srnate and t/,1:. Spwi.-cr of the House o; H€pres:entatfres his u.ritten
dtclaration that /,e is unaUe to (Hsc/,arge the ]Jou;ers C!nd duties of his
njiicc. unrl v;itil Id trollsmits to tl>em a written declarc.tion to the contrary,
.'11c), r,;wus und rhtic., s!1all le discharged &'I/ tl,e F{ce Prcs;°c/ent as Acting

p,.[\.;,h11t.

SE~·. 4. TFliu:1 ;·a tl1e 1:-:ice Prc;sidrnt and a mr:jority of either the princ:j,(!/ ''.f,7.cu;s nf tl, i' e;,.·,'t:ul;rc depurlments or of surf.. othu body as Congress
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may by law prouiM, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable t.o disch.arge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice President shall immediately ossv.me the p01Cers and duties
of the office a.s Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President tran::.mits to the President pro temf.ore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his wntten
declaration that no inability ensts, he shall resnme the 'I!ou;ers and duties
of his o.ifice unless the Vice PresUent and a majority of elther the principal
officers of the executive department or of s11ch other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit 'Within four days to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represent.atives their written
declamtion that the President is unable to ai.scharge the powers and duties
of his o.ifice. Thereupon Co11gress shall decide the i.ss11e, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written
declaration, or, if Congress i.s not in session, within tu;enty-one days
after Congress is required to assemble, determines by tu;o-thirds vote oj
both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise, the Presuunt shall resnme the
powers and duties of his ojjice.
And the House agree to the same.
EM.'i..::>nJEL CELLER,
BYRON G. ROGERS,
J.'i..l\!ES
COR'.\IAN,

c.

•

WILLIAM M. 11cCu-x.Loca:,

RICHARD H. POFF,
Jo.1anagers on the Part of the House.
BrncH E. BA TH, Jr.,
JA~ES

0. EASTLAXD,
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,

Ei."ERETT :i\1. DIRE:SEX,
Ro'.\IAN L. HRUSK..'i..,

Managers on th,e Part of the Senate.

. ...

I\

--

STATEMENT OF THE :\-!ANAGERS ON THE
PART OF THE HOUSE .
The m:rnagers on the part of the House at the conference on the
dis1tgreeing votes of the t\rn Houses on the amendment of the House
to the bill (S.J. Res. 1) proposing o.n amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency o.nd to ca·ses where the President is unable to dischnr~e
the powers and duties of his office, submit the following sto.tement m
explanation of the effect of the action o.greed upon by the conferees
and recommended in the accompanyina conference report:
The House po.ssed House Joint ResoYution 1 and then substituted
the pro>-isions it hs.d adopted by striking out all after the enn.cting
cbuse and insertinq all of its pronsions in Senate Joint Resolution.I.
The Senate insisteo. upon its version and requested a. conference; the
House then o.areed to the conference. The conference report recommends that the Senate recede from its disagreement to the House
amendment and agree to the same with an amendment, the n.mendment being to insert in lieu of the matter inserted by the House
nmendment the matter agreed to by the conferees and that the
House agree thereto.
In substance, the conference report contains subst.o.ntinlly the
langunge of the House !!.me::id.mcnt ';',"itb. & !ew exceptio!ls.
Sections 1 and 2 of the proposed constitutional amendment were not.
in disugreement. Howe,er, in sections 3 n.ncl 4, the SenA.te provided
that the trn.nsmittal of the notification of a President's inability be to
the President of the Senute nnd the Speaker of the House of Representati,·es. The House >ersion pronded tliat the trimsmittnl be to
the President pro t.empore of the Senate and the Speaker of the Honse
of Representnti>es. The conference report provides tho.t the transmittal be to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the Honse of Representatives.
In section 3, the Senate provided that after receipt of the President's
written cleclarn.tion of his ino.bility th::i.t such po,vers and <lnties wonld
then be discha.rged by the Vice President as Acting Presiclent. The
Honse Yersion proYided the so.me pronsion except it adclecl the clnuse
"uncl 1mtil he transmits a \rritten clecbrntion to the contrnry". The
confere;1ce report adopts the House langnage with one minor chnnge
for p;1rposes c•f clarification by adding the phrn.se "to them". me:rnin~
the Pre:;ident pro tempore of the Sennte and the SpeR.ker of the House.
The first paragraph of section 4, ontside of adopting the langna!?e
of the House designating the recipient of the letter of transmittal be
the Pre:;itlent pro tcmpore of the Senate ::i.nd the Speaker of the House
of RPprcsentatives, minor change in language was m:i.de for purpu~es
of rhriflc:>.tion.
In the Seun.te Ycrsion there wus fl specific section; namely, section 5,
<lealing ,,·ith the procedure thn.t when the Presiclent sent to the Congress his written <lecln.r::i.tion tliut he wus no longer clisablecl be could
3
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rc.;11111c the i;wwers :111<l duties of his office unless the Vice President
nnd a mnjunty of the principal officers of the executh·e depnrtments,
or such other body ns the Congre::;s might by law pro·dde, transmit
within 7 <lnys to the <lesi~nnte<l officers of the Congress their "°Titten
dcl'hration that the President is unable to <lisclrn.r~e the powers nnd
<l 11 ties of his tiffice. Thereupon, the Congress woulct irnmedintely procet-d to decide the issue. It further proYided thn.t if the Congress
clelennines bv two-thirds vote of both Houses thnt the President is
una hie to dis~hfl.rge the powers nnd duties of bis office, the Vice Presi<lcut would continue to discharge the same us Acting President; otherwise, the President would resume the powers nnd duties of his office.
The House \ersion combined sections 4 and 5 into one section, now
Eection 4. Under the· House Yersion, the Vice President had 2 days
in "·hich to decide whether or not to send n letter stating that he and
n llllijority of the officers of the execufrve departments, or such other
body as Congress mny by lnw pro,;de, thnt the President is unable to
disclrnrge the powers nnd duties of his office. The conference report
pro,ide:'- that the period of time for the transmittal of the letter must
Le within 4 dnys.
Tue Seuute provision did not pro,;de for the conYening of the Congre:::s to decide this issue if it was not in session; the Honse pro'rided
that the Con~rress must convene for this specific purpose of deciding
the issue "·it.bin 48 hours nfter the receipt of the 'nitten .declnration
that the President is still disnbled. · The conference report adopts
the hn~nuge of the House.
The Senate provision pbced no time limitation on the Congress for
clc:Lem1ining whether or not the President. wus still disabled. The
Ho11sc ";"Crsion provided that detc!"r!1ino.ticn by the Cm:!~ess must be
m!lde within 10 d!!.y:> nfter the receipt of the written aeclurution of
the \"ice President :ind n majority of the principal officers of the
excrntive dcpartrn2nts, or such other body :.1.s Con~Tes:; m:Ly by ls.w
pro,·ide. The conference report adopts the principle of limiting the
period of time \\ithin ";hich the Congress must determine the issue,
and while the Honse originnl version 'ms 10 days nnd the Senate
\Cr:'-ion an unlimited period of tirne, the report requires n. fins.I determination inthin 21 dA.ys. The 21-dny period, if the Congress is in
se::sion, nins from the du.te of receipt of the letter. It further pro-rides
that if the Congress is not in session the 21-day period runs from the
time tbnt the Congress con-rnnes .
. ..\ Yote of less thu.n t\\o-thir<ls by either House \\Ould immedi:.1.tely
nuthorize the President to nssume the powers and duties of his office.
E:'IIAXUEL CELLER,
BYRON G. ROGERS,
JA:IIES C. COR:\!A);,
" ... ILLIA:\! ~-f. ::\·fcCULLOCH,
RICHARD H. POFF,

Managers on the Part of the House.
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} HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES {

REPORT

No. 564

PRESIDE;:\TIAL INABILITY Al"\1"D VACANCIES IN
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Ju~E

:\Ir.

C:t:LLER,

30,

1965.-0rd~red

THE

to be printed .

from the co:nmittee or conference, submitted the
following

CONFERENCE REPORT
[To accompany S.J. Res_ 1]

,
I!
.l

l1
'

~

•

··l

1

j

~

1
·.1

The committee of conference on the <lis11greein~ votes of the tw·o
Hou,;e:; on the nmendment of the House to the joint resolution (S.J.
Res. 1) proposing nn n.mendment to the Constitution of the United
~1
·;; rebtrng to succession to the Pre:;idency nud "Vice-Pre:;idency
case::; where the President is unn.b!e to discharge the powers
ties of bis office, ha Ying met, after full nnd free conference,
l11n·e agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respecti\-e
H ou:0e:; ns follov..·s:
That the Senu.te recede fro:n its disagreement to the n.mendment of
the Hc11!-,e n.nd n.gree to the same with nn amendment as follows:
Iii lieu of the mutter prnposed to be inserted by the House amendme!'lt in:::ert the follo\',;ng:
Tl·ai t-':ef,illnu:inr article. is proposul as an amer.dmer.t to tl.e Cr,11stilution. nf thf Cnit.ed E"lates, wl.ich shall be rnlid to all fr.fer.ts and pi.;rpo.~·es
as !!art 1J th' Con ~titutio11 wf.e n ratified by tf.e lef islali:res of three-jot rt/. s
'.J.f the ~uual St,1tes u:itlin seren years frcm ti:e date of its sulmfr5icn
by t1:c C.1n~ ress:

"SECT 10.Y 1.

In '"·"

of th1 :::::,.::Lo; th1 Pu.,id1nt.fTom ojfiCI OT of hU.

1lwth or 1·esiJ11alir>n, the 'Vice Pre1;ident shall become President.
"S£c. 2. 117,er~ecer there is a rccancy in the office of the Vice President,
the Pre~i1lerd shall 11ominale a 1'ice President v:ho shall take office upon
con.fin1<1tirJn by a mc.jori·t!I ro~e of both Hoi;.<es of C'c-ngress.
"SEr. 3. lrJ;.enuer the l'rc,ident trans7flits to the Pre1;ident pro fempore
r,_f tl~e Su1aft and the S11enf..:cr of the House n.f Representatfres his uritten
rlrclurr.tion f/,nt lie i.~ 1rnnble tu discharge the pou·crs and duties of his
1ifjict' . n1:r.1 !llllil he frn11smits lo tl:r:m a v.;riften declaraf1"on to the contran1,
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suc!L po1cers and duties slu1ll be di.;c!Larged by the Vice Pre.si<lenl a.<: .·1ctina
I'n~sident.
·
· · .
·
·
·
"S£c. I,. l Vhenuer lht Vice President a ncl a majority of either the vrfodpal officus of the ereculice departments nr of wch other body a.s C'<mgress
111n;1 by law proi:ide, lran..,mit tu the President pro lt:mpnre of thr Senate
and the Speaker of the HousP. of Representatices their ·u:n"tten declaration
that the Pre.;.;ident is unable to cliscliar~t. the pou.:ers aml du.tie.<s of f.i11
office, the Vice Proident shall immediately assume the powers and dvtie.'l
<d the ofjice as ...::1ctin9 President.
·
.
"Thereafter, v;hen the President transmits to the Pre.:rfrlent pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker o/ the House of Represl!ntatir:es his wriUen
clcclarr..tion that no inability erisl~, he shall resume the powers and dv.ti~
of his office 11nless the ·vice President and a majority of either the principal
. officers of the e.recutii:e department or of such other body as Congress may·
by law ziror:ide, transmit 1uithinf01tr days to the Presi.dent prn tempore of
the Senate and the Spwker of the House of Representatives their written.
cleclara6on that the President is unable lo <lischarge tl.e prrwers and dutie.s
of his office. Thereul'on Cong,.ess shall decide the issu.e, assembling
1.1.;ilhin forty-eight hours for that zrurpos! if not in session. · If the Congress, within. t11;entu-one days after receipt of tlie Zaller written <feclaration,
or, if Congress is not in session, u:ith.in twenty-one clays after C'ongre.ss
is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds rote of both. Houses
that the President is unable to discharge the pou;ers and duties of ki-s
office, the Fice President shall continue to discharge the same as Aeling
President; otheru.,ise, the President shall resume tli.e powers and duties
of his office."
·
And the House ngree to the same.
E:-.tAX GEL CELLER,
BYROx G. RoGEr..s,

J.Dn:s C. ComL-\.X,
\YILLI.UI ::\f. ::'.\fcCuLLOCH,

l

i

t
l

R1cru. no H. PoFF,

BmcR E. B.>.. YH, Jr.,

I

l
1

.

},Janagers on the Part of the House.

0.

EASTL.!SD,
ERYIX, .Jr.,
EYETIETT ).L DIRKSEX,

JA:'-IES

SA~I

J.

Ro::-.r.>..x L. HP.t:5KA,
},fanagers on the Part of the Sen ale.
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STATE:\!E:\T OF THE :\JANAGERS ON THE
PART OF THE HOUSE
The managers on the pnrt of the House at the conferenee on the
clisii.grreing \"Otes of the two Houses on the nmendment of the House
to the bill (S.J. Res. 1) proposing an nmendment to the Constitution
of the United Stntes relating to succession to the Presidency i\nd
-- Yice-Pre.,;idency nnd to c11.:;eo; where.the Pre:;inent i-; unn.ble to clischnr~e
the po\vers nnd <lnties of his office, submit the following statement 10
exphnH.tion of the effect of the nction ngree<l upon by the conferee:>
nnd recommended in the nccomp:rnying conference report: The .!-Iou:;e p:i.sse<l House Joint Re:;olution 1 nnd then substituted
the pro\·isions it hnd ncloptecl by striking out nil after the enacting
chu:se :incl inserting nil of its pro,·isions in Senate Joint Resolution 1.
The Senate insi:;teCl upon its ,·ersion an<l requested n conference; the
·Hou:::e then 11.greed to the conference. The conference report recommends thnt t"he. Se111\le recede from its cfuugreement to the House
nmendment and :i.~ree to the sirn1e with an nmendment, the nmendment being to ins-ert in lieu of the matter inserted by the House
nmeuclment the matter ngreed to by the conferees 1rncl tb-1.t the
Ho1t-:>e ugree thereto .
n sub.:.to.nce, the conference report contains snb'ltantially the
~'ll•t;e of the H01.1se nmenc1ment wit-h fl. few exceptions.
cetio11:s 1 nn<l 2 of the propo:;ecl con:;tiiutiounl nmenclment were not
•
in cfo-,1greement. Ho'.YeYer, in ~ections 3 :i.nd 4, the Sen;1te pro,·ided
thiLt- the transrnittul of the notific:1tion of a President's inability Le to
the Pre,;iclcnt of the Senate nnd the Speaker of the Home of Representati,·es. The House Yersion provided thnt the trnt!~mittal be to
the Pre"iiclent pro ternpore of the Sennte nnd the Speaker of the Hou~e
of Rt:pre:sentati\·es. The conference report pro,·ides thftt the tr1msmitt1il be to the President pro ternpore of the Senate an<l the Spenkcr
of the House of RcpresentatiYes.
·
In ~ection 3, the Sen11.te proYided thut nfter receipt of the President's
\\Tit ten decLm1tio:i of hi:; inability tlui.t such powers and cluties \Vould
the:-i be <liseharged by the Vice President ns Acting Pre::iclent. The
Hume Yersion proYitled the s11.rne proYision except it n.clcled the clnuse
"1111<l until he trnnsmits n. written clechrntion to the contran·". The
conference report adopts the House langunge ·with one minor chunge
for purposes of chrific:ition by adcling the plu·use "to them", me:miug
tlie Prc:-iclent pro tcmpo:·e of the Senute an<l the Speaker of the House.
Tlie fir.:;t p;1.rngr:1.ph of section 4, outside of adopting the b.ngunge
of the Hou~e de:>ignnting the recipient of the letter of trun~mittul be
tl1e Presi(lent pro tempore of the Sennte nn<l the Spell.ker of the House
of Rerre::ienl11ti,·es, minor c-h:.rnge in bngunge wns macle for purposes
of cbrific:-1tion.
In tLe Senate ver:;ion there \\·usu specific section; uamely, section 5,
de;ilin~ ,,·itb the proceclure thnt wl1en the President sent to the Congress lii:s wiitten clecl1u-ntion tlwt he wo.s no longer disabled he could
rc:0ume tlie pO\\-crs ancl duties of his office unless the Vice President.
3
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n1l\I a mnjority of the principnl officers of the e:-i:ecuth·e clepnrtrnents,
or such other body ns the Cougress might by lnw provide, transmit
within 7 <l11ys to the desi9n1\tccl officers of the Congress their written ·
cler:1u·ntion thnt the President is un11ble t.o cliscb11r~e the powers and
duties of his office. ·TI1ereupon, the Congress woulct immediately proceed to decide the issue. It. further provided that if the Congress
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses thnt the President is
unnhle to <lisdrnrge the powers und duties of his office, the Vice Prcsi<l~ut would co~ti.nue to disclrnrge the sH.me as Ac tin~ P:esiden~; other- .
wise, the Pres1<lent would resume the powers and auties of his.office;:_:·..
The House >ersion combined sections 4 nnd 5 into one section, now .;.:.
section 4. Under the House >ersion, the Vice President had 2 days -~: ·
in which to decide whether or not to send a letter stating that he and ..:.,:··
· R majority of the officers of the executive depnrtments, or such othei: --~
bodv us Congress roo.y by 111w provide, thnt the President is unable to .. :·
discb:\rge the powers and duties of his office. ·The conference report· · ·
pro,~de~ that the period of time for the transmittal of the .letter mus.t ·
be w1thm 4 clRys.
·
· ··· · .. ,:, ... , .
The Senate provision did not proYide for the convening of the Con~· . •
gress to decide this issue if it was not in session; the House provided ·
tl11\t the Congre.ss must convene for this specific purpose of deciding
the issue within 48 hours nfter. the receipt of the written declnration
th1\t the President is still disabled.. The conference report adopts
the l11ngunge of the House.
.
·
, ·. ,. .
The Sennte provision plt\ce<l no time Emitation 011 the Congre:>s for
<letenninin~ wheti1er or not the President wns still clisnbled. The
Hou~e Yers'ion provided thnt <letermiu:i.tion by the Con&'re:;s must be
made within 10 dH.ys nfter the receipt of the wTitten d.ecl.\ration of
tl1e Vice Pre::;i<lent a:id n. majority of the pri.ncip11l officers of the
c:-:c·ctttive departments, or such other bo<ly ns Con£Tess mny by bw
pro,·itle. The conference report ndopts the princip1e of limitin~ the
pe1iod of foue within which the Congress must determine the issue,
and while the Hou:;e originRl Yersion was 10 cll\ys and the Sennte
ver~ion n.n unlimited period of time, the report requires n final determin.1tion within 21 cl!\ys. The 21-dfl.y period, if the Congress is in
se"'sion, runs from the <l1\te of receipt of the letter. It further pro\·ides
th11t if the Congress is not in se..;;sion the 21-<lay period nms from the
ti111e that the Cullgres::; con,·enes.
::.
..:\ ,·ote of le::;s than t\Yo-thirds hy either House would immediately
n11tl1urize the Prcsiclent to :tS5ume the powers and duties of his office;
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THE WHITE HOl"SE
W .... SHINGTO)'.;

July 13,

Dear Mr.

1985

Speaker:

I am about to undergo surgery during which time I
will be briefly and temporarily incapable of
discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of
the Office of the President of the United States.
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3
oi the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the
uncertainties of its application to such brief and temporary periods of incapacity.
I do not believe
that the drafters of this Amendment intended its
application to situations such as the instant one •

•

Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing
arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and
not intending to set a precedent binding anyone
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have
determined and it is my intention and direction that
Vice President George Bush shall discharge those
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I
determine that I am able to resume the discharge of
the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office.
May God bless

this

Nation and us all,
S~rely,

~~~~~

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
20515

THE WHITE HOL.SE

July 13,

Dear Mr.

1985

President:

I am about to undergo surgery during which time I
will be briefly and temporarily incapable of
discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of
the Office of the President of the United States.

\.

After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3
of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the
uncertainties of its application to such brief and temporary periods of incapacity.
I do not believe
that the drafters of this Amendment intended its
application to situations such as the instant one.
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing
arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and
not intending to set a precedent binding anyone
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have
determined and it is my intention and direction that
Vice President George Bush shall discharge those
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I
determine that 1 am able to resume the discharge of
the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office.
Mav God bless

this

Nation

and

us

all,

Sin~ely,

~<~~
The

Honorable Strom Thurmond
Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
20510
Preside~t

•

•
THE WHITE HOCSE
WASHl;\;GTOS

July 13,

Dear Mr.

1985

Speaker:

Follo~ing

up on my letter to you of this
date, please be advised I am able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional po~ers
anc duties of the Office of the President of
the Cnited States.
I have infor~ed the Vice
?resident of ~y deter~ination ar.d ~y
res~=ption cf
those po~ers and duties.
c:.;,...ce[(ei
·
--··.
·~~

The Eonorable Ihomas P.
Speaker
Cnited States House a:
~ashington,
D.C.
20515

O'~eil~.

Jr.

Represe~tatives

THE WHITE HOt:SE
WASHISGTOS

July 13,

Dear Hr.

1985

President:

Follo~ing

up on my letter to you of this
date, please be advised I am able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional po~ers
and duties of the Office of the Presider.t of
the United States.
I have infor~ed the Vice
President of my determination and my
resu=ption of those po~ers and duties.
c:: • .

"

"C\~~
T!-:e Eor.crc.ble Strcr:: ';hur:::ond
President ?ro Ter::pore
United States Senate
~ashington, D.C.
20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
~\aD

FROM:

DIANNN A G . HOLLAND CJ.J U

SUBJECT:

July 13, 1985, Letter from the President
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate

With regard to the above referenced letter, the reference to a
long-standing arrangement between the President and the Vice
President is not an agreement that was ever put in writing;
however, Fred Fielding (Counsel to the President) told me that
the President and the Vice President reaffirmed a discussion
that they had after the assassination attempt with regard to
the transfer of power. This reaffirmation was done in·Mr.
Fielding's presence shortly before the July 13 event. He
further indicated that the concern with regard to invoking
Section 3 in 1985 was that the President wanted to ensure that
future Presidents would not be bound by the precedent of invoking Section 3 for such a short period of time. The
explanation was included in the July 13 letter in order to
explain the President's position that he did not want the
situation to set a precedent which could possibly include, for
example, having a tooth removed.

NOT USED

•
THE \\"HITE HOl'SE
WASHI?-:GTOX

January 5, 1987

Dear Mr. Speaker:
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will
be briefly and temporarily incapable of discharging the
Constitutional powers and duties of the Office of the
President of the United States.

•

As I have indicated in the past in similar circumstances,
I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th
Amendment to the Constitution and of the uncertainties
of its application to such brief and temporary periods of
incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this
Amendment intended its application to situations such as
the instant one.
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing arrangement
with Vice President George Bush, and not intending to set
a precedent binding anyone privileged to hold this Office
in the future, I have determined and it is my intention and
direction that Vice President George Bush shall discharge
those powers and duties in my stead commencing with the
administration ofLanesthesia to me in this instance.

~eirice

I shall advise you
President when I determine
that I am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional
powers and duties of this Office.
!\lay God bless this Nation and us all.

Sincerely,

•

The Honorable
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

NOT USED

•
THE WHITE HOL'SE
WASHll"GTON

January 5, 1987

Dear I'vir. President:
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will
be briefly and temporarily incapable of discharging the
Constitutional powers and duties of the Office of the
President of the United States.
As I have indicated in the past in similar circumstances,
I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th
Amendment to the Constitution and of the uncertainties
of its application to such brief and temporary periods of
incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this
Amendment intended its application to situations such as
the instant one.
Nevertheless, consistent with my long-standing arrangement
with Vice President George Bush, and not intending to set
a precedent binding anyone privileged to hold this Office
in the future, I have determined and it is my intention and
direction that Vice President George Bush shall discharge
those powers and duties in my stead commencing with the
administ:i. ation of anesthesia to me in this instance.
4

..

I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine
that I am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional
powers and duties of this Office.
May God bless this Nation and us all.
Sincerely,

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

>
w

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1987

Dear Mr. Speaker:
Following up on my letter to you of this
date, please be advised I am able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional powers
and duties of the Office of the President
of the United States. I have informed the
Vice President of my determination and my
resumption of those powers and duties.
Sincerely,

'.

The Honorable
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

(

NOT USED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1987

Dear Mr. President:
Following up on my letter to you of this
date, please be advised I am able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional powers
and duties of the Office of the President
of the United States. I have informed the
Vice President of my determination and my
resumption of those powers and duties.
Sincerely,

'.

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

•

'

•.

-,
~

,

'

NOT USED
THE WHITE HOL.SE
WASHl!'<GTON

July 31, 1987

Dear Mr. Speaker:
Following up on my lette: )0 you of this
date, please ·b,e advised y~~ able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional powers
and duties of the Office of the President
/
of the United States. I have informed the
Vice President of my, determination and my
resumption of those ~~ers and duties.
·.,

Sin'<:~erely,

"~

'"·
The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

,,"'

II
;

I

w
f-

I

3:
w

NOT USED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1987

Dear Mr.

Pr~ent:

Following up on "my letter to you of this
date, please be a~sed I am able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional powers
and duties of the Ofn~/of the President
of the United States./ !"-have informed the
Vice President of
det~mination and my
resumotion of tho e power~ and duties.
~

~

\.

Sincerely.,

\.
The Honorable John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

w
\J)

:J

0
I

w
I-

I

>

\

\

THE WHITE HOl'.SE
WASHINGTON

NOT USED

Dear Mr. Speaker:

"-,
Following 'op on my letter to ou of July 31,
1987, please ·be advised I
able to resume
the discharge 'of. the Constitutional powers
and duties of the'-Office of the President
of the United States-.. ,, I have informed the
Vice President of my 'Ci~termination and my
resumption of those powers and duties.

I

Sinc:;~ly,

The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

w
(J")

~

0
I

w
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I
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THE WHITE HOl.SE
WASHINGTON

NOT USED

Dear

Mr~
.sident:

Following up n my letter to you of July 31,
1987, please b advised I am able to resume
the discharge
the Constitutional powers
and duties of the Office of the President
of the United Stat
have informed the
Vice President of m determination and my
resumption of t,hos
wers and duties.

ot

I
//

Si

\y,

The Honorable John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

w
(f)

:::>
0
I

w
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~

w
I
I-

NOT USED
THE WHITE HOl:SE
WASHIJ'<GTON

July 31, 1987

Dear Mr. President:
I am about~undergo surgery during which t' e I will
be briefly an temporarily incapable of disc rging the
Constitutional owers and duties of the Of ce of the
President of the '\United States.

indicat~n

s~mfu:r

As I have
the past in
circumstances,
I am mindful of the =ovisions
,
of S,,e'ction 3 of the 25th
Am~ndment. to. the Con tituti?n a~d of the uncert~nties
of 1ts apphcation to sue . brief )Ind temporary periods of
incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this
Amendment intended its ap)µication to situations such as
the instant one.
/ / ·,\
Nevertheless, consistent with rlty long-standing arrangement
with Vice President ~orge Bush, and not intending to set
a precedent binding/ anyone privileged to hold this Office
in the future, I have determined and it is my intention and
direction that Vice President George Bush shall discharge
those powers a?ld duties in my stead \Commencing with the
administratioyof general anesthesia to ..me in this instance.
I

,

I shall a~·'e you and the Vice President when I determine
that I am ble to resume the discharge of the Constitutional
powers
d duties of this Office.
\
\

May God bless this Nation and us all.
Sincerely,

~

0
I

w
r---

The Honorable John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

\

\

~

NOT USED
THE \\'HITE HOl"SE
WASHl,GTO}.;

July 31, 1987

De~.
\

Speaker:

/'

I am about,, to undergo surgery during whiyr( time I will
be briefly
temporarily incapable of discharging the
Constitutional powers and duties of the j)'ffice of the
President of the United States.
/

ard

indic~d

As I have
in the past in ¢milar circumstances,
I am mindful of th~ provisions of Section 3 of the 25th
Amendment to the Constitution artd of the uncertainties
of its application to such brief .Amd temporary periods of
incapacity. I do not b€1ieve that the drafters of this
Amendment intended its \{lpplication to situations such as
the instant one.
\/

•
,.

L

I

\

Nevertheless, consisten~ ·with my long-standing arrangement
with Vice President George Bush, and not intending to set
a precedent binding anyone pnvileged to hold this Office
in the future, I hav.e determined and it is my intention and
direction that Vice ,President George Bush shall discharge
those powers and 'duties in my stead commencing with the ·
administration of/general anesthesia to me in this instance.

:fou

.,..
""':

.....c

I

~

C:l
~

0

c
0
::c

Pre~ident

I shall advise
and the Vice
when I determine
that I am abie to resume the discharge ,of the Constitutional
powers and !duties of this Office.
May God j>less this Nation and us all.

!'
The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Sincerely,

'

'

